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THE WORK OF THE LOUISIANA LEGISLATURE
FOR THE 1976 REGULAR SESSION
A Student Symposium*
INTRODUCTION
"No man's life, liberty, or property are safe while the legislature is in
session."' This aphorism, originally applied to the New York Assembly,
indicates a popular attitude toward the legislative process and at the same
time summarizes the plenary power of the legislature to scrutinize the
fundamental issues touching the lives of all the state's citizens. 2 That
plenitude of power is subject only to state and federal constitutional
limitations. Because the federal constitution serves as a grant of power to the
federal government and reserves all power not so granted to the states, the
state constitution thus becomes the limiting factor on the reserved powers
which are vested in the legislature of the state.' It is because this power
exists and is exercised in almost every area of public and private law that the
annual work of the legislature should be carefully and intelligently
scrutinized by the legal community. The function of this symposium is to
assist the legal community in that task by examining the impact of the 1976
regular session legislation on various areas of law,' by offering an analysis
of the laws enacted, and by suggesting potential problems which might arise
in the administration and litigation of those laws. 5 In addition, those court
* The authors of the Legislative Symposium sections are as follows: Kathleen
A. Manning: Torts, Employment and Labor Law, Insurance; Malcolm S. Murchi-
son: Persons, Successions, Matrimonial Regimes, Property; Judy F. Pierce:Criminal
Law, Civil Procedure, Pretrial Criminal Procedure, Criminal Trial Procedure, Post-
conviction Procedure, Evidence; Randall C. Songy: Expropriation, State and Local
Taxation, State and Local Government, James C Wear: Administrative Law and
Procedure, Security Devices, Trusts and Estate Planning, Corporations, Financial
Institutions.
1. 1 Tucker 249 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1866).
2. Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So. 2d 577 (La. 1975). This principle articulated as a
judicial standard in Hainkel is derived from the Manual for Style and Drafting of the
Louisiana Constitutional Convention, which states "the legislature is empowered to
enact any law not prohibited by the Constitution .... "I Journal of Proceedings of
the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973 at 769.
3. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
4. The format adopted in this symposium is derived from that used in the annual
symposium published in this Review entitled The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts.
5. The large number of Acts adopted by the legislature and limitations of time
and space preclude an examination of all of the laws enacted or a hornbook
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decisions and changes in the constitutional authority of the legislature and
legislative processes having an impact on the legislature will be examined.
LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE
Presiding Officers
The House of Representatives retains its traditional leadership struc-
ture under the Louisiana Constitution of 1974; it continues to elect its
Speaker from among its own membership as it has since 1812.6 However,
prior to the opening of the 1976 session a challenge was raised to the
procedure of electing the presiding officer as provided by the statute enacted
in 1972. 7 The Act in question provided for the election of the Speaker of the
House by secret ballot, an action which would violate the provisions of
Article 11, § 2 of the 1974 Constitution which requires that in "all elections
by persons in representative capacity, voting shall be "viva-voce. 8 The
theory on which this provision is based is that an individual should not be
examination of all of the substantive changes in the law. The following is a statistical
breakdown of the legislature's action:
DISPOSITION OF LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS
1976 REGULAR SESSION a
Passed House Passed Both Died in Signed by Vetoed by
introducedd of Origin Houses Conference Governor Governor
House Bills 1526 566 503 3 485 1810
House Joint
Resolutionsb 17 I 0 0 n/a n/a
Senate Bills 808 315 230 I 225 5#
Senate Joint
Resolutions' 15 t 0 0 n/a n/a
House
Resolutions' 53 391 n/a n/a n/a n/a
House
Concurrent
Resolutions' 270 208 n/a n/a
Senate
Resolutions' 27 23c n/a n/a n/a n/a
Senate
Concurrent
Resolutions' 132 105 n/a n/a
a) Data summarized in this table is taken from disposition tables compiled by the Louisiana Legislative Council and
published in Resume, 1976 Louisiana Legislature, iii-v.
b) Joint Resolutions are instruments which propose amendments to the constitution. They follow the same processes as
bills [La. Const. art. III § 15(A)I. They are also included in the total bill counts for both houses.
c) Resolutions do not require the signature of the governor but are forwarded to him for informational purposes.
d) Introductions include all bills and resolutions including bills and resolutions reported by substitute.
e) Approval of simple resolutions by house of origin constitutes final adoption.
f) Does not include as vetoed House Bill No. 154 [Act No. 171, the General Appropriation Bill. Gubernatorial "line item
veto" utilized 12 times in this bill. Veto sustained. [Suit challenging the constitutionality of the method employed in
those vetoes currently pending sub nom. Henry v. EdwardsJ.
g) All vetoes sustained either in session or by declaration of no necessity for a veto session as provided in La. Const. art.
It, § 20(c).
6. LA. CONST. art. III, § 7(C).
7. LA. R.S. 24:501 (1972).
8. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
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held to account for his vote in elections for public office. But public officials
acting in a public capacity are voting not as individuals, but as representa-
tives of a constituency which has a right to know how they vote. 9 This theory
militates in favor of a policy of public scrutiny and review.
Plaintiff in Roland v. Poynter'0 sought a declaratory judgment on the
constitutionality of the Act and sought an injunction prohibiting the House
from conducting its elections in violation of the constitutionally required
"viva-voce" voting provisions. In the district court the Act properly was
declared unconstitutional but the requested injunction was not granted with
due respect to the doctrine of separation of powers. " Writs were denied in a
memorandum decision.' 
2
The Senate for the first time since 184513 elected its presiding officer
from among its own membership, thus bringing to an end the system
whereby the Lieutenant Governor served as ex officio President of the
Senate. ' 4 This resulted from a change in the Constitution which was meant
to accentuate the notion of the separation of powers by removing the
Lieutenant Governor, a member of the executive branch, from his ex officio
position as a legislative officer.' 
5
Separation of Powers
The problem of separation of powers was confronted by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Guidry v. Roberts6 when a constitutional challenge was
9. STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VERBATIM
TRANSCRIPTS, vol. xx, day 62, pps. 23-50 [hereinafter cited as VERBATIM
TRANSCRIPTS].
10. 330 So. 2d 311 (La. 1976).
11. See decision and judgment in Roland v. Poynter, 19th Judicial District,
Docket No. 190575, cert. denied, 330 So.2d 311 (La. 1976). The Rules of the House
were amended by House Resolution No. 18 to provide for viva-voce election of the
Speaker.
12. LA. CONST. art. V, § 5(D) provides a right of appeal when "a law or ordinance
has been declared unconstitutional ...... After decision in the trial court, defen-
dants asked, in the alternative, for either writs or their appeal of right. The writ denial
was accompanied by a memorandum decision indicating the validity of the district
court decision: "There is no error in the judgment complained of." 330 So. 2d 311
(La. 1976). The Court apparently viewed the application in the alternative as a waiver
of the appeal right.
13. LA. CONST. art. III, § 17 (1812) provided for election of the President of the
Senate from among the members of that body. There was no office of Lieutenant
Governor until the adoption of the Constitution of 1845.
14. LA. CONST. art. III, § 7(C); art. XIV, § 27.
15. VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS at 40-47. That change was one of many designed to
more clearly distinguish the roles and functions of the three branches of government
and to strengthen local government independence. See LA. CONST. art. II, §§ I & 2;
art. IV, § 13; art. V, § 22(B), § 30; art. VI, § 13.
16. 335 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976).
1976]
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raised against the Louisiana Campaign Finance Disclosure Act.' 7 While
Guidry was pending on appeal, the United States Supreme Court rendered a
decision in Buckley v. Valeo"8 declaring the Federal Elections Campaign
Act' 9 unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the separation of powers
provisions of the United States Constitution. 20 A portion of the rationale of
the United States Supreme Court was adopted by Justice Tate in Guidry in a
discussion of unconstitutional encroachments of one branch in a field
reserved to another. 2' In both cases the composition and powers of the
enforcement commissions were at issue though their composition and
powers were a distinguishing feature in the results reached. The federal
commission was composed of both congressional and presidential appoint-
ees who had the authority to pursue violations of the act on their own
initiative, 22 while the Louisiana Campaign Practices Committees, com-
posed exclusively of legislative officers,23 had no power to initiate
actions 24
The United States Supreme Court found nothing offensive to the
constitution in the congressionally dominated committee so long as its
function was restricted to "functions relating to the flow of necessary
information-receipt, dissemination and investigations." 25 Only when the
committee's function moved into the realm of "execution of the laws" did it
violate the constitutional prerogatives of the executive branch .26 Because
the Louisiana commission's primary function was to collect information
and because it had no power to initiate prosecutions, the functions were
sustained as non-violative of the constitutional principle of separation of
powers. 27
While this decision does little to console pure political science notions
of the separation of powers, its ultimate result may be far-reaching in
determining the limits of power in the three branches. The test articulated by
the courts in Buckley and Guidry distinguishes the necessary informational
17. LA. R.S. 18:1481-1493 (1975).
18. 96 S. Ct. 612 (1976).
19. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 608-17.
20. 96 S. Ct. 612, 691.
21. 335 So. 2d 438, 446.
22. 96 S. Ct. at 676.
23. LA. R.S. 18:1482(12). The various committees are composed of some or all of
the following legislative officials: the Clerk of the House of Representatives, the
Secretary of the Senate, the Legislative Auditor, and the Director of the Louisiana
Legislative Council.
24. A discussion of the portion of the Act declared unconstitutional may be
found at note 21, supra.
25. 96 S. Ct. at 691.
26. Id.
27. 335 So. 2d 438, 446.
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functions of each branch of government from those which involve the
exercise of power by each branch. If applied, this test might result in the
declaration of invalidity of a number of laws which proyide for legislative
participation on committees and commissions within the executive
branch. 28 Despite some efforts to finally abolish legislative membership on
various state boards, agencies, and commissions, some vestiges of this
uniquely unitary system of government remain.
Effective Date of Laws
The general effective date of laws passed in the 1976 regular session is
October 1, 197629 but an earlier or later effective date is now permitted by
the constitution. The practice of providing for the immediate effectiveness
of laws is a radical departure from the prior constitutional scheme which
provided for a uniform effective date for laws except in those instances
where there was "the necessity for the immediate passage of [the law]...
certified by the Governor to the Legislature . ... ,30 This rule, relaxed in
the new constitution, has led to the establishment of a new procedure in
which many laws now contain an effective date clause which provides that
the law will be effective on signature by the governor or at the expiration of
the time for his signature if not signed."
This approach in providing effective dates has not been without
difficulty as indicated by Jones v. State of Louisiana.32 Plaintiff did not
qualify for election to a newly created judgeship in the 19th Judicial District
because of the limited time allowed for qualification after the judgeship bill
had been passed by the legislature and signed into law by the Governor. 33
The bill was finally passed by the legislature, enrolled and signed by the
presiding officers of the two houses and signed by the Governor on the same
day, June 30; qualification for the new judgeships was set by the terms of the
Act for the period from July 2 through July 5.34 Jones contended that the Act
violated the provisions of Article 4 of the Civil Code 35 in that it had not been
properly promulgated prior to the opening of qualification period. This
contention was correctly rejected by the Court of Appeal which distin-
guished the effective dates of laws, promulgation as used in Article 4 of the
Code, and the required publication in the official journal of the state. 36
28. See especially LA. R.S. 39:311 (Supp. 1976).
29. LA. CONST. art. III, § 19.
30. LA. CONST. art. III, § 27 (1921).
31. See, e.g., La. Acts 1976, No. 247, § 4 which recites the standard language.
Reference is made to LA. CONST. art. III, § 18.
32. 336 So. 2d 515 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d 59 (La. 1976).
33. La. Acts 1976, No. 46.
34. La. Acts 1976, No. 46, § 16.
35. LA. CIv. CODE art. 4.
36. 336 So. 2d at 61.
19761
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The court, in recognizing the power of the legislature to provide either
an earlier or later effective date for the laws it enacts, confirmed the system
adopted under the provisions of the new constitution but it also highlighted
the inherent weakness of the policy apparently adopted by the legislature .3
While no one would presume to limit the legislature's power to provide for
earlier effective dates by recourse to the provisions of Article 4 of the Civil
Code, its policy basis requiring the promulgation is sound because "as laws
can not be obligatory without being known, they must be promulgated.' 38
Receipt and assignment of an Act number by the Secretary of State is
effective promulgation, and by law the Act is then published in the official
journal of the state.39 The view which distinguishes promulgation from
publication is the grossest of legal fictions and defeats the ends sought by
Article 4 of the Civil Code. The mere act of receipt and assignment of an Act
number is not effective in any real sense in promulgating the laws enacted by
the legislature. In fact the intent of the constitutional convention in extend-
ing the general effective date of laws from twenty to sixty days following the
end of the session was an attempt to provide adequate time for the proper
promulgation and publication of the laws.40 Use of the earlier effective date
was viewed as an extraordinary device to be used in the sound discretion of
the legislature. While Act 47 presents a legitimate use of that power, it may
be argued that the device is becoming one of habit and not of necessity.
Given the proper circumstances, such Acts may be invalidated as offensive
to due process of law. 4 1
Introduction of Bills
The time for the introduction of bills during any session is limited to the
37. Id. Here the court correctly has taken a portion of the Transcripts of
Proceedings relative to the distinction between promulgation and publication, but the
full debate should be read for the policy notion underlying LA. CONST. art. III, § 19.
38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 4.
39. LA. R.S. 43:87 (Supp. 1975). The publication of the acts of the 1976 regular
session in the official journal of the state was completed prior to September 1, 1976,
less than thirty days after final adjournment of the legislature.
40. XXIX VERBATIM TRANSCRIP-rs at 96-102.
41. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Elements of the test to be used by the courts in due
process cases are summarized as: "The precise nature of the interest that has been
adversely affected, the manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the
available alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in
the office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt
complained of and good accomplished-these are some of the considerations that




first fifteen days of the session; after the expiration of those days a
super-majority record vote of two-thirds of the membership of both houses
is required for the introduction of a bill.42 This is a change from the prior
constitution4 3 and required some procedural device to protect the constitu-
tional integrity of bills introduced after the first fifteen days of the session.
To accomplish this, the legislature has revived a procedure from the now
abolished odd-numbered year fiscal sessions in the use of "consent resolu-
tions"' which seek the consent of the requisite number of members of both
houses for the introduction of the attached bill. Thus by tracing the history of
an Act, originally introduced beyond the permissible session limits, the





SEPARATION, DIVORCE, AND ALIMONY
In Fulmer v. Fulmer' the Louisiana Supreme Court clearly recognized
that whenever fault has been adjudicated in a separation proceeding the
effect of that determination precludes further litigation of the wife's fault for
alimony purposes under Civil Code article 160.2 The main objection to the
application of such an estoppel principle in alimony actions under article
160 is that the fault issue may not be fully litigated at the proceeding for
separation because often both spouses desire a judicial separation in the
42. LA. CONST. art. III, 2(A).
43. LA. CONST. art. III, 8 (1921).
44. See, e.g., House Concurrent Resolution No. 84, 1976 Regular Session. For
the judicial history of consent resolutions, see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for 1974-1975 Term-Legislative Process, 36 LA. L. REV. 549, 552-53 (1976).
I. 301 So. 2d 622 (La. 1974).
2. Apparently even when the wife secures a separation based on fault other
than abandonment, the adjudication of the husband's fault necessarily implies her
own freedom from fault. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1973-74 Term-Persons, 35 LA. L. REV. 259, 265 n.26 (1975). For a discussion of
recent cases concerning this issue see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1973-74 Term-Persons, 35 LA. L. REV. 259, 263-65 (1975); The Work of the




manner least likely to result in accusations in a public forum. 3 It has been
suggested that the source of the problem lies in Civil Code article 138(9)
which requires the spouses to live apart for one year before obtaining a "no
fault" separation. 4 Such a delay "induces many to seek what in reality is a
collusive judgment based on fault." 5 The suggested remedy is not to
relitigate the fault issue but rather for the legislature to shorten the period in
which the spouses must live apart before a "no fault" separation can be
granted.
6
The 1976 legislature introduced a bill which would have served to
implement the suggested solution by reducing the period of voluntary
separation contained in Civil Code article 138(9) to three months. 7 The bill
was tabled in the House, 8 however, and persons seeking divorces based on
one party's fault will continue to be required, as a result of the Fulmer
decision, to litigate fully the question of fault at the separation proceedings.
The public policy of reconciliation fostered by Louisiana law certainly will
suffer due to the legislature's failure to adopt this bill:' the confrontation
where each spouse seeks to attribute the "fault" for the failure of their
marriage to the other is obviously not conducive to those affections and
emotions essential to a successful reunion.
The application of the jurisprudential doctrine of recrimination has
long been used to deny a divorce or separation from bed and board where the
3. See the dissent in Broussard v. Broussard, 275 So. 2d 410, 413 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1973). See also The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-73
Term-Persons, 34 LA. L. REV. 201, 203-04 (1974).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 203-04.
6. Id. at 204. The contention is that the reduction of the one year period would
eliminate the need for collusion without resulting in a drastic change of Louisiana law
or sacrificing the public policy favoring reconciliation since the one year interval
between a judgment of separation and a judgment of divorce will still be required
under LA. R.S. 9:302 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 3 1, § I. See also The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-75 Term-Persons, 36 LA. L.
REV. 335, 337 (1976); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-74
Term-Persons, 35 LA. L. REV. 259, 265 (1975), where it is suggested that the
application of the doctrine of recrimination by the Louisiana courts further necessi-
tates reducing the period for no-fault separation. For additional discussion of the
doctrine of recrimination see the text accompanying note 9, infra.
7. La. H.B. 1389, § 1, 39th Reg. Sess., 1976. 1976 LEGISLATIVE CALENDAR OF
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, 39th Reg. Sess. 381.
8. Id.
9. See the text at note 3, supra; and note 5, supra. LA. R.S. 9:302 (1950)
provides a one year "cooling off" period after a judgment of separation before a
judgment of divorce may be rendered. See also The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1973-74 Term-Persons, 35 LA. L. REV. 259, 265 (1975).
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fault of both spouses is found to be of like character and proportional
degree.1° The use of the doctrine leads to unrealistic and legislatively
unsupportable results,I refusing spouses who have shown their inability to
live together the logical alternative of separation.' 2 Louisiana Civil Code
article 141"3 was enacted to correct this judicially created problem 4 by
mandating that a separation from bed and board be granted where mutual
fault exists. 15
Recent decisions have raised the question whether the husband has a
right to alimony either after separation 16 or after divorce.' 7 In Whitt v.
Vauthier'8 the right of the wife to receive alimony under Civil Code article
10. E.g., Eals v. Swan, 221 La. 329,59 So. 2d 409(1952); Snell v. Aucoin, 158 La.
767, 104 So. 709 (1925); Fontenot v. Fontenot, 327 So. 2d 678 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976);
Schillaci v. Schillaci, 310 So. 2d 179 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975); Maranto v. Maranto,
297 So. 2d 704 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1974). For a discussion of the recent jurisprudence
dealing with the doctrine of recrimination see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1974-75 Term-Persons, 36 LA. L. REV. 335 (1976).
1I. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 151-53; R. PASCAL, LA. FAMILY LAW COURSE 122 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as PASCAL]: "The exception of mutuality of fault may be reason-
able enough if the degree of seriousness of fault is about the same, even if not the
same kind, as long as the common life is not intolerable for the spouses" (Emphasis
added).
12. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts forthe 1974-75 Term-Persons,
36 LA. L. REV. 335, 337 (1976). It is suggested that the use of the doctrine of mutual
fault should be an additional justification for the reduction of the no-fault separation
period of one year found in Civil Code article 138(9). See also the text accompanying
note 5, supra.
13. LA. CIv. CODE art. 141, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 495.
14. The problem is the obvious conflict between Civil Code article 138(l)-(8) and
the jurisprudential doctrine of recrimination. Under the codal provisions one may
seek a separation from bed and board when the other spouse is guilty of "fault."
Under the doctrine of recrimination the legislative expression allowing a separation
for "fault" is circumvented when the court finds both spouses to be equally at
"fault" and refuses to grant a divorce.
15. La. Acts 1976, No. 495, adding LA. CIv. CODE art. 141. LA. CIv. CODE
article 141 provides: "A separation from bed and board shall be granted although
both spouses are mutually at fault in causing the separation. In such instances,
alimony pendente lite may be allowed but permanent alimony shall not be allowed
thereafter following divorce."
16. Williams v. Williams, 331 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976); Gravel v. Gravel, 331 So. 2d
580 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
17. Whitt v. Vauthier, 316 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4thCir.), cert. denied, 320So. 2d
558 (La. 1975). Cf. Broussard v. Broussard, 320 So. 2d 279 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
18. 316 So. 2d 202 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 So. 2d 558 (La. 1975). Cf.
Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So.2d 873 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. granted, 334 So.2d 436 (La.




160 survived constitutional attack as a denial of equal protection due to the
court's questionable finding that in the correct circumstances a husband
does have the right to alimony after divorce. 19 Also, the Louisiana Supreme
Court, in Williams v. Williams, has held that the right to alimony pendente
lite granted to the wife in Civil Code article 148 does not deprive males of
equal protection or due process under the federal or Louisiana constitu-
tion.2" An implication of this decision is that a husband does not have a
reciprocal right to alimony either before or after separation. 2' In summary,
the husband in the correct circumstances may have a right to alimony after
divorce under Civil Code article 160, but he is denied the right to alimony
pendente lite of article 148.
In an apparent attempt to establish some type of uniformity, a bill was
introduced seeking to amend Civil Code article 148 to allow either spouse
not having sufficient income for his or her maintenance to seek alimony
pendente lite.22 The proposed amendment never left the House,23 arguably
indicating legislative approval of the previously discussed jurisprudence. 24
PATERNITY
Upon the recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute, the
legislature effected extensive changes in the presumption and disavowal of
paternity of articles 184-192 of the Civil Code. 25 Previously, the presump-
tion of paternity under Civil Code article 184 extended only to a child
conceived during the marriage; 26 a child born capable of living within 180
19. The Fourth Circuit's finding is questionable since it suggests that the Code
Napoleon of 1804 has legal effect in Louisiana. 316 So. 2d at 205. The Code Napoleon
was never enacted law in Louisiana. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
SYSTEM COURSE OUTLINES 53-55 (1971). See also PASCAL at 178.
20. Williams v. Williams, 331 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976).
21. Id. The court's reasoning was based on the finding that husbands and wives
are not similarly situated under Louisiana's community property system and the
legislative conferral of the right of claiming alimony pendente lite only to wivesbears
a fair and substantial relation to the legitimate objective of the article--a fair and
orderly termination of the community regime." 331 So. 2d at 441 (Emphasis added).
But see PASCAL at 170.
22. La. H.B. 1458, § 1, 39th Reg. Sess., 1976; 1976 LEGISLATIVE CALENDAROF
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, 39th Reg. Sess. 396.
23. Id.
24. See the text accompanying notes 28-33, supra.
25. La. Acts 1976, No. 430 amending LA. Civ. CODE arts. 184-90, repealing LA.
CIv. CODE arts. 191-92. For the full text of these articles as amended see Spaht &
Shaw, The Strongest Presumption Challenged: Speculations on Warren v. Richard
and Succession of Mitchell, 37 LA. L. REV. 59 n.64 (1976).
26. LA. CIv. CODE art. 184 (as it appeared prior to Act 430 of 1976) provided:
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days of the marriage was not presumed to be the child of the husband, since
it was presumed in that instance that conception had occurred outside the
marriage.27 The law still protected the child so conceived if the wife's
husband failed to establish his non-paternity within a limited time. 28 Article
184 as amended now clearly states that "[t]he husband of the mother is
presumed to be the father of all children born or conceived during the
marriage. " 29 The Civil Code was further amended to provide that a child
born three hundred days or more after the dissolution of a marriage does not
receive benefits of the presumption contained in article 184, while those
children born less than three hundred days after dissolution are presumed to
have been conceived during the marriage.
30
Prior to the 1976 amendments the presumption created by article 18431
was recognized as "the strongest presumption known in law.' '32 While five
situations listed in the Civil Code of 1870,3 and possibly a sixth in the
"The law considers the husband of the mother as the father of all children conceived
during the marriage." (Emphasis added).
27. LA. CIv. CODE art. 186 (as it appeared prior to Act 430 of 1976) provided in
part: "The child capable of living, which is born before the one hundred and eightieth
day after the marriage is not presumed to be the child of the husband. See
PASCAL at 213-14.
28. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 191-92 (as they appeared prior to Act 430 of 1976).
Article 191 required that in those instances when the presumption of paternity
ceased, the husband had to dispute the legitimacy of the child within six months if he
was in the place where the child was born, or within six months after his return if he
were absent; if the birth had been concealed from him he had to act within six months
after the discovery of the fraud. Article 192 provided that if the husband died without
having disputed the child's legitimacy but before the expiration of the periods
established in article 191, his heirs should have six months to contest the legitimacy of
the child. See also PASCAL at 213-14; The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for
the 1973-74 Term-Persons, 35 LA. L. REV. 259, 262-63 (1975).
29. LA. Civ. CODE art. 184, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 430 (Emphasis
added).
30. LA. CIv. CODE art. 185, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 430.
31. See note 26, supra.
32. Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119 (1952).
33. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 185-90 (as they appeared prior to Act 430 of 1976). The
situations included: (1) for cause of adultery where the birth has been concealed from
the father (art. 185); (2) where the child "capable of living" is born before the 180th
day after the marriage (art. 186) unless the husband knew of the pregnancy before the
marriage or was present and signed the registering of the birth (art. 190); (3) where the
child is born 300 days after the dissolution of the marriage or (4) 300 days after
sentence of separation from bed and board unless cohabitation is shown (art. 187); (5)




Uniform Act on Blood Test to Determine Paternity,3 4 allowed rebuttal of the
presumption, Louisiana courts strictly applied these provisions as well as
the time limits in articles 191-19235 and found that the policy of the state is to
protect the innocent child against attacks upon his legitimacy.3
6
Act 430 allows the husband to disavow the paternity of the child if he is
able to show "by a preponderance of the evidence any facts which
reasonably indicate that he is not the father." 37 Examples of such facts are
blood test results, sterility, and remoteness which renders cohabitation at
the time of conception unlikely .38 The time limit within which the husband
must bring a suit for disavowal of paternity is one hundred eighty days. 39
There are two provisions of the Act which should be critically
examined. First, article 186 provides that the mother's husband will not be
presumed the father of the child if another man is so presumed. 4 Although
34. LA. R.S. 9:396-98 (Supp. 1972). This Act authorizes the use of blood tests in
any civil action in which paternity is an issue, sets forth procedural rules, and
prescribes the effect to be given test results. In footnote dicta the Third Circuit in
Dugas v. Henson, 307 So. 2d 650 n.4 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), stated that the
legislature's intent in enacting this act was to provide an additional ground for
disavowal, noting with approval the case of Smith v. Smith, 300 So. 2d 205 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1974), where the court indicated that the statute's passage did not result in the
elimination of the procedural provisions of the code such as prescription or loss of the
right to bring an action en desaveu. The Dugas court, however, did acknowledge a
conflict may exist among the members of the Third Circuit as to the question of
whether R.S. 9:396-98 actually creates a sixth ground for disavowal, citing Brugman
v. Prejean, 288 So. 2d 702 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974). For a discussion of the Smith and
Brugman cases and the relationship of the Uniform Act to the procedural limits of the
Civil Code applicable to a disavowal action see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1973-74 Term-Persons, 35 LA. L. REV. 259, 261-63 (1975).
35. See note 40, supra.
36. E.g., Tannehill v. Tannehill, 261 La. 933,261 So. 2d 619(1972) (disavowal for
sterility due to childhood disease barred by art. 185's prohibition against disavowal
for "natural impotence"); Feazel v. Feazel, 222 La. 113, 62 So. 2d 119 (1952) (child
born during marriage held to be the son of the legal husband of his mother despite
testimony of the mother and the husband that they had never had any sexual relations
whatsoever with each other); George v. Bertrand, 217 So. 2d 47 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 253 La. 647, 219 So. 2d 177 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 974 (1969) (child
held to be son of mother and her legal husband even though mother was living with the
child's acknowledged father at the time of the child's conception and birth and later
married him).
37. La. Acts 1976, No. 430 amending LA. Civ. CODE art. 187.
38. Official Revision Comment to LA. CIv. CODE art. 187, as amended by La.
Acts 1976, No. 430.
39. LA. CIv. CODE art. 189, as amended by La. Acts No. 430. In addition, La.
Acts 1976, No. 430, § 2, repealedLA. CIv. CODE arts. 191 and 192 in their entirety; see
note 37, supra.
40. LA. CIv. CODE art. 186, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 430.
[Vol. 37
LEGISLATIVE SYMPOSIUM
not clearly revealed, the article apparently is intended to apply where the
wife, married to her second husband, gives birth to a child less than three
hundred days after the dissolution of her previous marriage. In that instance
the husband of the first marriage is presumed father of the child.4 This
provision appears to be an unrealistic application of the presumption of
paternity and will operate unfairly. It may effect results similar to decisions
reported prior to 1975 which refused to acknowledge a child as the issue of
his biological father.42 Those decisions had been uniformly criticized as
unrealistic." In 1975 the Supreme Court reached a more realistic conclusion
which allowed children, legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their
parents, to inherit from their biological father even though they were
presumed to be the children of their mother's first husband under article
184.' The court did not determine the effect of such a decision upon the
children's presumed status as the legitimate issue of the mother's first
husband or upon the right of the article 184 father to rebut the presumption
of paternity. 45 Although the application of amended Civil Code article 186
41. LA. CIv. CODE art. 185, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 430. See also text
at notes 41-42, supra.
42. George v. Bertrand, 217 So. 2d 47 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 253
La. 647, 219 So. 2d 177 (1969); Succession of Barlow, 197 So. 2d 682 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 250 La. 917, 199 So. 2d 921 (1967). In these cases children entitled
to be legitimated by the marriage of their parents after their birth pursuant to Civil
Code article 198 were deprived of the benefits of that article due to their mother's
undissolved marriage years earlier to a man who had disappeared. These decisions
were based on definitions provided in the Civil Code: "Children are either legitimate,
illegitimate, or legitimated." Art. 178. "Illegitimate children are those born out of
marriage. Illegitimate children may be legitimated in certain cases in the manner
prescribed by law." Art. 180. The courts reasoned that since under the article 184
presumption of paternity the children were presumed to be the legitimate children of
the husband of the prior undissolved marriage, the children were not born "out of
marriage," not illegitimate, and therefore could not be legitimated by the marriage of
their parents. The net result is to deny children so situated the right to inherit from
their biological father.
43. Pascal, Louisiana Succession and Related Laws and the Illegitimate, 46TUL.
L. REV. 180 (1971); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968-69
Term-Persons, 30 LA. L. REV. 171 (1969); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1966-67 Term-Persons, 28 LA. L. REV. 316 (1968); Note, 16 LOYOLA
L. REV. 235 (1969).
44. Succession of Mitchell, 323 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975). There the court's decision
that children born during an undissolved marriage could inherit from their parents
pursuant to Civil Code article 198 was based on a 1948 amendment to article 198. The
court determined that the legislative intent was to permit legitimation by subsequent
marriage of the biological parents of all adulterous children, whether technically
illegitimate or technically legitimate at birth.
45. Id. In the future it may be contended that the 1976 amendment to article 186
establishes the child as the legitimate issue of the first husband only, and as the latest
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will prevent the possibility of a child being presumed to have two fathers, 46
it establishes a rule which in many instances will ignore the child's actual
paternity. 47
A second area of concern arises when the husband dies within the
period allowed by Civil Code article 18948 for bringing an action en desa veu
without seeking to disavow the paternity of the child. Article 190 as
amended provides that "an heir or legatee whose interest in the succession
will be reduced shall have one year from the death or one year from the birth
of the child, whichever period is longer, within which to bring such an
action." 4 9 The granting of this power to a legatee should be questioned.
Despite the amendments effected by this Act, 50 it is still Louisiana public
policy to insure that the legitimacy of the child will be maintained whenever
possible. 5 It therefore seems advisable that only the presumed father and
his heirs should have the right to repudiate the presumption of articles
184-190. Since the Act does not limit the term "legatee," any individual
given a minute portion of a presumed father's estate may attack the paternity
of the child.
expression of the legislative will, it precludes any legitimation under the provisions of
article 198 and removes the question of whether a child can be both legitimate and
legitimated.
46. LA. CIV. CODE art. 186, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 430. See also
Succession of Mitchell, 323 So. 2d 451 (La. 1975). See note 45, supra.
47. This is true not only of the case of the child born to a woman who has lived
separate and apart from her husband without a judgment of divorce and the biological
father with whom the wife has lived and later married; but also where a divorce is
granted under LA. R.S. 9:301 (divorce may be granted after proof of living apart two
years) and LA. R.S. 9:302 (divorce may be granted one year after judgment of
separation if reconciliation has not occurred) and the wife remarries within three
hundred days. In such circumstances, where a child is born within three hundred days
of the dissolution of the marriage, the evidence strongly suggests that someone other
than the wife's first husband (more than likely her current spouse) is the father, but
the presumption of the amended article is otherwise. Furthermore, a full term
pregnancy generally is nine months or approximately two hundred seventy days. The
three hundred day provision of article 185 requires a presumption that a child
conceived within a month after dissolution (or later in the case of premature births) is
the child of the wife's husband of the previous marriage. In nearly all instances the
child's actual paternity will be contrary to that presumed by law.
48. LA. CIv. CODE art. 189, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 430.
49. LA. CIv. CODE art. 190, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 430 (Emphasis
added).
50. La. Acts. 1976, No. 430, § 1.
51. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 238-45 and arts. 917-28 indicate a continued distinction




There are two instances when the right to disavow the paternity of a
child is denied the husband under the new legislation. The first is found in a
modified retention of former Civil Code article 190(l).52 The law now
provides that a man who marries a pregnant women with the knowledge that
she is pregnant at the time of the marriage is denied the right to disavow the
paternity of such a child born of the marriage unless another man is
presumed the father. In such an instance the provisions of article 186
apply.53 The legislation also denies the husband the right to disavow
paternity when the child is born as the result of artificial insemination and
the husband consented to the procedure.
54
TUTORSHIP
Justice Barham, in the Appendix to Griffith v. Roy,55 answered
criticism of the judiciary's long-standing practice of permitting, without
reference to the rules on removal of tutors, 56 suits for change of custody after
an award in a separation or divorce judgment.57 Although only dictum, the
Appendix straightforwardly concludes that an award of custody in a
separation or divorce proceeding neither appoints a tutor nor institutes the
regime of tutorship unless the party who is awarded custody in the
proceeding has also been appointed natural tutor. 58 The procedure for the
change of custody is a civil proceeding for custody and not one for the
removal of a tutor. 5
9
52. LA. CIV. CODE art. 190(l) (as it appeared prior to Act 430 of 1976) provided:
"The husband cannot contest the legitimacy of the child born previous to the one
hundred and eightieth day of the marriage, in the following cases: I. If he was
acquainted with the circumstances of his wife being pregnant previously to the
marriage .. "
53. LA. CIv. CODE art. 188, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 430.
54. LA. CIv. CODE art. 186, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 430.
55. 263 La. 712, 728, 269 So. 2d 217, 223 (1972).
56. See, e.g., Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La. 1122,254 So. 2d 603 (1971); Webb v. Webb,
264 So. 2d 925 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
57. Pascal, Tutorship AfterSeparation of the Parents, 16 LA. B.J. 267(1968); The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term-Persons, 28 LA. L.
REV. 312. 318-19. See also PASCAL at 171-72, 318-25. Professor Pascal's position is
that Civil Code arts. 157, 246, and 250 establish tutorship as an essential element of
every pronouncement of civil custody. The parent initially awarded custody under
Civil Code art. 157 by that fact alone becomes tutor and can be deprived of custody
only through a proceeding to remove the tutor.
58. 263 La. 712, 728, 269 So. 2d 217, 223.
59. Id. at 734, 269 So. 2d at 225. Justice Barham's conclusion was reached
through an evaluation of the Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure articles
concerning the commencement of the tutorship regime. Although recognizing that
the person awarded custody in a separation or divorce proceeding is of right the
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A Senate bill proposing to amend article 4501 of the Code of Civil
Procedure might have resolved this conflict by establishing that the spouse
to whom custody is awarded upon divorce or separation "shall occupy the
place of and have the powers of a tutor."' However, since the bill was
withdrawn from the files of the Senate before any action was taken, a
definitive legislative resolution of the problem has been postponed. 6 1
The law concerning the appointment of a legal tutor has been improved
and clarified by Act No. 429,62 a recommendation of the Louisiana State
Law Institute. Prior law mandated, in most instances, that preference be
given to male relatives when the court appointed a legal tutor for a minor. 63
Those provisions were of questionable validity under Article I, § 3 of the
Louisiana Constitution.' Civil Code article 263 now states that when the
parent dying last has not appointed a tutor or if the tutor so appointed has not
been confirmed or has been excused, a judge must appoint as the tutor the
person whose appointment is in the best interest of the minor and must select
that person from among the qualified ascendants in the direct line, collater-
als by blood within the third degree, and the surviving spouse of the parent
dying last. 6
5
In lowering the age of majority to eighteen in 197266 the Louisiana
natural tutor of the minors, he classifies that right as an "inchoate" one, "exactly
what the Civil Code Article 250 calls it, 'tutorship . . . of right', but no more than a
'right'. Natural tutorship has existence, as do all other tutorships, only after appoint-
ment of the tutor by a judicial tribunal as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure."
Id. at 733-34, 269 So. 2d at 225.
60. La. S.B. 766, §1,39th Reg. Sess., 1976; 1976 LEGISLATIVE CALENDAROFTHE
STATE OF LOuISIANA, 39th Reg. Sess. 715. It may be argued that under the language of
the bill the spouse awarded custody would not be "appointed" tutor and therefort the
rules applicable to the removal of the tutor need not be invoked to seek a change in
custody.
61. Id.
62. La. Acts 1976, No. 429 amending LA. Civ. CODE art. 263, repealing LA CIv.
CODE arts. 264-69, and amending LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 4065-67, 4234.
63. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 263-69 (as they appeared prior to Act 429 of 1976); LA.
CODE CIv. P. arts. 4063, 4065-68 (as they appeared prior to Act 429 of 1976); for a
general discussion of the law as it existed prior to Act No. 429 of 1976, see PASCAL at
314.
64. LA. CONST. art. 1, § 3 provides in part: "No person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws. . . . No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably
discriminate against a person because of . . . sex . ... "
65. LA. CIv. CODE art. 263, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 429 (Emphasis
added).
66. La. Acts 1972, No. 346 amending LA. CIv. CODE arts. 373, 382, and 3478,
repealing LA. CIV. CODE arts. 367, 385; La. Acts 1972, No. 347 amending LA. CODE
Civ. P. arts. 3097, 3993.
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legislature repealed Civil Code article 38567 and amended Code of Civil
Procedure article 3993.68 As a result, the minimum age requirement for
"judicial emancipation conferring majority ' 69 was removed. 7 ° The only
restrictions remaining were provided in Code of Civil Procedure article
3993 which requires the judge to find that there was "good reason" for the
emancipation and that the minor was capable of managing his own affairs.7 '
However, confusion existed as to whether a judge had the authority to grant
such an emancipation. With the repeal of Civil Code article 385 there no
longer existed any "substantive" law giving him that power; at the same
time, however, the legislature amended, but did not repeal, the provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the judicial emancipation
conferring majority. 7 2 This action arguably indicated the legislature's
intention to have "substantive" effect given that portion of the Code of
Civil Procedure. Reenactment of Civil Code article 385 should eliminate
this confusion.73 A judge may now grant, under the provisions of Code of
Civil Procedure articles 3991-94, judicial emancipation conferring majority
upon a minor sixteen years of age or older 74 when there is "good reason"
and the minor is found capable of managing his own affairs.75
67. La. Acts 1972, No. 346. LA. CIv. CODE art. 385 (as it appeared prior to Act
346 of 1972) provided: "A minor over the age of eighteen years may be judicially
emancipated and relieved of the disabilities which attach to minority as provided in
Articles 3991 through 3994 of the Code of Civil Procedure."
68. La. Acts 1972, No. 347. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3993 (as it appeared prior to
Act 347 of 1972) provided: "If the judge is satisfied that there is good reason for
emancipation and that the minor is capable of managing his own affairs, he shall
render a judgment of emancipation, which shall declare that the minor is fully
emancipated and relieved of all the disabilities with full power to perform all acts as
fully as if he had reached the age of twenty-one" (Emphasis added).
69. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3991-94.
70. Prior to 1972, Civil Code art. 385 required the minor to be at least eighteen
years of age; under Code of Civil Procedure art. 3993 the judgment declared him a
majoi as if twenty-one years of age. See notes 67 and 68, supra.
71. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3993, as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 347.
72. See note 68, supra.
73. La. Acts 1976, No. 155, adding LA. CIv. CODE art. 385.
74. LA. CIV. CODE art. 385, as enacted by La. Acts 1976, No. 155 provides: "A
minor sixteen years of age or older may be judicially emancipated and relieved of the
disabilities which attach to minority as provided in Articles 3991 through 3994 of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure."
75. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3993, as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 347. See the





The long-awaited revision of Book II, Title III of the Louisiana Civil
Code-'"Of Usufruct, Use and Habitation" '-prepared under the auspices
of the Louisiana State Law Institute, was enacted in the 1976 regular session
of the Louisiana legislature. 2 Since an extensive discussion of the Act is
unfortunately precluded by space limitations, this paper will only discuss
two modifications of particular interest.
3
Drawing from former Civil Code article 646' the Act declares that
there are two kinds of servitudes, personal and predial. 5 The Act defines a
personal servitude as a charge on a thing for the benefit of a person, 6 and
states that there are three types of personal servitudes: usufruct, habitation,
and rights of use. 7 The obvious changes effected are the suppression of the
personal servitude of "use" and the establishment of the new category of
"rights of use.'' 8
The removal of the detailed provisions referring to "use" 9 was a
recognition that the personal servitude of use regulated in the 1870 Civil
Code has little, if any, practical significance today. 10 Even so, the revision
I. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 533-645 (as they appeared prior to Act 103 of 1976).
2. La. Acts 1976, No. 103 amending LA. CIV. CODE arts. 533-645.
3. An excellent discussion of the provisions and background of Act 103 is found
in Reporter A.N. Yiannopoulos' Expos des Motifs. See La. Acts 1976, No. 103, § 1,
Expos des Motifs [hereinafter referred to as Expos des Motifs]. Notice especially
should be given to the definition of "fruits" provided in article 551 and the discussion
in the Expose des Motifs.
4. LA. CIV. CODE art. 646 (as it appeared prior to Act 431 of 1976) provided in
part: "All servitudes which affect lands may be divided into two kinds, personal and
real.
Personal servitudes are those attached to the person for whose benefit they are
established, and terminate with his life. This kind of servitude is of three sorts:
usufruct, use and habitation .... "These provisions were removed from art. 646 by
La. Acts 1976, No. 431, a companion to Act No. 103.
5. LA. CIv. CODE art. 533, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 103.
6. La. Acts 1976, No. 103 amending LA. CIv. CODE art. 534.
7. Id.
8. Compare LA. CIv. CODE art. 646 (as it appeared prior to Act 431 of 1976)
with LA. Civ. CODE art. 534, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 103. Note that Act
103 of 1976 also changed the heading of Title III from "Of Usufruct, Use and
Habitation" to "Personal Servitudes."
9. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 626-45 (as they appeared prior to Act 103 of 1976).
10. See Expose des Motifs, supra note 3.
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retains the concept of use by allowing an owner to establish a real right in
favor of another for a limited portion of the fruits of his property. "
As noted above, the revision provides for a new kind of personal
servitude-rights of use. ' 2 A rights of use servitude (or limited personal
servitude) has been described as a real right that confers on a person limited
advantages over an immovable belonging to another and constitutes an
intermediate category between personal and predial servitudes. 3 Prior to
1976 the question whether an individual could create personal servitudes
upon his property other than those of usufruct, use, and habitation had been
left to the Louisiana judiciary. '" In Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Sailing's
Heirs5 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the owner of property may
validly create other personal servitudes. Acknowledging the existence of a
conflict in the Civil Code,' 6 the court concluded that it could not "say that
the law clearly prohibits the creation of a servitude upon lands in favor of a
person and his heirs. . . hence the intention of the parties should govern
such matters." 7
11. LA. CIv. CODE art. 545, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 103, provides:
"Usufruct may.be established for a term or under a condition, and subject to any
modification consistent with the nature of usufruct.
The rights and obligations of the usufructuary and of the naked owner may be
modified by agreement unless modification is prohibited by law or by the grantor in
the act establishing the usufruct."
12. See text accompanying notes 5-8, supra.
13. A. YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES § 123 in 3 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 404 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as PERSONAL SERVITUDES]. Professor
Yiannopoulos notes that "rights of use" servitudes are an intermediate category
between personal and predial servitudes since "[I]ike usufruct, use, and habitation,
they are charges on property in favor of a person rather than an estate; like predial
servitudes they are necessarily charges on an immovable belonging to another person
and are confined to certain advantages of use or enjoyment." Id. at 405.
14. See, e.g., Mallet v. Thibault, 212 La. 79, 31 So. 2d 601 (1947); Frost-Johnson
Lumber Co. v. Sailing's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1920). LA. CIv. CODE art. 646
(as it appeared prior to Act 431 of 1976) declared that personal servitudes are of three
sorts: usufruct, use, and habitation. LA. CIV. CODE art. 709 in part states that
"[oiwners have a right to establish on their estates, or in favor of their estates, such
servitudes as they deem proper; provided, nevertheless, that the services be not
imposed on the person or in favor of the person, but only on an estate or in favor of an
estate; and provided, moreover, that such servitudes imply nothing contrary to public
order." These articles conflicted with the provisions of Civil Code arts. 607, 758, and
2013 which appeared to allow the existence of the right to establish a servitude in
favor of a person and his heirs. See also PERSONAL SERVITUDES at 125, 406.
15. 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1920).
16. See note 14, supra.
17. 150 La. 765, 91 So. 207, 245 (emphasis by the court). See also PERSOIAL
SERVITUDES at 125, 413.
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The enactment of the rights of use provisions in the Civil Code18 has
given legislative approval to the Frost-Johnson decision and further defini-
tion to the limited personal servitude. The Code now provides that the rights
of pse personal servitude "confers in favor of a person a specified use of an
estate less than full enjoyment," 19 but limits the individual's freedom to
contract rights of use only to those advantages that may become the object of
a predial servitude.20 Unless prohibited by law or contract, a rights of use
servitude is transferable 21 and heritable, 22 may be granted in favor of legal
entities as well as natural persons, 23 and is to be regulated by the rules
governing usufruct and predial servitudes to the extent that their application
is compatible with the rules governing a rights of use servitude. 24
RECLAMATION OF LAND LOST THROUGH EROSION
In 1936 the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that where forces of
nature such as subsidence and erosion had operated on the banks of a
navigable body of water, submerged areas resulting therefrom become a
portion of the bed and are therefore insusceptible of private ownership. 25
Although the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 forbids alienation by the
legislature of the beds of navigable waterways there is an exception to allow
riparian land owners to recover land lost through erosion. 26 Since this
proviso appears not to be self-executing, the 1976 legislature amended La.
R.S. 41:1131 to recognize the right of riparian land owners to reclaim land
lost through erosion.27 Such reclamation includes all oil, gas, and mineral
18. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 639-45, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 103.
19. LA. CIV. CODE art. 639, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 103.
20. LA. CIv. CODE art. 640, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 103. Official
Comment (b) to art. 640 provides: "The rights of passage, of aqueduct, or of light and
view, may thus be stipulated in favor of a person rather than an estate. Further,
fishing or hunting rights and the taking of certain fruits or products from an estate
may likewise be stipulated in the form of a right of servitude."
21. LA. Civ. CODE art. 643, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 103.
22. LA. CIv. CODE art. 644, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 103.
23. LA. CIv. CODE art. 641, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 103.
24. LA. CIv. CODE art. 645, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 103.
25. Miami Corporation v. State, 186 La. 784, 806-07, 173 So. 315,322 (1936). Cf.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Board, 317 So. 2d 576 (La. 1974); Stevens v. State
Mineral Board, 221 So. 2d 645 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969) (concurring opinion). See also
LA. CIv. CODE arts. 453, 509-11.
26. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
27. La. Acts 1976, No. 180 amending LA. R.S. 41:1131 (1950). Section (F) of LA.
R.S. 41:1131 notes the word "reclamation" refers to "the raising of land through
filling or other physical works which elevate the surface of the theretofore sub-
merged land as a minimum above the level of ordinary low water in the case of rivers
or streams and above the level of ordinary high water in the case of bodies of water
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rights28 subject to any right-of-way, servitude or lease granted by the state
while the reclaimed land was a part of the navigable water bottom. 29 The
legislature also prescribed the procedures for seeking recovery of eroded
land: the party must make application to the register of state lands,
accompanied by a deed of ownership and/or a certified map or plat of survey
defining the boundary between the lands belonging to the state and those of
the riparian land owner and showing the exact extent of the land claimed to
have been lost through erosion. 30
LEASE OF NON-NAVIGABLE WATER BorroMs
The register of the state land office is now authorized to grant
long-term leases for the use of the bottoms of any non-navigable waters
owned by the state. 3' The register's authority can be exercised only when
such a lease is deemed in the interest of the state32 and approved by both the
governor and the "local governing authority." 33 Such leases may be
granted only to a public agency, political subdivision, municipality, public
corporation, or "private person who is a riparian owner with respect to the
water bottoms and air rights to be leased. 3 4 The statute specifically directs
that nothing in its provisions is intended to "alter or abrogate" the state's
claim to mineral rights in the leased area or to entitle the lessee to any part of
the mineral rights in the leased areas. 35 Although not included in the chapter
of Title 41 dealing with the lease of public lands36 and therefore not subject
to the advertisement and bid requirements of that chapter,37 this new
provision appears to have sufficient safeguards to ensure effective use and
development of non-navigable water bottoms .
38
other than rivers and streams, to such heights as may be prescribed in regulations or
forms adopted by the register to ensure reasonably permanent existence of the
reclaimed lands."
28. LA. R.S. 41:1131(B) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 180.
29. LA. R.S. 41:1131(E) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 180.
30. LA. R.S. 41:1131(C) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 180.
31. LA. R.S. 41:91, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 263.
32. While the statute requires that the lease can be granted only when such action
is deemed in the interest of the state the language used does not clearly establish who
is to make that determination.
33. LA. R.S. 41:91, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 263.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. LA. R.S. 41:1211-94 (1950).
37. LA. R.S. 41:1214 (1950).





The passage of the Louisiana Statutory Wills Act! in 1952 has been
acknowledged as providing a valuable supplement to the forms of wills
found in the Louisiana Civil Code.2 Designed to provide the testator a
simplified means of executing a document of easily ascertainable authentic-
ity, 3 the statutory will has widespread applicability since it is suitable for
estate planning.4
Prior to the 1976 session of the legislature the statutory will was not
available to the testator who did not know how to sign his name or was
unable to read. 5 Thus, an individual with either of these disabilities,
particularly a blind person, was relegated to the forms of testaments
contained in the Civil Code. 6 Act 333 of 1976 has added a new section to
R.S. 9:2442 which allows those individuals who are unable to read to
execute a statutory will.
7
However, the provisions of R.S. 9:2443 that prevent an individual who
1. La. Acts 1952, No. 66, § I, as amended by La. Acts 1964, No. 123, § I
(codified as LA. R.S. 9:2442-44). For a general description of the original act see
Comment, The New Louisiana Wills Act, 28 TUL. L. REV. 288 (1954).
2. L. OPPENHEIM, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 110 in 10 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE 202 (1973) [hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM]. The four codal forms of
will are I) the nuncupative will by public act, LA. Clv. CODE arts. 1578-80; 2) the
nuncupative will by private act, LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1581-83; 3) the holographic will,
LA. Clv. CODE arts. 1588, 1589; and 4) the mystic or sealed will, LA. CIv. CODE arts.
1584-87.
3. See Succession of Morgan, 257 La. 380, 242 So. 2d 551 (1970); Woodfork v.
Sanders, 248 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
4. OPPENHEIM at 203; Note, 45 TUL. L. REV. 205 (1970).
5. LA. R.S. 9:2443 (1950), as amended by La. Act 1964, No. 123, §1 provides:
"Except as provided in R.S. 9:2442 with respect to a testator who is physically unable
to sign his name, those who know not how or are not able to sign their names, and
those who know not how or are not able to read, cannot make dispositions in the form
of the will provided for in R.S. 9:2442, nor be attesting witnesses thereto."
6. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1574-1604.
7. LA. R.S. 9:2442, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 333, § 1. Section B of
R.S. 9:2442 now requires the will to be read in the presence of the testator, the notary,
and three witnesses; the notary and/or the witnesses not reading aloud are required to
follow the reading on copies of the will. After the reading the testator is required to
indicate to the witnesses and notary that the instrument is his and to sign his name.
The notary and witnesses then execute a declaration of what has transpired in the
execution of the will by the testator.
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is unable to read or sign his name from executing a statutory will or serving
as an attesting witness were not amended or deleted. An apparent conflict
therefore exists between a portion of amended R.S. 9:2442 and R.S.
9:2443.1 Due to the section of Act 333 that provides for the repeal of prior
conflicting legislation this supposed conflict may be resolved. 9 The appa-
rent effect of the 1976 legislation is to suppress the conflicting portions of
R.S. 9:2443 while preserving the requirement that attesting witnesses be
able to read and sign their names. 10 It also appears that the failure to amend
R.S. 9:2443 denies those persons who are unable to sign their names the
right to execute a statutory will. " This prohibition, however, is of doubtful
significance. Even a person who is unable to read can be taught to sign his
name, and the prohibition against the execution of a statutory will by a
person who is unable to read has been effectively removed.' 2
SMALL SUCCESSIONS
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure outlines the procedure to be
followed in the probate of small successions, which were previously defined
as successions with a gross value of two thousand dollars or less.' 3 This
streamlined procedure provides for lower court costs and determines when
judicial proceedings are unnecessary to open such successions. 14 In addi-
tion, the Louisiana Inheritance Tax Statute prior to 1976 provided that
where the property in a succession did not exceed two thousand dollars, the
tax collector in his discretion could fix and collect the tax based on an
affidavit filed by the succession representative, heirs, or legatees. 5 Unfor-
tunately, inflation since 1960 (when the two thousand dollar restriction was
8. Compare LA. R.S. 9:2442, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 333 with LA.
R.S. 9:2443.
9. La. Acts 1976, No. 333, § 2.
10. LA. R.S. 9:2442(B), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 333, requires the
attesting witnesses to follow the reading of the testament on copies of the will and
sign a declaration that the will had been executed in compliance with the procedures
prescribed in LA. R.S. 9:2442.
11. Compare LA. R.S. 9:2442, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 333 with LA.
R.S. 9:2443. Both LA. R.S. 9:2442(A) & (B) require that the testator sign the
instrument and that when he is not physically able to sign". . he must so declare or
signify to the notary in the presence of the witnesses as well as declare and signify the
cause that hinders him from signing, and shall then affix his mark in the place where
his signature is required." See the text of LA. R.S. 9:2443 at note 5, supra.
12. See the text accompanying notes 7-10, supra.
13. LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 3421-43. For a general discussion of these provisions
see OPPENHEIM at 358.
14. LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 3422, 3431.
15. LA. R.S. 47:2410 (1952).
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established) has placed the small succession provisions beyond estates
which could use them most effectively. With the passage of Act 187,16 the
Code of Civil Procedure now defines a small succession as one having a
gross value of ten thousand dollars or less. 17 The inheritance tax law now
permits the tax collector to fix and collect the inheritance tax upon an
affidavit when a succession does not exceed that same amount.18
TORTS
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN DEFAMATION ACTIONS
Largely as a result of extensive efforts by the governor, the 1976
legislature added Article 2315.1 to the Louisiana Civil Code providing for
the recovery of punitive damages, as well as general and special ones, in
defamation actions. Public or private plaintiffs are now eligible for such an
award if it is proven that the defamatory statement was made "with
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.' 1
Punitive damages in tort actions are not unknown in Louisiana.
Nineteenth century cases awarded punitive damages to successful plaintiffs2
while other cases, though not making such awards, also recognized the
possibility of doing so if malice or bad motive were shown.3 This view of
punitive damages changed in 1917 with the case of Vincent v. Morgan's
Louisiana & Texas Railroad and Steamship Company.4 There, the court
considered an award of punitive damages as a method of punishing the
offender for the benefit of the community and saw no reason why an injured
party should be allowed to combine such a criminal prosecution for the
16. La. Acts 1976, No. 187 amending LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3421 and LA. R.S.
47:2410.
17. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3421, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 187.
18. LA. R.S. 47:2410, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 187.
1. La. Acts 1976, No. 217, adding LA. CIv. CODE art. 2315.1. The provision
impliedly repeals LA. R.S. 45:1353 (1950) limiting awards against broadcasters to
actual damages proved.
2. Graham v. St. Charles Street R. Co., 47 La. Ann. 1656, 18 So. 707 (1895);
Burkett v. Lanata, 15 La. Ann. 337 (1860); Summers v. Baumgard, 9 La. 161 (1835);
Block v. Roux, 12 Orl. App. 313 (1915).
3. Townsend v. Fontenot, 42 La. Ann. 890, 8 So. 616 (1890); Marin v.
Scatterfield, 41 La. Ann. 742, 6 So. 551 (1889); Kee v. Smith, 35 La. Ann. 518 (1883);
Perrine v. Planchard, 15 La. Ann. 133 (1860); Biggs v. D'Aquin, 13 La. Ann. 21
(1858); Stinson v. Buisson, 17 La. 567 (1841).
4. 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 (1917).
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community with his own civil damage action. 5 The court further supported
its view by interpreting Civil Code Articles 2315 and 1934 as providing only
for awards of actual compensatory damages. 6 Following Vincent,
Louisiana jurisprudence has consistently held that punitive damages are
not recoverable at civil law. 7 However, Louisiana courts have suggested
that punitive damages would be allowable if there were a statute specifically
authorizing them.' Act 217 apparently fills this statutory void.
The new article's fault standard, based on knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for truth, is in line with recent United States Supreme
Court cases dealing with defamation laws and thus appears to pass constitu-
tional muster. In New York Times Company v. Sullivan9 the Supreme Court
sought to insure uninhibited debate on public issues by requiring that public
officials prove actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for
truth) before any damages for defamatory statements can be recovered.' 0
Subsequent cases continued to favor fuller freedom for the speaker and
evidenced the Court's concern about the chilling effect which the threat of
damage awards might have on the exercise of free speech. " In testing the
constitutionality of the new Louisiana provision, the case most pertinent is
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 2 where the Court stated its present view of
5. Id. at 1039, 74 So. at 546.
6. Id. at 1039-50, 74 So. at 546-49.
7. Moore v. Blanchard, 216 La. 253, 43 So. 2d 599 (1949); Layne Louisiana Co.
v. Superior Oil, 209 La. 1014,26 So. 2d 20(1946); Sanders v. Times Picayune, 168 La..
1125, 123 So. 804 (1929); Spearman v. Toye Bros., 164 La. 677, 114 So. 591 (1927);
Janssen Catering Co. v. Abadie, 157 La. 357, 102 So. 428 (1924); Hanna v. Otis, 151
La. 851, 92 So. 360 (1922); Brian v. Harper, 144 La. 585, 80 So. 885 (1919) (libel);
Howell v. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co., 144 La. 427, 80 So. 613 (1919); Serio v.
American Brewing, 141 La. 290, 74 So. 998 (1917); Walker v. Associated Press, 191
So. 2d 727 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1966).
8. Terry v. Butler, 240 La. 398, 123 So. 2d 865 (1960); McCoy v. Arkansas
Natural Gas Co. 175 La. 487, 143 So. 383, cert. denied, 287 U.S. 661 (1932); Post v.
Rodrigue, 205 So. 2d 67 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Gugert v. New Orleans Independent
Laundries, 181 So. 653 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938).
9. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. Constitutional guarantees require a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice"-that is,
with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard for its truth.
Id. at 279-80. The concurring justices, Black, Goldberg, and Douglas, felt that the
first amendment left the people and press completely free to criticize the official
conduct of their leaders. Id. at 279, 305.
II. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976); see also Note, 37 LA. L. REV.
247 (1976). Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
12. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See also Eaton, The American Law of Defamation
Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L.
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state defamation laws: "We hold that so long as they do not impose liability
without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard
of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood." 3 The
Court added that the recovery of punitive damages may be proper so long as
liability is based on a showing of actual malice. Louisiana's new provision
incorporates this as the test of determining whether or not punitive damages
are to be allowed. ' 4 Because Gertz linked the propriety of a punitive damage
award to the New York Times actual malice standard and Act 217 effects the
same result, there should be no constitutional defect in an award of punitive
damages. 5 Recent federal cases are in accord. 16
Attorney's fees are also recoverable under Act 217. The plaintiff may
receive them if he meets the burden of proof necessary to recover punitive
damages. Should the defendant prevail, he is entitled to recover his
attorney's fee if it is determined that the plaintiff's action was frivolous.
Because of the potential for large damage awards, Act 217 provides
that retractions or corrections made by the defendant must be considered in
mitigating damages. ' 7 Since the basic purpose of a defamation action is to
redress the damage caused by "invasion of the interest in reputation and
good name,"' 18 the plaintiff has an interest in requiring the defendant to
admit the falsity of his statement. Allowing a retraction to mitigate damages
encourages prompt correction of errors and to some degree minimizes their
effect. Because a retraction may not be as widely read or given as much
REv. 1349 (1975); Robertson, Defamation & the First Amendment: In Praise ofGertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEXAS L. REv. 199 (1976); Note, 49 TUL. L. REv. 685
(1975).
13. 418 U.S. at 347.
14. Id. at 349-50.
15. Louisiana has managed to maintain its criminal defamation provisions, LA.
R.S. 14:47-50 (Supp. 1968), despite constitutional attack. Although declared uncon-
stitutional in their application .to discussion of public officials in Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), the statutes were held to be susceptible of a limiting
construction and so not unconstitutional per se. Snyder v. Ware, 314 F. Supp. 335
(W.D. La.), aff'd per curiam, 397 U.S. 589(1970). Surely if a criminal penalty maybe
imposed so long as constitutional standards are met, punitive damages, a much less
drastic remedy, may be awarded under the same conditions.
16. Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Goldwater v. Ginzburg,
414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1969), reh. den., 397 U.S. 978
(1969).
17. Several states require that such effect be given to retraction efforts by the
defendant that attempt to minimize the harm his statement has caused. Eaton, supra
note 12, at 1439-43.




credence as the original statement, retraction has wisely been allowed only
to lessen the damage award rather than to defeat it entirely.
Senate Bill 794, a related measure, would have required radio and
television stations to retain for sixty days verbatim recordings of all news
broadcasts, editorial comments or analyses made by their employees. This
proposal would have aided the defamation plaintiff in proving the content
and communication of any defamatory remarks so aired and afforded the
defendant an opportunity to combat charges of defamation with evidence as
concrete as that available to newspapers and magazines. The provision was
not enacted, however.
PROPOSED CHANGES IN ARTICLE 2315
In the first hearing of Callais v. Allstate Insurance Company,'9 the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that a child could recover the damages
suffered as a result of the death of her parent even though the death was
caused solely by the negligence of that parent. Article 2315, the court
explained, affords recovery against any person whose negligent act causes
the death which results in the damage; the child could, therefore, recover
from her father's succession the damages she incurred when her father
deprived her of love, affection, and support by negligently killing himself.
This vast expansion of the wrongful death action created a substantial furor
which prompted the supreme court to grant a rehearing. 20 Another response
to the original decision was House Bill 817, not enacted, which would have
placed limits on the wrongful death action. The bill would have allowed the
beneficiaries named in Article 2315 to recover for wrongful death only
when the deceased could have recovered his damages had he survived. This
change would have prevented further decisions such as the original Callais
opinion by clearly expressing the legislative intent to the contrary. The
supreme court's decision on rehearing, however, eliminated the need for
enacting this provision. In its reconsideration the court denied recovery by
holding that the death was not a wrongful one because two parties-an actor
who caused the death and a victim whose death created the action-were not
involved. 2'
19. 334 So. 2d 692 (La. 1976).
20. 334 So. 2d 699 (La. 1976) (on rehearing).
21. A death is not wrongful, the court explained, unless it involves an element of
fault. Since there is no parental duty to protect a child against the risk of the parent's
own death, there was no negligence or fault as to the daughter and hence there could
be no liability. Id. at 701. See also Johnson, Death on the Callais Coach: The Mystery
of Wrongful Death and Survival Actions in Louisiana, 37 LA. L. REv. 1 (1976).
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A more far-reaching change was proposed by Senate Bill 261 which
would have defined the terms "man," "person," and "another" in Article
2315 to include human beings from the moment of conception. 22 This
proposal would have allowed the statutory beneficiaries to recover for the
wrongful death of a fetus occurring at any stage of its development.
Prenatal injuries and deaths have created complex problems in tort
actions because the unborn child is not considered a separate legal personal-
ity as it develops. 23 In Louisiana, a child born alive, or his parents if he
should later die, may recover for the damage caused by prenatal injuries
under the holding of Cooper v. Blanck.24 In dicta, the court intimated that a
wrongful death action would lie when a child is stillborn if the child was
"viable" when injured. 25 However, the first case to squarely consider that
question, Youman v. McConnell & McConnell, Inc.26 refused to allow a
wrongful death recovery. The Youman court felt constrained by Civil Code
Article 28 which does not recognize the separate legal personality of a
stillborn child 27 and only allowed the mother to recover for the pain and
anxiety she suffered between the accident and the birth and not for the loss of
the child as such. Subsequently another circuit court, in Valence v.
Louisiana Power and Light Company,2 expressed the view that it was not
22. For a discussion of similar definitional changes made in the criminal laws,
see The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1976 Regular Session-Criminal
Law, infra at 151.
23. Most jurisdictions allow a child born alive to maintain an action for his
prenatal injuries. Should he die from the injuries after his birth, an action will lie for
his wrongful death. Some courts have considered the child a person earlier in his
development, however, and have allowed the parents of a child stillborn because of
his injuries to bring an action for his wrongful death. PROSSER at 55. See also
Comment, Tort Liability for Prenatal Injury, 24 TUL. L. REv. 435 (1950); Note, 12
LA. L. REv. 519 (1952) for Louisiana's position; Note, 6 LOYOLA L. REv. 157 (1952).
24. 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1923) "We think it manifest that injury to a
child at this period (8 months), is in contemplation of law injury to a living child for
which the child, if it survives its birth, may maintain an action under Art. 2315."
(Emphasis added.) The child was born prematurely and died 3 days later.
25. "If the child be killed at this period (8 months) we see no reason why the
parents cannot maintain an action for the death." Id. at 360.
26. 7 La. App. 315 (2d Cir. 1927).
27. LA. Civ. CODE art. 28 provides: "Children born dead are considered as if
they had never been born or conceived." Article 29, which provides that "children in
the mother's womb are considered, in whatever relates to themselves, as if they were
already born" would seem to refute the Youman argument that nothing which is in
existence was injured. As the court in Cooper pointed out, an unborn child is an entity
separate enough to have a right of action survive for injuries to its father during its
gestation; surely the right of action for the child's prenatal injuries should survive for
the father.
28. 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951).
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Article 28's purpose to preclude recovery of damages under any circum-
stances if an unborn fetus is so injured that it cannot be born alive. Since the
mother can recover for the fear of miscarriage she suffers following an
accident,2 9 the court reasoned, she should certainly be allowed to recover
for the loss of her child if her fears are realized. The court in Valence held a
wrongful death recovery could be allowed where there is "actionable
negligence which causes such injury to a viable fetus as to prevent its being
born alive.' '30 Both the Valence and Cooper courts utilized the amorphous
concept of viability in discussing the possibility of a wrongful death
recovery. The new provision would have precluded any investigations into
"viability" since the loss of any child conceived would have been a
compensable injury. 31
Without this new provision a tortfeasor injuring a fetus who is later
born alive is liable in damages to the child, and, should the child die, the
parents may recover for wrongful death and also bring a survival action. On
the other hand, a tortfeasor causing a more severe injury which results in a
stillbirth need only compensate the mother for the fear and anxiety she
suffered before the birth, unless the Valence court's view 32 is adopted by the
other circuits. Since this allows the more serious offender to acquit his
responsibility to those injured more easily, the proposed change in Article
2315 would be a welcome one. However, a possibility exists that such a
broad provision could conflict with the United States Supreme Court's
decision recognizing a woman's qualified right to terminate her preg-
nancy .3 The new definitions in Article 2315 read broadly could allow the
29. See, e.g., Buckelew v. Plunkett, 242 So. 2d372 (La. App. 2dCir. 1970); Warr
v. Kemp, 208 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Olivier v. Transcontinental Ins. Co.,
93 So. 2d 701 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957); Jordan v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 90 So. 2d
529 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956); Youman v. McConnell & McConnell, Inc., 7 La. App.
315 (2d Cir. 1927).
30. Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847,850 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1951). The causal connection between the injury and the stillbirth must be clearly
shown; recovery was denied Mrs. Valence because the medical evidence offered
disputed the existence of any such causal relationship.
31. Presumably, adjustments in quantum could be made so that the amount of
damages awarded would adequately compensate the actual expectation the mother
has lost. Unfortunately, conception is also not a precise medical term. It is not nearly
so uncertain as viability, however, so it seems a better choice as a starting point for
liability.
32. See text at notes 28-31, supra.
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In the first trimester of pregnancy, the
decision to terminate rests with the mother and her doctor. The state may impose
reasonable regulations to protect the mother's health in the later stages of pregnancy




father of an aborted fetus to recover from the mother 34 and the doctor
performing the procedure for the wrongful death of his expected child. The
latest Supreme Court pronouncement in this field35 specified that the state
cannot give a husband or a minor's parents the right to veto an abortion.
Presumably, neither can the state afford the spouse a damage remedy since it
too could affect the mother's freedom to choose her own course of action.
However, because the proposed Louisiana provision could be subject to a
constitutional construction not limiting a woman's right to privacy and
would effect a beneficial change in the law, it is unfortunate that the
proposal was not enacted.
SHERIFF'S IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY
In a recent incident at the state penitentiary, guards knew that certain
armed inmates opposed the transfer of a fellow prisoner to another dormi-
tory and that the transferring prisoner had been threatened. A quarrel ensued
and an inmate was stabbed to death. The Louisiana Supreme Court, in
Breaux v. State,36 found that the guards should have anticipated the attack
and taken reasonable precautions to prevent it; because they did not, the
state was held liable for the death of the inmate. Earlier cases, 37 imposing a
lesser standard of liability, had held that a penal institution was not an
insurer of inmates against attacks by other inmates. Perhaps to prevent the
application of the somewhat stricter Breaux standard to parish officials,
House Bill 1213 was introduced. By its terms it would have relieved
sheriffs, deputies, and their insurers of liability arising from any injury to an
inmate which is either self-inflicted or the result of a battery by another
inmate. This proposed limitation on liability was not enacted; therefore
presumably the Breaux rationale could be extended to govern cases of
sheriffs' liability to injured parish prison inmates in the same way that it
governs cases involving inmates of the state prison.
34. An intraspousal immunity is created by LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1965) which
provides that a wife may sue her husband only in certain enumerated instances. This
immunity has been held to be personal only so that the wife may sue her husband's
insurer. LeBlanc v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 202 La. 857, 13 So. 2d245 (La. 1943).
A husband has also been allowed to recover from his wife's insurer. McHenry v.
American Employers Ins., 18 So. 2d 840 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944). The father of the
unborn aborted child could, of course, sue the mother who was not his wife but
proving his paternity might be extremely difficult.
35. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976).
Noted at 37 LA. L. REV. - (1976).
36. 326 So. 2d 481 (La. 1976).
37. Parker v. State, 282 So. 2d 483 (La. 1973); St. Julian v. State, 98 So. 2d 284





Act 407 of 1976 sets forth the requirements which must be met if
unwritten consent to medical treatment is to be valid.38 When consent is
oral, the explanation to the patient must include the same elements neces-
sary for proper written consent: the nature and purpose of the procedures
and the known serious risks to be encountered. An opportunity must be
given to the patient to ask questions which must be answered satisfactorily
in order for his consent to be truly informed.
The 1976 legislature also provided that those persons statutorily
authorized to consent to medical procedures for others 39 may enter into
binding medical arbitration agreements on behalf of those others without
court approval. 4°
Definition of Death
Act 233 of 1976 provides two definitions of death. The first defines
death as an "irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiratory and circulat-
ory functions.'"41 The adoption of such a definition has been mandated by
the rapid advances in medical technology, especially with regard to the use
of organs from deceased donors. Since organs must be transplanted soon
after the donor's death, doctors must be able to pinpoint an exact moment of
death after which they may legally remove the required organ. Where
organs are to be used in transplants, the bill creates an additional safeguard
by requiring that a second physician who is not a member of the transplant
team concur in the pronouncement of death.
The second definition covers the circumstance where artificial
methods of life support are maintaining respiration and circulation. Death
will occur in such a situation only when a physician announces that, in his
opinion based on standards of approved medical practice, there has been an
"irreversible total cessation of brain function." 4 2 Once this has been
38. LA R.S. 40:1299.40 (Supp. 1975) now provides guidelines for written con-
sent. Act 407 addes a new section to the existing statute, providing for oral consent.
39. LA. R.S. 40:1299.53 (Supp. 1975) provides that the following persons may
consent to treatment for others: any parent, adult or minor, for his minor child; any
married person for his spouse; any person standing in loco parentis for the minor in
his care; any adult for his minor sibling in the parents' absence; any grandparent for
his minor grandchild in the absence of the child's parents.
40. La. Acts 1976, No. 269, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.57 (Supp. 1976).




determined, the artificial methods would presumably be discontinued. This
does not recognize a "right to die" 43 since the patient is legally dead
because of the pronouncement before the artificial aid is removed. The
provision does not address the question which would arise should it be
possible for respiration and circulation to resume naturally once the artificial
aid was disconnected. 44 Should this occur the patient would then be alive
under the first definition though pronounced dead under the second.
Malpractice
The medical malpractice package enacted in 197541 underwent a
number of changes this year. Most of these, enacted by Act 183, were
procedural statutes. 46 The one year prescriptive period for malpractice
actions now applies to all persons, including minors and interdicts,47
regardless of their disability. A noteworthy change effected in the malprac-
tice system is the redefinition of the word "malpractice." Formerly the term
encompassed "[A]ny tort or breach of contract based on health care or
professional services rendered."4 It is now limited to unintentional torts
and breaches of contract; 49 intentional acts are not given the benefit of the
malpractice system's protection. The new definition further includes "all
legal responsibility of a health care provider arising from defects in blood,
tissue, transplants, drugs and medicines, or from defects in or failures of
43. See Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976) (recognizing that
artificial methods may be discontinued in certain cases, allowing the patient to die if
his body cannot itself maintain life).
44. Karen Quinlan remains "alive" two and one-half months after her artificial
life support, a respirator, was disconnected. Baton Rouge State Times, Monday,
August 16, 1976. At the time the artificial breathing apparatus was removed from
Miss Quinlan, however, she did not meet the medical criteria of brain death;
presumably a Louisiana patient would meet these criteria before such artificial aid
could be withheld.
45. LA. R.S. 40:1299.41 et seq. (Supp. 1975). For a general discussion of the
changes effected by the 1975 enactments see Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice
Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV. 655 (1976).
46. Act 183 of 1976 amends many of the present malpractice statutes and makes
provision for doctors and health care providers who intend to remain self-insured,
changes the administration of the Patients' Compensation Fund designed to cover
awards in excess of $100,000, and effects minor changes in both the Residual
Malpractices Insurance Authority and in the procedures of medical review panels.
47. LA. R.S. 9:5628, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 214.
48. LA. R.S. 40:1299.41(8) (as it appeared prior to Act 183 of 1976).
49. LA. R.S. 40:1299.41(8), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 183, § 1. The same
definition is also found in LA. R.S. 40:1299.39A(5), added by La. Acts 1976, No. 66
and amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 660.
[Vol. 37
LEGISLATIVE SYMPOSIUM
prosthetic devices, implanted in or used on or in the person of a patient." 5"
While appearing to broaden the liability of health care providers, the new
definition does not necessarily have such an effect. Construed strictly, it
merely includes those defects for which health care providers were previ-
ously held legally responsible within the definition of malpractice. Health
care providers have been held liable for supplying defective products of this
nature only when there was some negligence involved. 5' However, as an
effect of the new definition, actions of this sort will now be considered
malpractice actions and therefore subject to the malpractice system's
prescription rules and its limitations on liability.52
In response to an outcry from the physicians of the state's charity
hospitals, the legislature attempted to relieve those doctors of their heavy
insurance burdens.53 The first attempt was rushed through the legislative
process and signed by the governor early in the session. This law, Act 66,14
provided that no person rendering health care services for any state agency
could be held liable for any act of malpractice; rather, suit was to be
instituted against the state which would be liable for any damages awarded.
As the session progressed, many legislators became convinced that a more
carefully constructed program was required. Thus, Act 660"5 allows suit to
be brought against a state-employed health care provider but limits his
potential liability to $500,000 and establishes a state fund to pay the
expenses of defending claims and to satisfy judgments or compromises. The
state's medical personnel are therefore no longer required to carry insurance
50. LA. R.S. 40:1299.41(8), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 183, § 1.
51. In article 1764(B), the Civil Code provides that the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness are not applicable to sales of human blood, plasma,
tissues or organs and that these are not products but are rather medical services.
Courts have held that this statute extinguishes all causes of action relative to these
services except for the negligence action. See, e.g., Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Services,
506 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.. 1975); Juneau v. Interstate Blood Bank, 333 So. 2d 354 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1976). Doctors must take care that drugs are administered properly by
denoting specific dosage instructions. Norton v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 144 So. 2d 249
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
52. No judgment exceeding $500,000 may be rendered in a medical malpractice
action. The health care provider is liable for the first $100,000 and the excess is to be
recovered from the Patients' Compensation Fund. LA. R.S. 40:1299.42 (Supp. 1975).
53. The 1975 package was designed to remove the burden of heavy premiums
from private physicians. An earlier attempt, LA. R.S. 40:1299.38 (Supp. 1975),
designed to aid those employed by state agencies by providing insurance at no cost to
them, proved insufficient to meet their need for greater protection against malprac-
tice actions.
54. La. Acts 1976, No. 66, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.39 (Supp. 1976).
55. La. Acts 1976, No. 660, amending LA. R.S. 40:1299.39 (Supp. 1976).
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to cover potential malpractice liability and the injured victim is allowed to
recover damages from the state up to the statutory ceiling.
56
Res Ipsa Loquitur in Malpractice
The tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been applied in malpractice
actions by the Louisiana courts when the facts suggest the defendant's
negligence as the most plausible explanation of the injury.5 7 Since use of
this doctrine shifts the burden of proof to the health care provider to show
that he is free of negligence, 58 it has been restricted to use only when there
have been unusual or untoward occurrences during the time of medical
supervision." Proposals before the legislature this session would have
limited application of res ipsa loquitur to specifically enumerated instances:
a foreign substance unintentionally left in the body after surgery, 60 an
explosion or fire caused by a substance used in the treatment ,61 an
unintended burn suffered during medical care, 62 an injury suffered to a part
of the body not directly involved in the treatment, 63 and a surgical procedure
performed on the wrong patient or the wrong part of the patient's body. The
provision would, of course, have eased a doctor's defense by decreasing the
number of instances in which he could be called upon to carry the burden of
proof. Its restrictiveness, however, would have prevented any further
jurisprudential extensions of the doctrine and would have denied trial judges
the flexibility needed to prevent unjust results.'
Reconventional Demands
Two bills proposed the creation of a new cause of action for profession-
als beset by malpractice claims. 65 A professional forced to defend a
56. For a discussion of the argument that such recovery limitations are uncon-
stitutional, see Medical Malpractice, supra note 45, at 667-69.
57. McCann v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 276 So. 2d 259 (La. 1973).
58. Bryant v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 272 So. 2d 448 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1973).
59. McCann v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 276 So. 2d 259 (La. 1973); Wells v.
Woman's Hosp. Foundation, 286 So. 2d 439 (La. App. I st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 288
So. 2d 646 (1974).
60. Grant v. Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204, 223 So. 2d 148 (1969); Chappetta v.
Ciaravella, 311 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 So. 2d 841 (1975).
61. Andrepont v. Ochsner, 84 So. 2d 63 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955).
62. Davis v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 293 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
63. McCann v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 276 So. 2d 259 (La. 1973); Jacobs v.
Beck, 141 So. 2d 920 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
64. For a discussion of the constitutionality of placing statutory restrictions on
this tort doctrine see Medical Malpractice, supra note 45, at 679.
65. La. H.B. 657, 39th Reg. Sess., 1976; La. S.B. 277, 39th Reg. Sess., 1976. The
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malpractice claim not based on probable cause would have been allowed to
recover his attorney's fees and the damages occasioned by and expenses
incurred in defending the frivolous suit. The claim could have been asserted
either by reconventional demand or in an independent action brought by the
professional following rejection of the original demand. To escape liability,
the original plaintiff would have been required to prove that probable cause
existed at the time his suit was brought. While such a provision would
decrease the number of frivolous suits66 against professionals, it might also
have discouraged plaintiffs with legitimate claims who feared exposure to
this potential liability.
MATRIMONIAL REGIMES
In Louisiana married residents tacitly consent to the community of
acquets or gains absent a contrary stipulation in a marriage contract.' The
husband as "head and master" of the community controls and manages the
community assets, subject to the wife's concurrence in only a few limited
instances. 2
When title to community property stands in the wife's name, her
consent is required to sell or mortgage those assets. 3 In addition, prior to
1976, there were instances when the wife's consent was required before
certain community property could be alienated by the husband, but only if
affirmative steps had been taken to insure that her concurrence was
necessary. Pursuant to Civil Code article 2334, the wife could declare that
her consent was necessary before immovable property standing in both
spouses' names could be leased, mortgaged, or sold by her husband. 4
Furthermore, if community immovable property had been authentically
declared the "family home" by either spouse, the wife's consent was
provisions were designed to apply to claims against any professional, not only health
care providers.
66. The medical review panel procedure created in LA. R.S. 40:1299.47 (Supp.
1975) seems an adequate safeguard against frivolous claims against health care
providers.
I. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2329, 2332, and 2399.
2. E.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2404. Under this article the husband cannot donate
any immovable or a fractional part of the movables of the community without the
wife's consent unless it is to establish their children in marriage or in a trade or
profession.




required before that property could be sold or mortgaged. 5
With the advent of the women's rights movement, recent Supreme
Court decisions, 6 and the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, 7 attention
has focused on the fairness, constitutionality, and future reform of the entire
Louisiana community property regime.8 Most objections appear to stem
from the fact that the community assets are included in the husband's
patrimony9 and evidence a dissatisfaction with the system's foundations. '
0
The consensus among contemporary writers appears to be that the question
no longer is how to defend Louisiana's community regime as it now exists,
but rather how to reform it."
The Louisiana State Law Institute has established a committee to
prepare amendments to Louisiana's community property law. This commit-
tee, however, has yet to propose any extensive reform measures. 2 While
awaiting reform proposals from the Law Institute, the 1976 legislature
amended article 2334 of the Civil Code to require the wife's consent before
5. LA. R.S. 9:2801-04 (1950) (as they appeared prior to Act No. 679 of 1976).
6. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (social security payments of
benefits to widows, but not widowers; held unconstitutional); Frontiero v. Richard-
son, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (statute favoring dependents of male members over the
dependents of female members of the armed services invalid under fifth amendment
due process clause); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (Idaho statutory preference for
males to administer intestate's estate struck down as violative of the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause).
7. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92dCong., Ist Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1971).
8. See Bartke, Community Property Law Reform in the U.S. and in Canada,
50 TUL. L. REV. 213 (1976); Bilbe, Constitutionality of Sex-Based Differentiations in
the Louisiana Community Property Regime, 19 LOYOLA L. REV. 373 (1973). Pascal,
Updating Louisiana's Community of Gains, 49 TUL. L. REV. 555 (1975); Community
Property: Symposium on Equal Rights, 48 TUL. L. REV. 560 (1974).
9. Community Property Law Reform in the U.S. and in Canada, supra note 8, at
222; Updating Louisiana's Community of Gains, supra note 8, at 562 where Profes-
sor Pascal notes that "women have objected that no disbursement of community
funds can be made by the wife except as the husband's mandatary; that separate
creditors of the wife may not enforce their rights against community assets; that
nevertheless the husband may employ community funds and other assets as he
pleases, even for his separate interests, subject to the necessity of the wife's consent
in only a few instances; and that even the husband's separate creditors may enforce
their rights against the community as long as the regime lasts."
10. Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973). LA. CIV. CODE arts.
2334, 2404.
11. See note 8, supra.
12. The Law Institute did propose one bill concerning matrimonial regimes




the husband may sell or encumber community property in the name of the
wife, immovable property in the name of both the husband and wife, or
community immovable property declared the family home. 3 The husband,
without the wife's consent, may alienate immovable property which is in the
name of both spouses 14 or has been designated as the family home 5 when an
authentic act declaring that the wife's consent is not necessary has been filed
in the conveyance records of the parish where the property is situated. This
action by the legislature does not radically reform the law, but merely
automatically extends to the wife rights which she was previously able to
claim by affirmative declaration.' 6 Since few married women made such
declarations, or even knew that they could, the changes by the legislature
are praiseworthy. The amendments will result in a multiplication of situa-
tions requiring joint spousal participation in the management of the com-
munity. Third parties dealing with the marital partners will require com-
pliance with these provisions to ensure the validity of contracts or
conveyances.'
7
In 1976 the Louisiana legislature, acting upon the recommendation of
the Law Institute, did enact legislation which may have a pronounced effect
upon the relationship between the community and the separate creditors of
each spouse. 8 To understand this legislation's implications, it is necessary
13. La. Acts 1976, No. 679, § I amendingLA. CIv. CODE art. 2334; La. Acts 1976,
No. 679, § 2 amending LA. R.S. 9:2801-02; 2804 and LA. R.S. 35:11.
14. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2334, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 679. The
declaration by the wife has to be by authentic act and recorded in the mortgage and
conveyance records of the parish in which the property is situated. Such a declaration
may be general to all such property or specify the property to which it shall or shall
not apply; it may apply generally to property acquired in the future but may be
withdrawn by the recording of a contrary declaration by the wife. Note that no
change is made with respect to any community property standing in the wife's name.
Today, as prior to 1976, the wife's written consent is required before the husband
may affect such property. In addition the declaration provisions described in the text
are unavailable with respect to property standing in the name of the wife.
15. LA. R.S. 9:2801, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 679. LA. R.S. 9:2801 now
provides that where the owner of a parcel of land by authentic act declares that he is a
married man and designates the property as a family home then that property may no
longer be alienated by the husband alone except where the wife has recorded the
declaration that her consent is not required as provided by article 2334 of the Civil
Code.
16. See the text accompanying notes 3-5, supra.
17. In addition LA. R.S. 35:11 now requires notaries to include in the acts they
pass not only the marital status of the parties but also a declaration by any married
party that the affected property is or is not the family home.
18. La. Acts 1976, No. 444.
1976]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
to first review recent developments concerning the rights of each spouse's
separate creditors to satisfy the debts owed them from community assets.
In 1968, in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Green,' 9 the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the husband's antenuptial (and therefore
separate) debts could not be satisfied from community property. The
decision was based on Civil Code article 2403, which appears to say without
restriction that the antenuptial debts of each spouse are to be paid out of the
separate assets of the debtor spouse, and on a line of decisions which
described the wife's interest in community assets as a present one-half
ownership. 20 The court reasoned that to pay the husband's debts out of
community property would be to permit the use of the wife's assets to satisfy
the husband's obligations. Then, in 1973, the supreme court in Creech v.
Capitol Mack, Inc.21 permitted an antenuptial debt of the husband to be
satisfied out of community property. Justice Barham's decision resorted to
Spanish sources to demonstrate that Civil Code article 2403 was drafted
specifically to regulate the rights and responsibilities between spouses and
was never intended to establish the legal relations between a creditor and a
husband. Therefore, Justice Barham concluded, the article was not to be
read to preclude the husband's separate creditors from seeking satisfaction
out of community assets. 2  Discussing those decisions indicating that the
wife has a present ownership in the community, Justice Barham noted that
all the property of a debtor is subject to the rights of his creditor and stated
that the problem before the court was to determine which assets are included
in the patrimony of each spouse under a community of acquets and gains .23
The court concluded that the wife's interest in the community is an
"imperfect ownership" 24 and noted that the husband's patrimony consists
of his separate property and the community of acquets and gains. 25
19. 252 La. 227, 210 So. 2d 328 (1968).
20. The principal decision is Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926);
see also Fazzio v. Krieger, 226 La. 511, 76 So. 2d 713 (1954).
21. 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973). For a general discussion of the case see Younger,
Louisiana Wives: Law Reform to Their Rescue, 48 TUL. L. REV. 567, 576-80 (1974);
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Matrimonial
Regimes, 35 LA. L. REV. 303 (1975); Note, 48 TUL. L. REV. 619 (1974).
22. 287 So. 2d 497, 506-07. The court noted that the Green decision had failed to
consider Civil Code articles 3182 and 3183 which do establish creditors' rights against
their debtors. Id. at 500.
23. Id. at 504.
24. This was based on the fact that under Civil Code articles 2404-23 the wife is
given various options upon the dissolution of the marriage in regard to claiming or
renouncing her one-half interest in the community.
25. The court recognized that under Civil Code article 2404 the husband as head
and master of the community generally administers all things in the community "as if
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Therefore, since the community is a part of the husband's patrimony, it is
subject to his creditor's rights.26 The opinion specifically overruled Green,
Phillips v. Phillips,27 and Fazzio v. Kreiger28 insofar as they declared the
wife to own community assets in indivision with the husband before
dissolution of the community.
Prior to 1975 only the husband's antenuptial debts could be satisfied
from community assets;29 after a woman married, her antenuptial creditors
had no recourse except against her separate property. 3° Then in 1975 the
Louisiana legislature enacted the Louisiana Equal Credit Opportunity Law
(LECOL)3' which allows a woman's antenuptial debts to be satisfied from
community assets to the extent of her "earnings." 32 Therefore, while the
husband's separate creditors are able to satisfy his separate obligations from
all of the community's property, the wife's separate creditors are limited to
those community assets which represent her earnings. If the wife is not a
wage earner her creditors have no right to any of the community assets. 33
The legislature, acting upon the recommendation of the Louisiana
State Law Institute, enacted Civil Code article 2398 which provides:
Each spouse owns a present undivided one-half share in the community
property subject to the management of the community by the husband
in accordance with the rights and restrictions provided by law. 34
Certainly Creech is overruled insofar as that decision held that the wife does
not have a present interest in the community.35 The Act does not specify,
they were his own property" and as a result third parties "necessarily" view the
husband's patrimony as including the assets and liabilities of the community. 287 So.
2d at 508.
26. Id. at 510.
27. 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926).
28. 226 La. 511, 76 So. 2d 713 (1954). This case indicates that the husband's
antenuptial creditors were limited to only the husband's one-half interest in the
community.
29. Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973).
30. Greenleeze v. Penny, I La. 241 (1830); Flogny v. Hatch, 12 Mart. (O.S.) 82
(La. 1822). Even the wages of a working woman are unavailable since Civil Code arts.
2334, 2402, and 2404 establish her earnings as community property subject to the
husband's control. The exception is that the community is bound by the contracts
executed by the wife as a public merchant. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 131, 786.
31. La. Acts 1975, No. 705.
32. LA. R.S. 9:3585 (Supp. 1976).
33. LA. R.S. 9:3516(15) (Supp. 1975) defines earnings as "compensation paid or
payable to an individual or for his account for personal services rendered or to be
rendered by him ....
34. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2398, as enacted by La. Acts 1976, No. 444 (emphasis
added).
35. The language used in article 2398 appears to follow that used in Phillips v.
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however, the rights of each spouse's separate creditors who seek to satisfy
their debts from the assets of the community. It appears that the real issue
Justice Barham addressed in Creech was the inconsistency of permitting the
husband's separate creditors to satisfy their claims out of community assets
while existing decisions recognized the wife's right in the community as a
present undivided one-half interest. Justice Barham was forced to overrule
these decisions; otherwise the payment of the husband's antenuptial debts
out of community assets would be use of the wife's property to satisfy the
husband's obligations. 36 Therefore, the 1976 legislation overruling Creech
may have removed the right of the husband's separate creditors to reach any
community property.
It may be contended that the wife's separate creditors are now in a
superior position to the husband's separate creditors. If the 1975 legislation
permitting the wife's creditors to reach her "earnings" (which are a part of
the community) 37 remains unaffected by the 1976 legislation it can be
contended that the husband's separate creditors are discriminated against if
they are unable to reach any of the community assets. In addition, the wife
still may renounce the community upon the dissolution of the marriage, 38
thus exonerating herself and her heirs from the debts contracted during
marriage. The husband has no such right and this right in the wife is
inconsistent with the theory of present ownership which appears to be
established by Civil Code article 2398." 9 If Creech has been legislatively
overruled, one resolution of the resulting problems is to find that by this
enactment the legislature intended to establish that each spouse's antenup-
tial creditors are to be limited to only one half of the community assets.4°
Such an interpretation would remove the possibility of discrimination and
expand the rights of the wife's creditors.4 1 Similar measures are recognized
Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584 (1926), which was overruled by Creech. In Phillips
the court said that "the wife had not a mere expectancy but the absolute ownership of
half of the community property subject to the husband's power of administration."
Id.
36. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2301-14. See also the text at notes 19-29, supra.
37. See note 30, supra.
38. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2410.
39. Cf. Note 48, TUL. L. REV. 618, 625 (1974).
40. Cf. Fazzio v. Kreiger, 226 La. 511, 76 So. 2d 713 (1954).
41. The wife may claim that under Creech she is discriminated against since her
separate creditors are unable to reach the community assets while the husband's
creditors are able to do so. The husband may claim, after the overruling of Creech by
Civil Code article 2398, that he is discriminated against since LA. R.S. 9:3584 permits
the wife's separate creditors to reach a portion of the community, i.e., her wages. See
the text accompanying notes 30-34, supra.
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as an integral part of the reform of a community property regime.42 The
wife's right to renounce the community might be rationalized as a right
granted to counter the husband's rights as head and master of the commun-
ity." However, the right to renounce is of questionable constitutionality'
and as noted above is inconsistent with the theory that the wife has a present
undivided ownership interest.4 5 Therefore, since the legislature did provide
that all prior conflicting legislation was repealed, 6 there is a basis for
contending that the wife no longer possesses that right.
The previous discussion illustrates that there must be a comprehensive
reform of the Louisiana community property regime. Piecemeal legislation
cannot make the system more responsive to today's needs. The resultant
confusion in business transactions will demonstrate the need for extensive,
thoughtfully prepared reform proposals in the next regular session of the
legislature.
SECURITY DEVICES
Often the purchaser of property agrees to assume payment of an
existing obligation owed by the vendor to a third party.' In most cases the
obligation which is assumed is itself secured by a mortgage or other
privilege on the property-sold. A problem exists in situations where a vendor
sells two or more tracts of land, each subject to a mortgage securing his
separate debts, and the vendee assumes the obligations secured by the
mortgages. Although the vendee's payment of the debt secured by a
mortgage on the first tract will extinguish the mortgage on that tract, the
42. See Community Property Law Reform in the U.S. and in Canada, supra note
8, at 237.
43. Cf. Williams v. Williams, 331 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976). Such a contention is
questionable in the light of the language of Civil Code article 2398. The article
indicates that the husband is the "manager" of the community, not the head and
master. This appears to be a restriction of the husband's powers under Civil Code
article 2402. For the text of article 2398 see the text accompanying note 29, supra.
44. See note 6, supra.
45. See the text accompanying note 39, supra.
46. La. Acts 1976, No. 44, § 3.
I. The courts have held in such cases that the creditor whose obligation is
assumed may directly enforce the buyer's promise to pay the debt and the vendor's
privilege securing it on the theory that the undertaking is in the nature of a stipulation
pour autrui in favor of the creditor. See, e.g., A.G. De L'isle v. Succession of Moss,
34 La. Ann. 164, 168 (La. 1882).
1976]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
vendee's promise to pay the obligation secured by the mortgage on the
second tract is considered to be as much a part of the purchase price of the
first tract as it is of the second if both were sold together. 2 Until both
obligations are satisfied, the vendor enjoys a vendor's privilege to secure
payment on the entire property including the first tract so that title to the first
tract remains encumbered.'
Act 338' is intended to alleviate this problem by creating a presumption
that the vendor's privilege on each piece of property is limited to that portion
of indebtedness secured by a pre-existing mortgage on the property, unless
the parties agree otherwise. Although the intent of the Act seems clear, it is
worded ambiguously and is incomplete in that it does not clearly indicate
whether a right of resolution still exists over the entire property. The right of
resolution of a sale for nonpayment of the purchase price is an independent
substantive remedy that is not dependent upon the existence of a vendor's
privilege.' If the right of resolution is not divided, even after the payment of
one of the mortgages, title to the property will still be encumbered.
Act 3156 allows the parties to a mortgage of either movable or
immovable property to designate a keeper or receiver to act in the case of a
foreclosure or seizure. The parties to the mortgage may designate the person
who is to serve as keeper by expressly naming him in the mortgage
instrument or by describing the method by which he is to be selected. 7 If
petitioned by the creditor, the court must direct the sheriff or other seizing
officer to appoint as keeper of the seized property the person that the parties
to the mortgage designated. If the parties have not designated a keeper and
the sheriff for any reason wishes the court to appoint one, the court must
direct the sheriff to appoint a keeper designated by the court.
The keeper or receiver has full powers of management and administra-
tion of the property and must perform his duties as a prudent administrator.
All revenues received during his administration must be applied by the
2. See Citizens' Bank of Louisiana v. Succession of Cuny and Clement, 38 La.
Ann. 360 (La. 1886); LA. CIv. CODE art. 3249(l).
3. The fact that the vendor's privilege still exists is occasionally overlooked by
title examiners who, upon finding that the mortgage on one tract is cancelled after
payment, assume the property to be free of encumbrances.
4. La. Acts 1976, No. 338, adding LA. R.S. 9:5383 (Supp. 1976).
5. See Sliman v. McBee, 311 So. 2d 248, 253 (La. 1975); Louis Werner Saw Mill
Co. v. White, 17 So. 2d 264, 266 (La. 1944).
6. La. Acts 1976, No. 315, adding LA. R.S. 9:5136-40.1 (Supp. 1976).
7. The parties to the mortgage are not restricted in whom they may choose to be
keeper, except that the parties may not name a keeper other than the owner during his
occupancy of the mortgaged property as his home. LA. R.S. 9:5136 (Supp. 1976).
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keeper first to his costs in administering or preserving the property, and any
balance must be applied to the debt secured by the mortgage. The keeper
must render an accounting of his administration at such times as the court
before which the proceedings are pending may direct. If the keeper,
mortgagor, or moktgagee believes that some action beyond the ordinary
course of administration is required to preserve or protect the property, or if
the mortgagor or mortgagee believes that the keeper is acting beyond his
authority, such party may apply to the court for instructions concerning the
proper course that should be taken by the keeper. 8
Act 3599 changes the procedure for the garnishment of wages, salaries,
and commissions. The Act requires the garnisher to serve upon the gar-
nishee the citation, petition, garnishment interrogatories, notice of seizure,
and a statement of sums due under the garnishment.'°
TRUSTS AND ESTATE PLANNING
In T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery' the Louisiana Supreme
Court held on rehearing that the death benefits of employee retirement and
profit sharing plans were payable to the designated beneficiary even though
the written designation was not in testamentary form. 2 The court recog-
nized, however, that the beneficiary is accountable to any complaining
forced heir or community spouse if the beneficiary's receipts of proceeds
violates either the forced heir's legitime or the spouse's community owner-
ship rights.
Act 4943 is in accord with the rationale of T.L. James in providing that
any designation form permitted by a deferred compensation plan4 is valid
8. Such party may apply to the court before which the proceedings are pending,
in a summary proceeding with notice to the mortgagor and mortgagee if they are not
parties to the application, for instructions as to the proper course that should be taken
by the keeper. LA. R.S. 9:5138; 5140 (Supp. 1976).
9. La. Acts 1976, No. 359 amending LA. R.S. 13:3923, 3927 (1950).
10. LA. R.S. 13:3923 (as it appeared prior to 1976) required that only a writ of
garnishment or one set of interrogatories be served in a garnishment of wages. The
statement of sums due under the garnishment may include principal, interest, court
costs, and attorney's fees.
1. 332 So. 2d 834 (La. 1976).
2. The court had held on original hearing that the proceeds passed by intestacy
since the designation form was not in testamentary form. Id. at 847.
3. La. Acts 1976, No. 494, adding LA. R.S. 23:651-53 (Supp. 1976).
4. La. Acts 1976, No. 494, adding LA. R.S. 23:651 (Supp. 1976) defines "plan"
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for the purpose of naming a beneficiary. Such a designation will remain in
effect until terminated as provided by the plan and need not be in any
specific form, e.g., testamentary or authentic.
The Official Revision Comments to Section 652 of Act 494 give sound
policy reasons for validating the beneficiary designation form without
requiring the written designation to be in testamentary form. Because many
payrolls necessarily cross state lines, it is inconvenient if not impossible for
the employer to design a form which meets the testamentary requirements of
every applicable state. It seems unreasonable to require the designation to
take testamentary form, especially when most employees die intestate and
many who die testate make no mention of deferred compensation plan
benefits in their wills. Moreover, the inclusion of plan benefits in the
succession would subject the benefits to the expense and delays of adminis-
tration, and to federal estate 5 and Louisiana inheritance taxes, 6 from which
benefits payable to a named beneficiary other than the succession are
presently exempt.
Act 2047 adds a procedure for the transfer by a banking association of
the contents of safety deposit boxes, money, or other property in the name of
a deceased or in which the deceased has an interest. The association may
deal with such property in accordance with its contract with the customer
until it receives notice in writing of the customer's death. After receiving
notice and upon proper authority8 and obtaining a receipt, an association
may transfer the deceased's property to the succession representative, the
surviving spouse, heirs, or legatees of the deceased; however, no such
transfer may be made until the inheritance tax due the state has been fixed
and paid or until the collector of revenue approves the transfer.
broadly to include "any arrangement, agreement, contract, plan, system or trust
whereby a participant acquires an enforceable right to retirement income where
payment is deferred until the termination of employment or thereafter ... " The
Official Revision Comments of Section 651 indicate that the definition of "plan"
does not include ordinary gratuities nor does it include benefits such as retirement
bonuses which are customary, but to which a participant has no enforceable right.
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(C).
6. LA. R.S. 47:2404, as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 512, § 1.
7. La. Acts 1976, No. 204, adding LA. R.S. 6:770-71 (Supp. 1976).
8. LA. R.S. 6:770(B), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 204, provides that the
letters of the succession representative, or the judgment recognizing and putting the
heirs in possession accompanied by letters of tutorship or curatorship of the heirs
who are not sui juris, will constitute proper authority for making the transfer. The
letters issued to the legal representative of an interdict or minor will constitute proper




Several acts of interest pertaining to Louisiana corporation law were
passed in the 1976 legislative session. Act 6311 changes the procedure by
which the secretary of state may revoke the franchise and articles of
incorporation of a company which has failed to designate and maintain a
registered office or agent for ninety consecutive days, or which has failed to
file a franchise tax return and annual report for three consecutive years.2 At
least thirty days prior to his action, the secretary must inform the affected
corporation of his intention by directing notice to its last designated
registered agent.3 The secretary must record notice of revocation in the clerk
of court's office in the parish where the corporation maintains its registered
office. 4 Act 631 also transfers to the attorney general three other causes of
action previously available to the secretary of state to revoke a corporation's
franchise and articles of incorporation.5
Act 6866 adds a new chapter to the Louisiana Corporation Laws to
provide for the organization of professional chiropractic corporations. The
Act prohibits such corporations from engaging in any business other than
I. La. Acts 1976, No. 631, amending LA. R.S. 12:163 (1950).
2. Previously, if a corporation failed to file either a franchise tax return oran
annual report, the secretary of state was authorized to suspend its articles of
incorporation and state franchise and to bring a subsequent action against the
corporation for the revocation of the articles and franchise. LA. R.S. 12:163(a)(5)
(1950). Under the new law, the secretary may make the revocation without a court
proceeding, but only after he certifies that no annual report has been filed in his office
during three consecutive years, and after the collector of revenue certifies that no tax
is due or lien outstanding and that no franchise tax return has been filed by such
corporation within the same three year period. The secretary also is authorized to
revoke the franchise of a corporation which has failed to maintain a registered office
or agent for ninety consecutive days upon.the certificate by the collector of revenue
that no tax is due or lien outstanding. LA. R.S. 12:163A (Supp. 1976).
3. Although Act 631 requires the secretary to give notice to the corporation of
his intention to revoke the corporate franchise, no method is provided in the act for a
corporation to rectify its violation of the act. Presumably, the corporation could
apply for an injunction to halt the secretary's action.
4. In Orleans Parish notice also must be recorded in the office of the recorder of
mortgages. LA. R.S. 12:163(C) (Supp. 1976).
5. Now the attorney general, rather than the secretary of state, may bring an
action when the corporate franchise was procured through fraud practiced upon the
state; or the corporation has continually abused authority conferred upon it; or the
corporation should not have been formed or has been formed without substantial
compliance with the conditions precedent to incorporation.
6. La. Acts 1976, No. 686, adding LA. R.S. 12:1051-65 (Supp. 1976).
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chiropractic, but allows the holding of property for investment or for
carrying on the chiropractic enterprise. A professional chiropractic corpora-
tion is restricted to issuing only common shares of stock, and only
shareholders may be officers and directors.
In the event that a final disposition of a corporation has not been
effected within one year from the date that dissolution is authorized, Act
3127 requires the liquidator to prepare a report indicating the assets and
liabilities of the corporation as of the date of authorization of dissolution, the
disposition of any assets as of the date of the report, and the anticipated tax
year in which a final accounting and distribution to the shareholders will be
made. The report must be updated annually until the final disposition of
assets and dismissal of the liquidator.
Act 4608 allows a corporation to change the name of its registered agent
or the location of its registered office by including the change in the
corporation's annual report. 9 Notice of the change must be recorded both in
the office of the recorder of mortgages of the parish in which the new
registered office is located and the recorder's office in the parish from which
the registered office is changed.
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Act 441 provides that no person2 may make a business take-over offer3
of a target company4 unless the offer conforms with the procedural
requirements specified in the Act. The offeror is required to file a disclosure
7. La. Acts 1976, No. 312, adding LA. R.S. 12:145(I) (Supp. 1976).
8. La. Acts 1976, No. 460, adding LA. R.S. 12:104(E) (Supp. 1976).
9. LA. R.S. 12:104B & C (1950) specify other procedures for a corporation to
change the name of its registered agent or the location of its registered office.
I. La. Acts 1976, No. 44, adding LA. R.S. 51:1500-12 (Supp. 1976).
2. Person is defined as an individual, corporation, association, partnership,
trust or other entity. La. Acts 1976, No. 44, addingLA. R.S. 51 :1500(9)(Supp. 1976).
3. "Take-over offer" is defined as an offer to acquire or the actual acquisition
of any equity security of a company in which the offeror after acquisition would be
directly or indirectly a record or beneficial owner of more than five percent of any
class of outstanding equity securities. La. Acts 1976, No. 44, adding LA. R.S.
51:1500(l1) (Supp. 1976).
4. Acts 1976, No. 44, adding LA. R.S. 51:1500(12) (Supp. 1976) defines "target
company" as "a corporation or other issuer of securities which is organized under
the laws of this state or has its principal place of business or a substantial portion of




statement with the commissioner of financial institutions that must include
such information as the identity and background of the offeror, the source
and amount of funds used to acquire any equity security, the number of
shares which the offeror presently owns of the target company, and any
contracts or arrangements with any person with respect to equity security of
the target company. No later than the date for filing the disclosure statement
with the commissioner, the offeror must send a copy of the disclosure
statement by certified mail to the target company at its principal office. The
commissioner, offeror, target company, and any equity security owner of
the target company may obtain injunctive relief whenever a person has
engaged or is about to engage in a practice violating a provision of the Act.
Criminal sanctions may be imposed,5 and any offeror who does not comply
with the Act is liable for damages to any person selling securities to him.
Modeled after the Indiana statute on business take-over offers,6 Act 44 is a
thorough protective measure for companies and their shareholders con-
fronted with a business take-over offer.
Act 498' contains changes concerning the management, organization
and powers of state banking institutions. Every state banking association
must be managed by a board of directors of not less than five nor more than
thirty directors, regardless of the size of the bank's capital, surplus, and
undivided profits.' No director of a banking association may be fined for
missing a meeting of the board of directors.9 Act 498 increases the amount
of subscribed capital necessary for the lawful organization of a banking
association or savings bank'0 and provides that immovable property held by
5. Any offeror who fails to file a disclosure statement may be imprisoned for a
period not to exceed one year or fined an amount not to exceed five thousand dollars,
or both. Any person making a knowing misrepresentation of a material fact or who
deliberately withholds information from the commissioner in connection with a
business take-over offer may be imprisoned for a period not to exceed five years, or
fined an amount not to exceed ten thousand dollars, or both. La. Acts 1976, No. 44
adding LA. R.S. 51:1508 (Supp. 1976).
6. IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-2-3-1 to 23-2-3-12 (1971).
7. La. Acts 1976, No. 498 amending LA. R.S. 6:2; 3; 6; 7; 16; 22; 37; 151; 234;
235; 238; 240; 241; 251; 254; 255; 259; 261; 328; 389(B); 390; and 400.
8. LA. R.S. 6:2(A), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 44 eliminates the right of
banks to have five extra directors for each million or fraction thereof, of capital
surplus and undivided profits exceeding two million.
9. A fine had been imposed by the State Bank Commissioner on a director who,
without an acceptable excuse, failed to attend three consecutive regularly called
meetings of the board of directors. La. Acts 1976, No. 498 amending LA. R.S. 6:2
(1950).
10. La. Acts 1976, No. 498 amending LA. R.S. 6:234 (1950) provides that no bank
may be organized with less than three hundred thousand dollars subscribed capital
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a bank for reasons other than the transaction of business can be held no
longer than ten years. I I Additionally, Act 498 requires banking associations
and savings banks to disclose three additional liabilities in their quarterly
reports submitted to the commissioner: notes and bills rediscounted,
amounts due to persons not already included in the report, and liabilities on
letters of credit, acceptance and guarantees. Act 453 also affects state
banking institutions'2 by increasing to fifty percent the portion of direct
obligations of the United States government includable in the required
reserve fund of a banking association.
PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION
Confronted with a sprawling executive branch exhibiting growth
without concerted purpose or planning, the delegates to the 1973 Constitu-
tional Convention recognized a need to reorganize the executive branch.
The 1974 Louisiana Constitution thus included general guidelines' mandat-
ing that all departments, offices, and agencies of the executive branch,
except for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor, be organized
according to function within not more than twenty departments, 2 no later
except that in incorporated municipalities of three thousand to thirty thousand
population the lower limit is one hundred fifty thousand dollars, and in municipalities
of less than three thousand population, the limit is one hundred thousand dollars. LA.
R.S. 6:235, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 498 (Supp. 1976) designates similar
requirements for the organization of savings banks.
II. La. Acts 1976, No. 498 amending LA. R.S. 6:240(4) (1950) increases from
five to ten the number of years which banking associations or savings banks may hold
immovable property not acquired for the transaction of their business.
12. La. Acts 1976, No. 453 amending LA. R.S. 6:249(E) (1974).
I. LA. CONST. art. IV, § I; art. XIV, § 6.
2. In organizing all departments, offices, and agencies of the executive branch
according to function within departments, the Louisiana Constitution recites lan-
guage similar to provisions contained in other state constitutions. See. e.g., ALAS.
CONST. art. III, § 22; COLO. CONST. art. IV, § 22: HAWAII CONST. art. IV, § 6; MICH.
CONST. art. V, § 2; Mo. CONST. art. IV, § 12; and N.J. CONST. art. V, § 4. Requiring
that agencies be grouped according to function is intended to eliminate needless
duplication of services, and providing that all agencies of the executive branch be
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than December 31, 1977. 3
In partial compliance with the provisions of the new Constitution, Act
720 of 1975' organized all executive agencies, exclusive of the offices of
governor and lieutenant governor, into nineteen departments according to
function. The Act also created the Joint Legislative Committee on Reor-
ganization of the Executive Branch, gave it authority to make all necessary
studies to fully effect the constitutional mandate and required it to report its
findings to the legislature.5 Changes suggested by this committee and
amendments adopted during the legislative process are contained in Act 513
of 1976,6 the Executive Reorganization Act.
Act 513 designates twenty executive departments, twelve of which are
newly created, to incorporate particular agencies and to fulfill specified
functions.7 The remaining eight departments, which are currently under the
control of statewide elected officials, are continued without alteration.
8
Eleven of the new departments are directly responsible to the governor
while one, the Department of State Civil Service, continues to be an
independent agency headed by the director of civil service.
allocated to not more than twenty departments is a step toward ensuring agency
accountability and responsibility.
3. On its face Article IV, Section 6 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution purports
to set an inviolable deadline for reorganizing the executive branch. This "mandate"
imposed on the legislature seems unenforceable, however. It is highly doubtful that a
writ of mandamus could issue requiring the legislature to perform its assigned task of
reorganizing the executive department. The "mandatory" deadline was not intended
to be a court-enforceable duty imposed by the constitution on the legislature. See
STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VERBATIM TRANS-
cirTS, Vol. XXIX, Day 89, p. 38 [hereinafter cited as VERBATIM TRANSCRIP'rS].
4. La. Acts 1975, No. 720, adding LA. R.S. 36:1-960 (Supp. 1975).
5. La. Acts 1975, No. 720, adding LA. R.S. 36:931-37 (Supp. 1975).
6. La. Acts 1976, No. 513 amending LA. R.S. 36:1-960 (Supp. 1975).
7. The twelve newly created departments are: (1) Department of Commerce,
(2) Department of Corrections, (3) Department of Culture, Recreation and Tourism,
(4) Department of Health and Human Resources, (5) Department of Labor, (6)
Department of Natural Resources, (7) Department of Public Safety, (8) Department
of Revenue and Taxation, (9) Department of Transportation and Development, (10)
Department of Urban and Community Affairs, (11) Department of Wildlife and
Fisheries, and (12) Department of State Civil Service. LA. CONST. art. X, Part I
created the Department of State Civil Service while the other eleven departments are
created by Act 513.
8. La. Acts 1976, No. 513 amending LA. R.S. 36:154 (Supp. 1975). The eight
departments headed by elected officials are: (1) Department of Agriculture, (2)
Department of Education, (3) Department of Elections, (4) Department of Insurance,
(5) Department of Justice, (6) Department of Public Service, (7) Department of State,
and (8) Department of the Treasury.
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Each of the eleven departments responsible to the governor has a
similar structure, consisting of a secretary, a deputy secretary, an undersec-
retary, and a varying number of assistant secretaries. The secretary of each
department is appointed by the governor, serves at his discretion, and is the
chief administrative officer responsible for department policy.9 The secre-
tary must appoint a deputy secretary to carry out assigned duties and to serve
as acting secretary in the secretary's absence. 10 Unlike Act 720 of 1975, Act
513 confers on the governor the authority to appoint the undersecretary,
who is responsible for the management and financial functions of the
department," and the assistant secretaries, 12 who are to head each office
within the department except for the office of management and finance.' 3
All appointments are subject to confirmation by the Senate.
Recognizing the difficulties inherent in the consolidation of a mul-
titude of agencies into a limited number of departments, Act 513 specifies
several distinct methods of transferring agencies to the various departments.
Some agencies "continue to be composed and selected as provided by
law," thereby retaining substantial authority to operate independently of the
secretary, undersecretary, and any assistant secretaries. 14 A second method
of transfer for other specific agencies requires all agency powers, duties,
and functions to be placed under the administration and control of the
secretary of the department to which the agency is transferred.' 5 Another
transfer method provides that the functions and duties of each agency will
vest in the secretary, with the transferred agency serving the secretary in an
9. Included in the secretary's enumerated duties is the duty to provide for the
ongoing merger and consolidation of the agencies and functions transferred to his
department and to submit a report thereon to the governor and the legislature. La.
Acts 1976, No. 513 amending LA. R.S. 36:154 (Supp. 1975).
10. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 36:401 (Supp. 1976) which provides that the deputy
secretary for the Department of Public Safety shall also serve as the head of the office
of state police.
11. Although the secretary has authority to assign additional duties to the
undersecretary, he cannot change the management functions assigned to the position
by law. LA. R.S. 36:405 (Supp. 1976).
12. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 36:406 (Supp. 1976). Several exceptions exist to the
general rule that the governor will appoint the assistant secretary of each office. LA.
R.S. 36:207(A) (Supp. 1975), as amended byLa. Acts 1976, No. 513; LA. R.S. 36:107,
added by La. Acts 1976, No. 513; LA. R.S. 36:357(A) (Supp. 1975), as amended by La.
Acts 1976, No. 513.
13. In the Department of Public Safety, the office of state police as well as the
office of management and finance will not be headed by an assistant secretary. La.
Acts 1976, No. 513 amending LA. R.S. 36:407 (Supp. 1975).
14. LA. R.S. 36:801-10 (Supp. 1975), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 513.
15. LA. R.S. 36:851-56 (Supp. 1975), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 513.
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advisory capacity in regard to agency policies.' 6 Act 513 abolishes sixty-
eight agencies, committees, and commissions; 7 however, the abolishment
is in name only since the employees and functions of the agencies are
transferred to one of the twelve departments.18
Perhaps the most important difference between Act 720 of 1975 and
Act 513 is the change in management structure within the departments
responsible to the governor. Although both Acts provide for the appoint-
ment of the secretaries by the governor, Act 720 gave the secretary the
authority to appoint his subordinates-the deputy secretary, undersecre-
tary, and assistant secretaries-whereas, Act 513 provides that the secre-
tary's only direct appointment is the deputy secretary. Act 513 offers an
inferior management structure compared to the 1975 reorganization act: 1
9
the secretary remains the chief administrative officer of the department
under Act 513, but his authority is limited since he must supervise key
management personnel whom he can neither hire nor fire. 20 Although the
additional appointments afford the governor more flexibility, the numerous
appointments also mean that the governor will not be able to divest himself
of continued involvement in the affairs of the departments.
2
'
An area remaining for future consideration in Louisiana's executive
reorganization is the determination of which state officers should be
appointed by the governor and which should be elected. The delegates to the
1973 Constitutional Convention, after emotional debate, 22 finally agreed
that the governor, lieutenant governor, and seven of the department heads
16. LA. R.S. 36:901-08 (Supp. 1975), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 513.
17. La. Acts 1976, No. 513, adding LA. R.S. 36:921 (Supp. 1976).
18. LA. R.S. 36:921-26 (Supp. 1976), added by La. Acts 1976, No. 513. See
Volume 24, Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc., Legislative Bulletin
No. 3, p.2 (June 4, 1976). But see LA. R.S. 36:559(E) (The powers of the local affairs
advisory committee are transferred to the Governor's Committee on Intergovern-
mental Relations.).
19. A comprehensive reorganization of state administrative agencies is de-
signed to provide efficient and responsive state government, but the management
structure provided in Act 513 makes the intended goals of executive reorganization
more difficult to achieve. The lines of authority are overlapping and the assignment
of responsibility and accountability are made more difficult since the undersecretary
and assistant secretaries are answerable both to the secretary and to the governor.
20. Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc., Legislative Bulletin,
Vol. 24, No. 3, p. 3 (June 4, 1976).
21. Id. Allowing the governor to appoint the secretary of each department would
give the governor sufficient control over department operations without requiring
him to appoint an assistant secretary for every office within each department and the
undersecretary of each department.
22. See VII VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS at 23-24, 31.
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were to be elective rather than appointive officials.2 3 Article IV, Section 20
was adopted, however, stating that after the first election of state officials
under the 1974 Constitution, the legislature by two-thirds vote may provide
for the appointment, in lieu of election, of the superintendent of education
and the commissioners of elections, agriculture, and insurance. A funda-
mental principle of effective governmental organization requires that top
administrative officials be appointed by and be responsible to the chief
executive officer of the state, the governor, 24 who is the only officer in
Louisiana charged with the responsibility of seeing that the laws are
faithfully executed. For this reason, the legislature should follow the
nationwide trend of gradually reducing the number of elected state adminis-
trative officials 25 and provide for the governor's appointment of the superin-
tendent of education and the commissioners of elections, agriculture, and
insurance. The legislature may not make the offices of the secretary of state,
attorney general, and treasurer appointive without amending the
constitution.26
Act 513 continues the Joint Legislative Committee on Reorganization
of the Executive Branch to undertake all necessary studies and to propose
legislation in order to accomplish executive reorganization. 2' Hopefully,
through this committee's recommendations and careful legislative delibera-
tion, Louisiana will complete, within the constitutional time limit, a
systematic and comprehensive reorganization of state administrative agen-
cies that will help create a more efficient executive branch. As demands and
circumstances change, the organizational structure of the executive branch
should be reexamined to ensure responsiveness to Louisiana's needs.
23. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 3 provides that the governor, lieutenant governor,
secretary of state, attorney general, treasurer, commissioner of agriculture, commis-
sioner of insurance, superintendent of education, and commissioner of elections are
to be elected for a term of four years.
24. The Council of State Governments, Reorganizing State Government 107
(1950).
25. Id., quoting from the Legislative Committee for Reorganization of State
Government, Possible Improvements in Governmental Organization in Idaho, p. 16
(1949).
26. Providing that these officers should be elected conforms with Louisiana's
political and constitutional history as well as accepted practice in other states.
27. LA. R.S. 36:931-37 (Supp. 1976), added by La. Acts 1976, No. 513. The
committee must complete its study and determine its recommendations to the
legislature no later than March 7, 1977, and submit to each member of the legislature




With state spending continuing to increase 28 and the largest source of
state revenue, the severance tax, expected to decline, the Louisiana legisla-
ture has expressed concern over the cost and efficiency of state government.
Act 14629 amends the state budget laws to provide for zero-base budgeting
and uses the Senate Finance Committee, the House Appropriations Com-
mittee, and the Legislative Budget Committee as a joint committee to
supply legislative oversight3" of the budget process. Act 27731 contains a
"sunset" provision32 providing for the termination of all statutory entities at
graduated time intervals with a procedure for their re-creation after a
zero-base budget review and evaluation. Both acts are intended to attain
substantially the same goal as executive reorganization: to create an
executive branch which is efficient and responsive to the needs of the state.
Zero-base budgeting is a comprehensive approach in which spending
for each unit must be justified from a zero base without any reference to
previous spending. 3 Under the incremental budgeting approach which had
been used in Louisiana, only changes from the current budget were
examined in preparing the new budget. Incremental budgeting assumes that
what has occurred in the past is still valid; consequently, only a small
portion of the total budget is closely examined. Zero-base budgeting
reverses this assumption: 34 each agency must analyze and justify its entire
appropriations request, current as well as proposed activities.
35
28. State spending has more than doubled from 1.529 billion dollars in the
1969-1970 fiscal year to 3.129 billion in the, 1975-1976 fiscal year. State of Louisiana
Financial Statement, Louisiana Division of Administration.
29. La. Acts 1976, No. 146, adding LA. R.S. 24:141, 39:43.1, 39:44.1, 39:45.1.
30. The implementation of zero-base budgeting in Louisiana represents a radical
departure from the state's present budget policies. Legislative oversight of zero-base
budgeting is designed to assist legislators in obtaining information necessary to
correct problems and to otherwise assure compliance with legislative policy and
intent.
31. La. Acts 1976, No. 277.
32. "Sunset" laws require government agencies and programs to justify their
existence periodically or face extinction. Colorado pioneered the sunset movement
and sunset measures were introduced this spring in California, Florida, Illinois, and
other states. In Congress, sunset legislation proposes that federal government
programs, grouped by functional areas, come up for renewal every five years. See
State Judiciary News, Vol. 2, No. 4 (June 4, 1976).
33. Public Affairs Research Council of Louisiana, Inc., Legislative Bulletin,
Vol. 24, No. 3, p. 4 (June 4, 1976).
34. 122 CONG. REC. 1134 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1976).
35. Hearings on S. 2925 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of
the Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. Testimony of Stephen
L. Neal, (D. N. Cal.) 55 (1976).
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Acts 146 and 277 provide different yet compatible programs for the
implementation of zero-base budgeting in Louisiana. Act 146 requires that
the executive budget present a complete financial plan for the ensuing year.
The budget must contain, inter alia, a budget message signed by the
governor; a detailed statement identifying all substantial aspects of agency
activities, including a priority ranking of these activities and a statement
concerning the effect of funding each activity at seventy percent of its
current level;36 and a presentation of the measurements used to determine
standards of performance. 37 To provide for the orderly implementation of
zero-base budgeting, 10% of all units in the executive budget must be
submitted on a zero base in the 1977-78 fiscal year,38 50% in the next fiscal
year, and thereafter, the entire executive budget must be prepared on a zero
base.
Act 277 mandates that all legislative authority for the existence of each
statutory entity39 shall cease according to a schedule extending from July 1,
1979 to July 1, 1982.4° Two years prior to the scheduled termination of any
entity, the standing committee or committees having jurisdiction must
conduct a zero-base budget review, recommend an appropriate budget
level, a" and submit a report of its findings to both houses of the legislature.
A bill may be introduced authorizing the re-creation of any entity in the year
prior to that entity's scheduled termination; however, any statute that
creates or re-creates a statutory entity after the effective date of Act 277 must
contain a termination date for that entity no more than four years from the
date that the entity is created or re-created.
By examining each budget in its entirety, zero-base budgeting can be
36. One study indicates that the statement of the effect of funding the budget
unit at 70 percent of its current level is threatening to agency personnel since to
submit a cost figure on such reduced operations encourages the legislature to reduce
an appropriation. LaFaver, Zero-Base Budgeting in New Mexico, 47 STATE GOVERN-
MENT 108, II1 (1974).
37. La. Acts 1976, No. 146, adding LA. R.S. 39:43.1A (Supp. 1976).
38. The executive budget office must determine which agencies will submit their
budget requests on a zero base. At least one constitutional agency, one agency with
multiple means of financing, and one agency with complex program structure must be
selected by the executive budget office in the 1977-78 fiscal year.
39. The term "statutory entity" is defined broadly to include "any office,
department, agency, board, commission, institution, division, officer or other person
or functional group created and continued in existence by statute or legislative
resolution to which state funds are appropriated." La. Acts 1976, No. 277.
40. La. Acts 1976, No. 277, § 2.
41. La. Acts 1976, No. 277, § 4. The committees conducting the zero-base
budget review must give notice to the statutory entity of its termination date and of
the budget review at the time they begin the review.
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an effective tool in determining what resources are available and how these
resources should be allocated among the various state agencies. Many
private corporations and a few state and local governments 42 employ
zero-base budgeting, and at least one bill is currently pending in Congress to
implement zero-base budgeting at the federal level .43 The major disadvan-
tage of zero-base budgeting which has prevented its widespread employ-
ment is the increased paperwork resulting from an agency having to justify
annually its entire budget proposal. No budgeting system is ideal, however,
and despite the added demands placed on state agencies, zero-base budget-
ing should offer a superior budgeting technique to the incremental approach
which has failed to provide the information needed to effectively evaluate
state operations. Provided state agencies are able to supply accurate cost
information," the implementation of zero-base budgeting can help make
Louisiana government more productive and accountable. If the workload
placed on state agencies proves to be excessive, the legislature may wish to
require a comprehensive zero-base budget review less often than annually.
45
LEGISLATIVE OVERVIEW
Legislative overview of the executive branch of government is an area
in which most state legislatures, including Louisiana's, have performed
poorly.' In order to hold executive agencies accountable for their conduct
of public policy, Act 27947 provides a detailed procedure whereby the
legislature may review the exercise of rulemaking authority by state
42. See, e.g., LaFaver, Zero-Base Budgeting in New Mexico, 47 STATE GOVERN-
MENT 108 (1974).
43. S. 2925, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
44. The detailed cost information required for the submission of a zero-base
budget will be difficult to supply for many agencies. One study indicates that historic
cost and performance data are seldom available for the budget unit, and therefore,
estimates usually must be used with the understanding that pertinent data will begin
to be compiled for future use. LaFaver, supra note 36, at 108.
45. S. 2925, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), originally provided for a zero-base
review and evaluation every four years. Requiring that state budget units submit a
zero-base budget review less frequently may be advantageous for Louisiana due to
the state's short legislative session. Possibly none but the most pressing budget issues
may be considered during the short legislative session, so that state employees will
have worked to develop materials that were not used. If zero-base budgets were
submitted less frequently, perhaps both the budget unit employees and the state
legislators would be inclined to give them greater attention.
46. See Tucker, Legislative Overview: Progress in Florida, 49 STATE GOVERN.
MENT 115, 116 (1976).
47. La. Acts 1976, No. 279 amending LA. R.S. 49:953;954.1 ;967 and adding LA.
R.S. 49:968 (Supp. 1976).
1976]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
agencies. Act 279 requires that an agency, prior to the adoption, amend-
ment, or repeal of any rule, submit to the appropriate standing committees a
report relative to the rule change. After the agency submits its report, the
committees may meet to review the proposed change48 and may submit their
recommendation to the agency which proposed the change. Thirty days
prior to the beginning of each regular session, agencies which have
proposed rule changes during the previous year must submit updated reports
to the appropriate standing committees, including statements of actions
taken and summaries of all data, views, and arguments received by the
agency concerning the rule changes.49 No later than the second legislative
day of each regular session, standing committees to which rule changes
have been referred may submit to the legislature a report containing
summaries of all committee action and any recommendations for statutory
changes concerning the agency.
5°
LOUISIANA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
Act 52451 provides that confidential or privileged records and docu-
ments in an agency's possession must not be made available for adjudication
proceedings of that agency, and may not be subject to subpoena by any
person or other state or federal agency.52 Any disclosure in violation of the
Act's prohibition will be a waiver of governmental immunity from suit for
damage resulting from such disclosure.
Act 279 eliminates the special exemptions formerly given to the State
Bond Commission and the Atchafalaya Basin Division from the Louisiana
Administrative Procedure Act.53 The 1974 amendment5 4 to the Louisiana
Administrative Procedure Act redefined the term '"agency" intending to
bring the State Bond Commission and the Atchafalaya Basin Division
within the scope of the Act; but, prior to Act 279, doubts remained whether
48. LA. R.S. 49:968D (Supp. 1976), added by La. Acts 1976, No. 279.
49. LA. R.S. 49:968H (Supp. 1976), added by La. Acts 1976, No. 279.
50. For a discussion of legislative overview of the executive rule-making process
in other states, see Dakin, The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure
Act-Critique and Commentary, 25 LA. L. REV. 799, 806 (1965).
51. La. Acts 1976, No. 524, adding LA. R.S. 49:956(8) (Supp. 1976).
52. The privileged records or documents may only include any private contracts,
geological and geophysical information and data, trade secrets, and commercial or
financial data, which are obtained by an agency through a voluntary agreement.
53. These exemptions were formerly given by LA. R.S. 49:951-67 (Supp. 1967).
The Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act was adopted to replace the myriad of
rules governing agency procedure with a uniform and comprehensive system.
54. LA. R.S. 49:951(2) (Supp. 1967), as amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 284.
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the exemptions might still apply. 55
LOUISIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
Under Article IV of the Louisiana Constitution, the Louisiana Public
Service Commission must, within twelve months after a common carrier or
public utility files a proposed rate increase, render a full decision on the
proposed rate change.56 If the decision is delayed beyond that date, the
proposed increase may be put into effect pending final action by a court of
last resort, but only if and as provided by legislation, and subject to
protective bond requirements.57 Act 15158 permits a common carrier or
public utility to implement a proposed rate increase subject to protective
bond or security requirements59 whenever the Louisiana Public Service
Commission fails to render a full decision within twelve months after the
effective filing date. The rates, which become effective on the filing of the
prescribed bond or security, may be continued in effect, until final determi-
nation of the validity of the increase by the commission, or if appealed, by
the court. 6°
The Louisiana Supreme Court in South Central Bell Telephone Co. v.
Louisiana Public Service Commission61 held that mandamus is the proper
remedy to compel the commission to perform its constitutionally imposed
duty of rendering a decision upon a proposed rate increase by South Central
Bell. The court also held that the trial court, absent enabling legislation, did
not have the authority to order a rate increase even though the commission
had made no decision on the rate increase within the required twelve month
period. Act 151 provides the enabling legislation required by the constitu-
tion62 so that common carriers and public utilities now may implement
proposed rate increases, subject to protective bond or security requirements,
whenever the Public Service Commission fails timely to render a decision.
55. See Comment, Louisiana's "New "AdministrativeProcedureAct, 35 LA. L.
REV. 629, 633-35 (1975).
56. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 21(D)(2).
57. Id. § 21(D)(3).
58. La. Acts 1976, No. 151, adding LA. R.S. 45:1163.2 (Supp. 1976).
59. LA. R.S. 45:1163.1(A)(5), added by La. Acts 1976, No. 151. The common
carrier or public utility must file with the commission a protective bond or security to
assure full refund. The protective bond is in the amount that the common carrier or
public utility certifies to the commission it will receive within the twelve month
period following the effective filing date of the bond.
60. LA. R.S. 45:1163.1(C) (1976), added by La. Acts 1976, No. 151.
61. 334 So. 2d 189 (La. 1976).




Act 69563 limits the powers of the Dairy Stabilization Board by
prohibiting the board from regulating or establishing the wholesale or retail
prices of dairy products.' 4 The board is still empowered, however, to
prohibit unfair methods of competition, as well as unfair, deceptive and
disruptive trade acts or practices with respect to the sale of milk and milk
products, and is directed to promulgate rules and regulations to define with
specificity prohibited acts and practices.
Regulation in the form of milk price fixing is commonly justified as
necessary to assure the local producer a minimum price, thereby benefitting
the public interest by insuring a sufficient supply of milk for the state. The
Louisiana Supreme Court has upheld price regulation of milk as a proper
exercise of state police power, 65 and the Sherman Act exempts the practice
from its proscription as a valid exercise of the state's sovereignty. 66
Although the state may regulate milk prices, price regulation has been
criticized as increasing the price of milk to the consumer in an attempt to
protect small dairies which cannot compete with modern means of produc-
tion and distribution. Studies tend to indicate that state control of milk prices
has acted as a trade barrier, preventing or retarding the use of new dairy
technologies and methods that competitive markets have adopted. 67 By
eliminating the Dairy Stabilization Board's power to regulate wholesale
dairy prices but still directing the board to prevent disruptive trade practices,
Act 695 balances competing interests by allowing competition while
offering some protection to small dairies. 68 With the passage of Act 695,
Louisiana still should be insured an adequate supply of milk and milk
products, with the possibility that milk prices will decrease in the absence of
wholesale price regulation.
63. La. Acts 1976, No. 695 amending LA. R.S. 40:931.5;931.6;931.8;931.10 F;
931.10 G; and 931.13 (1974).
64. LA. R.S. 40:931.5 (1974), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 695, prohibits
price regulation of dairy product sales by retailers but does not prohibit price
regulation at the wholesale level.
65. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts. v. McCrory, 112 So. 2d 606, 617 (La.
1959).
66. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Ass'n, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
67. Louisiana Legislation of 1962-Public Law Ass'n, 23 LA. L. REV. 70, 76
(1962).
68. Support existed for abolishing the Dairy Stabilization Board altogether, but





Until recently, a judicially created estoppel known as the St. Julien
doctrine, allowed entities with the power of expropriation to acquire
servitudes by unopposed use or possession.' Under this doctrine, if a
property owner had "consented" or "acquiesced" in the use or possession
of his land by such an entity, he was not permitted to reclaim his property
free from the servitude, but was restricted to his right of compensation. 2
This doctrine allowed expropriating entities to acquire a servitude by simply
obtaining the oral or written consent of the apparent landowner.3 This
procedure was especially valuable to those expropriating entities which
could not use a "quick-taking" procedure to expropriate 4 because it usually
eliminated the great time and expense of title searches and formal expropria-
tion procedures.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Lake v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co.,' specifically overruled St. Julien and the cases relying thereon, holding
that the doctrine created by these cases violated Civil Code article 766 which
prohibits acquisition of servitudes not both continuous and apparent, except
by title.6 This case would require the expropriating entity, in order to avoid a
later order to remove its facilities and pay damages for trespass, to examine
I. The doctrine is named after the parent case, St. Julien v. Morgan's La. &
Tex. Ry. Co., 35 La. Ann. 924 (1883).
2. A.K. Roy, Inc. v. Board of Comm 'rs of Ponchartrain Levee Dist., 238 La.
926, 117 So. 2d 60 (1960); St. Julien v. Morgan's La. & Tex. Ry. Co., 35 La. Ann. 924
(1883); Comment, Expropriation-A Survey of Louisiana Law, 18 LA. L. REV. 509,
533-36 (1958).
3. See Sutherland, Acquisition of Apparent Servitudes, 24 LA. B.J. 31, 36
(1976).
4. "Quick-taking" refers to an expropriation procedure by which an ex parte
order prior to judgment transfers ownership provided that the taker deposits with the
court funds equal to the taker's appraisal of the property right acquired. Article I, § 4
of the constitution allows the legislature to provide a quick-taking procedure for the
state and its political subdivisions, but not for private entities with the power to
expropriate. See Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1974). Presently, the only entity legislatively
provided with such a procedure is the Department of Highways. LA. R.S. 48:441-60
(Supp. 1976).
5. 330 So. 2d 914 (La. 1976).
6. Since this was the basis of the decision, it would seem that the St. Julien
doctrine, if constitutional, would still apply to the acquisition of continuous and
apparent servitudes. However, the category of continuous servitudes was severely
restricted by Nash v. Whitten, 326 So. 2d 856 (La. 1976), and the Lake case, so that
most servitudes to be expropriated will not be continuous and apparent. There are
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title to each tract of land it crosses to find the record owner. If there were a
cloud on the title or the record owner could not be located, formal
expropriation would be necessary.
The legislature reacted to the Lake decision by passing Act 504 which
provides that if the state or a political corporation or subdivision
has actually, in good faith believing it had authority to do so, taken
possession of privately owned immovable property of another, and
constructed facilities upon, under or over such property with the
consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property, such owner shall
be deemed to have waived his right to contest the necessity for the
taking and to receive just compensation prior to the taking, but he shall
be entitled to bring an action for such compensation . . . to be
determined as of the time of the taking of the property ....
Similar language is used to delineate the rights of the parties when a private
corporation with the power of expropriation has done the taking, with the
exception that the landowner is entitled to bring an action for judicial
determination of whether the taking was for a public and necessary
purpose.8 Therefore, private corporations must be careful when using the
procedure allowed by this Act to ensure that the purpose for the taking is
"public and necessary" to protect against a later order to remove their
facilities and to respond in damages for trespass. This will be difficult in
light of the fact that the "public and necessary purpose" requirement was
created by the 1974 Constitution and there is yet little authority for
determining its meaning.
9
The Act requires the expropriating entity to be "in good faith believing
it had authority to take possession." Since the Lake decision conditions
authority to take possession upon valid title, the Act read literally seems to
require the entity to believe that it has valid title, and thus to check title to
each tract of land it crosses. However, the purpose of the Act was probably
essentially to reinstate the St. Julien doctrine within the constitutional
restrictions of Article I, § 4. Viewed in this light, the phrase should be
interpreted as only a general good faith requirement which would be
satisfied by acquiring the consent of the apparent owner of the land.
The expropriating entity must also have constructed facilities upon,
also serious questions as to the validity of a St. Julien doctrine under the present
Louisiana constitution.
7. La. Acts 1976, No. 504, amending LA. R.S. 19:14 (Supp. 1976).
8. The reason for the difference is article I, § 4 of the constitution, which makes
the validity of the purpose of a private taking a judicial question.
9. For some guidance, see Hargrave, supra, note 4, at 17.
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under, or over the property before the Act applies. Apparently if the
landowner objects to the taking during the early stages of possession before
any facilities are constructed,' 0 he is entitled to recover his land free of the
servitude, regardless of his prior acquiescence or oral consent.
In the Lake case, the plaintiff argued that the St. Julien doctrine
violated federal and state constitutional provisions, but the court, while
noting that the arguments were persuasive, decided the case on other
grounds. " Act 504 may come under similar constitutional attack. At first
glance, it seems to violate the state constitutional requirement of prior
payment. 2 The Act provides that the landowner waives this right, and this
waiver will probably be upheld in the case of consent by the owner. But in
the case of acquiescence, the waiver provision could be held unconstitu-
tional if "acquiescence" is construed liberally against the landowner.' 3
However, even in this instance, the prior payment requirement could be met
by construing the Act to mean that the expropriating entity does not actually
acquire the interest in the land until payment is made.
The Act may also be tested against the constitutional requirement that
the taking be for a public purpose. '4 The Act provides that the landowner
waives the right to contest the taking on this ground, and again there seem to
be no problems with this in the case of consent. But if "acquiescence" is
construed liberally against the landowner, this provision may take away his
opportunity to protect his interest in the land and thus violate due process. '
10. He may have to "object" by filing suit for an injunction against the
expropriating entity in order to keep from "acquiescing." See text at note 16, infra.
11. 330 So. 2d 914, 917 (La. 1976).
12. The requirement of prior payment was expressly stated in article I, § 2 and
article IV, § 15 of the 1921 constitution, and is continued by article I, § 4, of the 1974
constitution, as seen by the language". . . with just compensation paid to the owner
or into court for his benefit" (emphasis added). The reason for including the
emphasized phrase was to allow the state to take property through quick-taking
procedures on the payment of just compensation into court (for the benefit of the
landowner) without violating the prior compensation requirement. Thus if the
requirement was not meant to be continued, there would have been no purpose in
including the emphasized phrase.
13. This could be done by either requiring the landowner to take extraordinary
actions or to take action within a very short period of time in order to keep from
acquiescing. See text at notes 15 and 16, infra.
14. This attack could only arise against the state and a political corporation or
subdivision, because the question of whether the taking was for a "public and
necessary" purpose in the case of private entities with the power to expropriate is not
waived by the landowner under this Act. See text at note 8, supra.
15. For the due process requirements in expropriation cases, see M. DAKIN & M.
KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA 31 (1970).
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The only guidance in construing "acquiescence" is the jurisprudence under
the St. Julien doctrine, which indicated that if the landowner did not file suit
for an injunction against the expropriating entity within a very short time
after it took possession, he had acquiesced. 6 If under this concept of
acquiescence the landowner is given a reasonable time 17 within which to file
the suit before he is deemed to have acquiesced, the provisions of the Act
should be upheld against a due process attack.
Act 391 makes several changes in the Department of Highways
Quick-Taking statutes.' 8 Previously, if the defendant had failed to file his
answer timely, the court, on ex parte motion of the department, was to
render judgment for the department fixing just compensation as the amount
deposited in the registry of the court and to award that sum to the
defendant.'9 The Act provides that if the defendant has failed to file his
answer timely, the department must notify him of the pendency of the
proceedings by certified mail. If an answer is not filed within ten days after
mailing of the notice, the court will render judgment for the department as
stated above.2" Also, in order to introduce evidence on "special benefits" 2'
the department must now specially plead them, unless the defendant pleads
severance damages, in which case the department has the opportunity to
plead special benefits twenty days prior to trial.22
16. See, e.g., Gray v. Department of Highways, 250 La. 1045, 202 So. 2d 24
(1967); Williams v. Department of Highways, 92 So. 2d 98 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1957).
17. Perhaps the time within which the landowner must file suit for injunction
before he will be deemed to have acquiesced will be held to be any time before the
expropriating entity constructs facilities on, under, or over the land, since the
provisions of the Act do not seem to apply before that time. See text at note 10, supra.
18. La. Acts 1976, No. 391 amending LA. R.S. 48:441-60(Supp. 1976). See also
note 4, supra.
19. LA. R.S. 48:452 (as it appeared prior to Act 391 of 1976).
20. LA. R.S. 48:452 (Supp. 1976), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 391.
21. "Special benefits" are any increases in value to the remainder of the
landowner's property due to the expropriation or facilities constructed on the
expropriated property. LA. R.S. 48:453(B) (Supp. 1974).
22. LA. R.S. 48:456.1 (Supp. 1976), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 391. The
Act also puts a $500 limit on the bond or other security which a landowner must post
in order to have a jury trial on the question of just compensation, La. Acts 1976, No.
391 amending LA. R.S. 48:451.3 (Supp. 1976), and reverses the order of the presenta-
tion of evidence, allowing the defendant to present his evidence of value first. La.





In State v. Gyles,' the Louisiana Supreme Court, interpreting a
Louisiana murder statute, 2 followed common law authorities in defining the
term "human being." 3 The court found that striking a pregnant woman,
thereby causing stillbirth, was not punishable as the murder of a human
being under Louisiana law.4
La. Acts 1976, No. 256, amending LA. R.S. 14:2(7) (1950), however,
casts doubt upon the continued use in Louisiana of the common law
definition of "human beings," i.e. "those who have been born and who
thus have an existence independent of their mothers . . . . "5 Act 256
amends the definition of "person" in LA. R.S. 14:2(7) (1950) by providing
in pertinent part: 'Person' includes a human being from the moment of
conception .... . This change may have a marked effect upon the
interpretation of many Louisiana criminal statutes dealing with crimes
against the "person.'"6 It could be argued that Act 256 has no effect upon the
crime of murder since the Louisiana murder statutes refer to human beings
rather than to persons. It is suggested, however, that Act 256 indirectly
defines human being as well as person by referring to a "human being from
the moment of conception .... " The Act thus, by implication, recog-
nizes that a fetus is a human being from the moment it is conceived and is
included in the definition of person.
COMMITMENT OF JUVENILES
La. Acts 1976, No. 443, amending LA. R.S. 15:901 (Supp. 1976),
removes two ambiguities from the law concerning commitment of juveniles
to the Department of Corrections. LA. R.S. 15:901 (1950) (as it appeared
prior to Act 443 of 1976) explicitly prohibited a statement in an or-
der of commitment of a juvenile that "the child is delinquent or
I. 313 So. 2d 799 (La. 1975).
2. LA. R.S. 14:30.1 (Supp. 1973) (as it appeared prior to La. Acts 1976, No.
657).
3. Justice Barham presented a thorough list of common law authorities as well
as a history of Louisiana views on the term "human being." 313 So. 2d at 800-01.
4. Id. at 801.
5. Id. at 800-01. See also People v. Chavez, 176 P.2d 92 (Cal. 1947) (finding a
viable fetus which had entered the birth process to be a human being); Keeler v.
Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (refusing to extend the Chavez rule to a fetus
which had not entered the birth process).
6. SeeLA. R.S. 14:29-50. SeealsoRoev. Wade,410U.S. 113, 150,163-65(1973)
(dealing with states' interest in the matter of abortion); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 96 S. Ct. 2831 (1976); Note, 37 LA. L. REV. 270 (1976).
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dependent .... ." In State v. Brecheen,7 the court found that this
prohibition related only to the decree of commitment itself and had no effect
on the requirement of adjudication of delinquency. 8 Act 443 removes any
possibility of an opposite conclusion by requiring that the commitment
order "state that the child has been adjudicated delinquent . .. .
Act 443 also provides that a juvenile may be held until age twenty-one.
LA. R.S. 15:901 (1950) (as it appeared prior to Act 443 of 1976) provided
that the juvenile could be held "in no case beyond the majority of the
child." Louisiana appellate courts have disagreed as to how juvenile court
jurisdiction was affected by the 1972 amendment to Civil Code article 37
which set the age of majority at eighteen years. 9 Other provisions have been
amended to avoid the problem; ° fortunately, Act 443 has furthered this
progress.
LABOR-RELATED LEGISLATION
The area of criminal law did not remain untouched by the Louisiana
legislature's reaction to recent labor violence in Louisiana. Along with the
"Right to Work" law," the legislature passed three acts which originally
were intended to remove labor activity exceptions from the crimes of
disturbing the peaceI2 and obstructing public passages.' 3
7. 256 So. 2d 793 (La. App. I st Cir. 197 1), cert. denied, 262 La. 1175,266 So. 2d
450 (1972).
8. Id. at 795. (The adjudication of delinquency is essential because it "vests the
juvenile court with the jurisdiction over the juvenile.").
9. Compare In re Pittman, 315 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 316
So. 2d 398 (La. 1975) (finding LA. CIv. CODE art. 37 has no effect on LA. R.S.
13:1580(2) (1950) (as it appeared prior to Act 155 of 1974) with In re Braswell, 294 So.
2d 896 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 So. 2d 836 (La. 1974) (finding LA. CiV.
CODE art. 37 requires release of a juvenile at age eighteen because LA. R. S. 13:1580(2)
(1950) (as it appeared prior to Act 155 of 1974) stated that commitment could not
extend beyond majority).
10. LA. R.S. 15:1572 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1975, No. 355; LA. R.S.
15:1580(2) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 155.
II. La. Acts 1976, No. 97, adding LA. R.S. 23:981-87 (Supp. 1976). See The
Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1976 Regular Session-Employment and
Labor Law, infra at 178.
12. La. Acts 1976, No. 497, repealing LA. R.S. 14:103(B) (1950); La. Acts 1976,
No. 489, repealing LA. R.S. 14:103.I (Supp. 1960). The originally proposed version,
La. H.B. 544, Reg. Sess. (1976), suggested a mere amendment of the law, removing
the labor exception. The unconstitutionality of the law as a whole, however, has been
recognized by both the United States Supreme Court and the Louisiana Supreme
Court. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); State v. Harrison, 280 So. 2d 215
(La. 1973).
13. La. Acts 1976, No. 488, amending LA. R.S. 14:100.1 (Supp. 1960).
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ISSUING WORTHLESS CHECKS
La. Acts 1976, No. 651, amending LA. R.S. 14:71 (1950), makes
several changes in the definition of the crime of issuing worthless checks.
Act 651 adds the phrase "whether the exchange is contemporaneous or not"
to the definition. 4 This new provision should allow conviction when there
is a short lapse of time between delivery of value and issuance of the check,
a situation which in the past has barred conviction' 5 because the language of
the statute did not cover payment of an antecedent debt. 16
Act 651 also adds: "This provision shall not apply to payments on
installment contracts or open accounts." Though the refusal to apply the
law to payments on credit accounts has been referred to as "settled law," 17
the express provision is needed in order to avoid confusion in the previously
discussed situation of a short lapse of time between delivery of value and
issuance of the check.
Finally, Act 651 simplifies the state's evidentiary burden in proving
intent. LA. R.S. 14:71 (1950) (as it appeared prior to Act 651 of 1976)
provided that nonpayment after ten days from receipt by the issuer of written
notice of nonpayment was "presumptive evidence of his intent to defraud."
Act 651 provides that this presumption is created when written notice of
nonpayment is "deposited by certified mail . . . addressed to the issuer
thereof either at the address last shown on the instrument or the last known
address for such person shown on the records of the bank upon which the
instrument is drawn . . . ' Thus the obvious difficulty of proving receipt
of notice is now circumvented.' 8
CONTRIBUTING TO THE DELINQUENCY OF JUVENILES
La. Acts 1976, No. 121, amending LA. R.S. 14:92 (1950), resolves
two ambiguities relative to the crime of contributing to the delinquency of
juveniles. In 1968, the Louisiana legislature passed two acts, Nos. 647 and
14. La. Acts 1976, No. 651, amending LA. R.S. 14:71 (1950), states, inter alia:
"Issuing worthless checks is the issuing, in exchange for anything of value, whether
the exchange is contemporaneous or not, with intent to defraud, of any check, draft
or order for the payment of money upon any bank or other depository, knowing at the
time of the issuing that the offender has not sufficient credit ...-
15. See State v. McLean, 216 La. 670, 44 So. 2d 698 (1950) (defendant issued a
worthless check for bananas delivered three days earlier).
16. Id. at 674, 676, 44 So. 2d at 699-700.
17. Blue Bonnet Creamery, Inc. v. Gulf Milk Assoc., Inc., 172 So. 2d 133, 137
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
18. For examples of other evidence proving intent, see State v. Smith, 262 La.
39, 262 So. 2d 362 (1972).
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486, amending LA. R.S. 14:92, which added an additional ground of
contributing to the delinquency of juveniles and established the penalty
therefor. Unfortunately, the two acts conflicted. Act 647 provided for the
new ground of "enticing, aiding or permitting" a juvenile to "[absent
himself from home" and further provided that any prison sentence imposed
for contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile would be "with or without
hard labor." Act 486, on the other hand, provided for the new ground of
"enticing, aiding or permitting" a juvenile to "[a]bsent himself or remain
away" from home and further provided that any prison sentence be served
in the parish prison. 9
Act 121 of 1976 resolves these conflicts by adopting the Act 486
version of the new ground2" and by providing for new penalties. 2 It is
interesting to note that now the penalty for contributing to the delinquency
of juveniles is greater if the conviction is based on sexual misconduct than if
it is based on any other ground.22
PLACE OF LAWFUL DETAINMENT
La. Acts 1976, No. 345, adding subsection C to LA. R.S. 14:110
(1950), expands the concept of place of lawful detainment relative to the
crime of escape. Subsection C (added by Act 345) states that "a person shall
be deemed to be in the lawful custody . . . of the Department of Correc-
tions . . . when he is in a rehabilitation unit, work release program or any
other program under the control of. . .the Department of Corrections." In
State v. Williams,23 the Louisiana Supreme Court found that, although one
committed to the Louisiana Training Institute is under the "custody" of the
Department of Corrections, the Institute "is not a 'place of lawful detention'
within the meaning of the short indictment form set forth in C.Cr.P. art.
465.'24 Therefore, the defendant could not be found guilty of simple escape
from the Louisiana Training Institute.
19. Emphasis added.
20. The original version, La. H.B. 547, Reg. Sess. (1976), proposed a different
method of reaching the same result. This bill would have repealed Act 647 of 1968. In
effect, such action would have left the Act 486 version as the only law on the subject.
However, such a method may have created difficulties in determining the intent of
the legislature: did the legislature intend to repeal the entire ground or only to repeal a
conflicting act? The method actually used is the more direct and thus preferable
approach.
21. La. Acts 1976, No. 121, amending LA. R.S. 14:92 (Supp. 1976).
22. LA. R.S. 14:92(D) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 121.
23. 301 So. 2d 327 (La. 1974).
24. Id. at 328.
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One conceivable consequence of Act 345 is that it is now possible for
one confined in a reformatory such as the Louisiana Training Institute, since
these institutions are under the control of the Department of Corrections, to
be convicted of escape and to be subject to the jurisdiction of the appropriate
criminal district court. Although Act 345 merely defines "lawful custody,"
it may be argued that the effect of the Act would be to include the Louisiana
Training Institute within the concept of a place of lawful detention. It should
be noted that the purpose of the Act, as defined by the legislature, is "to
further define place of lawful detainment and place of lawful cus-
tody.....
JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE
La. Acts 1976, No. 655, adding LA. R.S. 14:20(3) (Supp. 1976),
represents a major change in the theory of self-defense. Act 655 adds a third
category of justifiable homicide:
A homicide is justifiable:
(3) When committed against a person whom one reasonably
believes to be likely to use any unlawful force against a person present
in a dwelling while committing or attempting to commit a burglary of
such dwelling. The homicide shall be justifiable even though the
person does not retreat from the encounter when it appears that he
would have been able to do so. 25
Under LA. R. S. 14:20 (1950) (as it appeared prior to Act 655 of 1976),
Louisiana courts consistently applied the test of reasonable fear of danger to
life or of great bodily harm in determining the justifiable nature of a
homicide.2 6 Unlike LA. R.S. 14:20 (1) and (2), Act 655 makes no mention
25. Due to the use of the word "person" in referring to both the burglar and the
occupant of the home, the meaning of Act 655 is somewhat ambiguous. Obviously,
however, upon close examination, the first and third uses of the word "person" refer
to the burglar and the second use of the word "person" refers to the occupant of the
home.
26. State v. Lane, 292 So. 2d 711, 715 (La. 1974) ("The material issue in a plea of
self-defense is whether it appears to a reasonable person, not one obsessed with
unnatural fear, that his life is in danger or that he is in danger of great bodily harm.");
State v. Rowland, 246 La. 729, 735-36, 167 So. 2d 346, 348 (1964) ("[I]n order to be
justified in taking the life of another. . the party accused must not only have a
present and reasonable belief he is in imminent danger of losing his life, or receiving
great bodily harm, but he must also reasonably believe it is necessary to kill in order to
save himself."); State v. Ciaccio, 163 La. 563, 572, 112 So. 486, 489 (1927) ("To
justify the killing, it must appear that the life of the accused was in danger, or that his
person was in danger of receiving great bodily harm, and the circumstances must be
such as would lead a reasonable person to that conclusion.").
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of either fear of danger to life or fear of great bodily harm, but rather refers
simply to a reasonable belief that the person is "likely to use unlawful force
Furthermore, Act 655 specifically states that ability to retreat does not
bar the defense. Though the possibility of retreat is not mentioned in the
prior law, it is one factor which the jury has heretofore been allowed to
consider regarding the necessity of the killing. 27 Thus, Act 655 marks a




Act 203 of 1976' provides that where membership in an organization is
acondition precedent to insurance coverage, the policy may be cancelled for
failure of the policy holder to maintain membership in the organization. The
procedure required for such cancellation is the same as the general cancella-
tion procedure2 except that it requires fifteen days notice while the general
procedure requires only five.
PROPOSALS OF INTEREST
House Bill 873 failed to pass the legislature, but it presented an
interesting example of artful legislative drafting. Its title purported merely
to require that all insurance policies make provision for the bankruptcy or
insolvency of the insured. In reality, by reenacting an amended version of
Section 655 of Title 22 of the Revised Statutes, the bill would have
abolished the direct action now allowed against insurers. Such a major
change in the Louisiana insurance law certainly deserves mention in the title
of the bill, designed to provide an easy subject matter reference to the
proposal. 3
27. See State v. Collins, 306 So. 2d 662, 663 (La. 1975) ("The possibility of
retreat . . . is one of the factors here present for jury determination as to whether the
defendant had the requisite reasonable belief that it was necessary to kill in self-
defense."). See also State v. Patterson, 295 So. 2d 792 (La. 1974); The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Criminal Law, 35 LA. L. REV.
402, 410 (1975).
I. La. Acts 1976, No. 203, adding LA. R.S. 22.636.3 (Supp. 1976).
2. LA. R.S. 22:636, as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 125.
3. The state constitution requires only that: "Every bill shall contain a brief
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Two bills were introduced in the House to effect changes in the law
relative to funeral insurance policies. The law presently allows issuance of
such policies if the value of the funeral is stated in dollars and the services
to be furnished are specified.4 Should the beneficiary choose not to avail
himself of the benefit provided, he is entitled to receive 75% of the face
value of the policy as a cash settlement. 5 The recent case of Wilson v.
Reliable Life Insurance Company6 provides a cogent example of the abuses
prevalent under the existing system. The decedent insured paid more than
$700 in premiums to receive a funeral benefit of one hundred fifty dollars
from which her beneficiary received only a seventy-five percent cash
settlement. The bills provided a choice of possible remedies: either a
complete prohibition of funeral insurance7 or a requirement that any cash
payment be in 100% of the policy's face amount.8 Neither change was
enacted.
Also of interest was a bill designed to prevent "stacking" of uninsured
motorist coverages, 9 which has been allowed by the Louisiana courts.'0
This proposal, however, failed to gain the approval of the Senate where it
was introduced and therefore the jurisprudential developments in this area
remain viable.
title indicative of its object." LA. CONST. art. III, § 15A. Hence the bill's title is
technically constitutional in spite of the fact that the title is misleading.
4. LA. R.S. 22:253, as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 246, § 1.
5. LA. R.S. 22:253B, as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 246, § 1.
6. 333 So. 2d 680 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
7. La. H.B. 1062, 39th Reg. Sess., 1976.
8. La. H.B. 1063, 39th Reg. Sess., 1976.
9. La. S.B. 34, 39th Reg. Sess., 1976. If the injury results when the insured is
a passenger in another's car, his own coverage would be used only as excess
insurance to apply to damages over the limits of liability of the other policy. In the
situation where two coverages are applicable to the accident, damage would be
limited to the higher of the policy limits and prorated between the insurers.
10. Barbin v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 315 So. 2d 754 (La. 1975);
Nicholson v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 332 So. 2d 906 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976);
Stutton v. Langley, 330 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976); Seaton v. Kelly, 327 So.
2d 512 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Raggio v. Volkswagen Ins. Co., 327 So. 2d 505 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1976); Bourgeois v. Government Employers Ins. Co., 316 So. 2d 804




STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
AD VALOREM TAXATION
Article VII, § 18 of the Louisiana Constitution provides for a restruc-
turing of the ad valorem taxation system in this state, which will take effect
January 1, 1978.' The change was prompted by the decision of Levy v.
Parker2 and Bussie v. Long,3 which held that the administration of the
present ad valorem taxation system violated the equal protection and due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment because there was no unifor-
mity of assessment of property of the same class throughout the state nor
within the parishes.4 Under § 18, property in the same class throughout the
state must be assessed at the same percentage of fair market value: land and
improvements for residential purposes are to be assessed at 10%, and other
property is to be assessed at 15%. However, bona fide agricultural,
horticultural, marsh, and timber lands are to be assessed at 10% of use value
rather than fair market value. The constitution also requires that "fair
market value and use value of property shall be determined in accordance
with criteria which shall be established by law and which shall apply
uniformly throughout the state." 5 Legislation enacted in 1976 establishes
the criteria for reassessment necessary under the new tax system.
6
Act 702 fixes the procedure and eligibility requirements for determin-
ing use value of bona fide agricultural, horticultural, marsh and timber
lands.' The purpose of assessing these lands based on use value rather than
I. LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 13.
2. 346 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. La. 1972).
3. 286 So. 2d 689 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 288 So. 2d 354 (La.
1974).
4. The court order in the Bussie case ordered the Louisiana Tax Commission to
secure equality and uniformity of assessment practices by January 1, 1976. Appar-
ently, this order is being suspended because of the new tax system provided for in the
constitution. Doc. No. 121,082 (La. Dist. Ct., 19th Jud. Dist., March 15, 1973), as
modified by the appellate court decision, 286 So. 2d 689,706 (La. App. I st Cir. 1973).
5. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(D).
6. La. Acts 1976, Nos. 702-05. In order to implement the new tax system the
legislature gave the Louisiana Tax Commission $500,000, and the assessors
$3,000,000. La. Acts 1976, No. 701.
7. The Act defines use value of bona fide agricultural, horticultural, and timber
lands as "the highest value of such land when used by a prudent agricultural,
horticultural or timber operator for the sole purpose of continuing the operation, as a
commercial agricultural, horticultural or timber enterprise, of an existing bona fide
agricultural, horticultural or timber use." Use value of bona fide marsh lands is
defined as "the highest value of such land for the sole purpose of continuing the
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market value is to encourage continued use of lands near urban areas for
farm, marsh, and timber production. 8 In order to be eligible for use value
assessment, the land must meet the definition of either bona fide agricul-
tural, horticultural, marsh or timber land specified by Section 2 of the Act, 9
and
(A) [b]e at least ten acres in size, or have produced an average gross
annual income of at least two thousand dollars in one or more of
the designated classifications for the four preceding years, and
(B) the landowner [must have] signed an agreement that the land will
be devoted to one or more of the designated uses as defined in
Section 2 of the Act. 1
The landowner is required to file an application for use value assess-
ment with the assessor certifying that his property meets one of the
definitions in Section 2."1 Applications must be filed once every four years,
except that in the event of a sale of the property, the purchaser must submit a
new application within 60 days of the date of sale. 12
traditional use of the marsh lands for hunting, fishing, trapping or various types of
aquaculture by a prudent manager of marsh lands." La. Acts 1976, No. 702, § 1.
8. The market value of these lands located near urban areas will be much
greater than the value of the land used as an agricultural, horticultural, marsh, or
timber operation; thus, taxing them on the basis of market value may create a tax
burden great enough to force the land into another use.
9. "Section 2. Definitions
A. Bona fide agricultural land is land devoted to the production for sale, in
reasonable commercial quantities, of plants and animals, or their products, useful to
man, and agricultural land under a contract with a state or federal agency restricting
its use for agricultural production. B. Bona fide horticultural land is land devoted to
the production for sale, in reasonable commercial quantities, of fruits, vegetables,
flowers or ornamental plants, and horticultural land under a contract with a state or
federal agency restricting its use for horticultural production. C. Bona fide marsh
land is wetland other than bona fide agricultural, horticultural or timber land. D. Bona
fide timberland is land stocked by forest trees of any size and specie, or formerly
having such tree cover within the last three years and not currently developed or
being used for nonforest purposes, and devoted to the production, in reasonable
commercial quantities, of timber and timber products, and timberland under a
contract with a state or federal agency restricting its use for timber production."
10. La. Acts 1976, No. 702, § 3. The latter two requirements do not apply to
marsh lands. Id. Although the Act uses the term "agreement," what is probably
meant is that the landowner must sign a statement that the land will be devoted to one
or more of the designated uses.
II. Id. at § 4(A).
12. Id. at § 4(B). Although this section does require submission of a new
application when the property is sold, the only time a penalty for failure to do so will
apply is when the purchaser converts the land to a use not eligible for use value
assessment. In this case, the penalty of § 6 will apply (see text at note 29, infra).
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For agricultural and horticultural land, use value is to be determined by
using the formula: Use Value = Net Income divided by Capitalization
Rate. 3 In determining the net income factor to be used in this formula, the
Louisiana Tax Commission first computes an average of the net income per
acre of every major agricultural commodity in Louisiana for the four
preceding years. 4 This average is then multiplied by the percentage of land
area used in the production of that commodity in Louisiana to determine a
weighted average of the net income per acre of average farmland, regardless
of the commodity produced. Land is divided into four classifications
according to land quality,1 5 and the tax commission must prepare a table
showing the range of productivity of the land within each classification.
From these factors, the weighted average and productivity, the tax commis-
sion will provide assessors with a table which will show the upper and lower
limits of the net income per acre for each classification of land. 16 Within
these limits, the assessors are allowed to take into consideration the
circumstances of each tract of land in arriving at the particular net income
factor.' 7 The capitalization rate to be used in the formula is the Federal
Reserve Rediscount Rate on the preceding January 1 plus 31/2 %, but in no
event shall the capitalization rate be less than 10%. 18 Determined in this
manner, the capitalization rate has very little relationship to a true interest
rate as determined by the market place, but this method of determination
was probably adopted for its simplicity.
For timberland the same formula is used, but the factors are determined
differently.19 Timberland is divided into four classifications according to
productive capacity. 20 The tax commission must publish a table showing the
13. Id. at § 7(A)(1).
14. However, if the net income for the past four years of a certain commodity is
negative, the factor entered for this commodity shall be zero. Id. at § 7(A)(2)(c).
15. Section 7(A)(2)(a) provides that, "In defining classifications of land, the first
four classifications of the U.S. Soil Conservation Service shall be used, with such
modifications as may be required by special circumstances, provided that all land
historically subject to regular and periodic flooding may be classified as Class IV
land."
16. Section 7(C)(I) provides that in applying the formula to determine use value,
the assessors must utilize the use value table (and the capitalization rate) provided by
the Louisiana Tax Commission.
17. The details of the procedure to determine the net income factor to be used in
the formula are not easily discernible from the provisions of the Act. The writer was
aided by information and sources supplied by the Louisiana Farm Bureau
Federation.
18. La. Acts 1976, No. 702, § 7(A)(3).
19. Id. at § 7(C)(1).
20. Class I-timberland capable of producing more than 120 cubic feet of timber
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average net income for each classification of timberland, determined by
taking the average of the gross return for the previous four year period less
the management cost. 2 The tax commission is also given the authority to set
the capitalization rate, provided that it shall not be less than 10%.22
For marsh land, no such formula is used and the assessor has complete
discretion to determine its use value, taking into consideration the following
factors:
23
(1) income derived from the traditional use of such marsh land;
(2) physical and economic risks;
(3) prevailing interest rates;
(4) liquidity of investments;
(5) federal and state regulations governing use of such marsh land.
Whether the property tax obligation of a landowner qualifying for use
value assessment will be higher or lower than under the present tax system
will depend on the past assessment practices of the assessor in his parish.
The effect of use value assessment for those who qualify is to keep their
property tax obligation lower than it would be under a market value
assessment, especially if the land is near an urban area.
24
If land having a use value assessment ceases to meet the eligibility
requirements of the Act, the owner is obligated to notify the assessor within
60 days following the effective date of loss of eligibility .25 The assessor then
must reassess the property immediately, and the assessment will be effec-
per acre per annum. Class II-timberland capable of producing more than 85 but less
than 120 cubic feet of timber per acre per annum. Class 111-timberland capable of
producing less than 85 cubic feet of timber per acre per annum. Class IV-timberland
capable of producing less than 85 cubic feet of timber per acre per annum and subject
to periodic overflow from natural or artificial water courses, and which is otherwise
considered to be swampland. Id. at § 7(C)(2)(a).
21. Id. at § 7(C)(2). Gross return is determined by multiplying the annual cubic
feet of growth per acre for timber in each of the four classifications (as determined by
the U.S. Forest Periodic Survey) by the value per cubic foot of timber stumpage (as
derived from severance tax returns). Id. at § 7(C)(2)(c).
22. In setting the capitalization rate, the commission must take into considera-
tion the following factors: (I) physical and economic risk; (2) effect of relative
marketability of timberlands on liquidity of investments; (3) competition with other
investments and prevailing interest rates; and (4) any other factors which may be
appropriate. Id. at § 7(C)(3).
23. The following list is a paraphrase of the factors found in § 7(B) of Act 702.
24. The use value and market value of some land will be equal because the land's
most valuable use will be agricultural, horticultural, marsh or timber production. In
this case, the tax obligation will be the same under either type of assessment.
25. La. Acts 1976, No. 702, § 5(A). For the penalty for failure to so notify the
assessor, see text at note 29, infra.
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tive the following year. 26 A presumption of loss of eligibility is created by
sale of the land for a price "four times greater than its use value." 27 The
purchaser can rebut this presumption by showing either that the sales price
paid includes other things of value which are susceptible of appraisal, such
as standing crops or timber, improvements, or equipment, or that the land
actually meets the requirements of eligibility .28 If the landowner fails timely
to notify the assessor of loss of eligibility, or if he obtains a use value
assessment by means of a false certification in his application, he is liable
for a penalty equal to five times the difference between the tax under a
market value assessment and the tax under a use value assessment for each
year that the assessment was obtained by these illegal means. 29
The Act discourages conversion of property taxed under the use value
system to any other use by providing that land so converted is subject to
deferred taxes for that year and for the immediately preceding four tax
years.3" The amount of the deferred tax for any one year is the difference
between the tax on a use value assessment and the tax on a current fair
market value assessment.3 This provision will especially tend to discourage
the conversion to other uses of land near urban areas, or any other land for
which there is a significant difference between its fair market value and use
value.
On its face, Act 702 seems to meet the requirements of article VII, § 18
and Bussie v. Long.32 Both require that property be valued according to
criteria which must apply uniformly throughout the state, and the Act
complies by providing the formula for calculating use value and by
requiring the Louisiana Tax Commission to supply most of the figures to be
used in the formula. However, both the constitution and Bussie also require
that the Act be implemented uniformly. Were assessors to fail in fact to
assess uniformly, the result would be an unconstitutional system. Even
though the Act provides uniform criteria, it is questionable whether the
26. Id.
27. Id. at § 5(B). Reading this provision strictly, it would seem that the presump-
tion would apply only if the price is four times the use value and not if the price is five
or six times the use value. Obviously, the legislature inended it to read "a price
greater than four times its use value."
28. Id.
29. Id. at § 6(A).
30. Id. at § 4(D). But if the land was converted because of the sale or transfer of a
servitude or easement to any entity having the right of expropriation, it shall not be
subject to deferred taxes. Id. at § 4(G).
31. Id. at § 4(D).
32. See text at note 4, supra.
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criteria alone give enough guidance to the assessors to be considered a basis
for uniform assessment.3 3 Therefore, tax commission regulations will have
to be specific enough to provide this guidance.
Act 705 prescribes a uniform method of appraisal for all property,
except bona fide agricultural, horticultural, marsh and timber land, to be
used by each assessor in determining fair market value. The fair market
value of real and personal property is to be determined by the following
generally recognized appraisal procedures: the market approach, the cost
approach, and/or the income approach;34 and these criteria are to apply
uniformly throughout the state. 35 In order to meet the uniformity tests of
Bussie 6 while using three different appraisal techniques, the Act requires
the Louisiana Tax Commission to adopt, and the assessors to follow,
uniform guidelines, procedures, rules and regulations necessary to imple-
ment these criteria.3 7 Whether uniformity will result will be determined by
the strictness of the commission's rules and regulations and by how closely
they are followed by the assessors. The Act provides that all property must
be reassessed in 1978, and that real property must be appraised at least once
every four years and personal property every year thereafter. 38
In gathering appraisal data, each assessor is required to send statutorily
prescribed forms to the taxpayer for completion and return. 3 Separate
forms are prescribed for residential property, apartment property, commer-
cial and investment property, and vacant land.' They contain detailed
inquiries but do not require the landowner to estimate the value of his
property. Forms for use in reporting personal property must be approved
and adopted by the Louisiana Tax Commission. 4' All returned forms are
33. The assessors are given some discretion by the Act, and if they are given no
guidance in how to exercise this discretion, they may exercise it arbitrarily, resulting
in non-uniform assessments.
34. La. Acts 1976, No. 705, § 3(C). The Act defines fair market value as the
"price for property which would be agreed upon between a willing and informed
buyer and a willing and informed seller under usual and ordinary circumstances; it
shall be the highest price estimated in terms of money which property will bring if
exposed on the open market."
35. Id. at § 3(A).
36. See text at note 4, supra.
37. La. Acts 1976, No. 705, 88 3(A) & (B). Any manuals used by an assessor shall
be subject to approval by the tax commission. Id. at § 3(B).
38. Id. at § 11. This meets the requirements of LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(f) and
art. XIV, § 13.
39. La. Acts 1976, No. 705, § 4.
40. Id. at § 5.
41. Id. at § 6.
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confidential and exempt from the public records statutes, but are admissible
in evidence and subject to discovery in judicial or administrative proceed-
ings according to the general law relating to the production and discovery of
evidence.42 If the property owner fails to file a report timely, he waives his
right to contest the determination of fair market value by the assessor.
4 3
There is also a penalty of 10% of the tax due for filing a fraudulent report."
In addition to requiring submission of these forms by the property
owner, the Act gives the assessor the right to require additional data
pertaining to the appraisal and to inspect the property. 45 Furthermore, acts
of sale or other acts transferring property must contain the total sales price,
the amount of any mortgages on the property, the correct names and
addresses of the vendor and vendee, and the municipal address of the
property, should one be available.46 The requirement that the total sales
price be included was enacted to allow the assessor to use this information in
appraising the property. Thus, an agreement between the parties to state a
low sales price in the act of sale and to put the actual price in a counterletter
would seem prohibited. The Act offers no guidance on the enforcement of
this requirement4 7 or on whose duty it is to ensure that the total price is
included in the act of sale. However, a side effect of this provision may be to
make such counterletters unenforceable, since the obligation would have no
lawful cause and the party attempting to enforce it would not be entering
court with "clean hands."
The constitution requires the Louisiana Tax Commission, rather than
the assessors, to appraise and assess public service properties,48 and Act 703
establishes the procedure to be used.4 9 The Act requires that all public
42. Id. at § 7.
43. Id. at § 9.
44. Id. at § 10.
45. Id. at § 5.
46. Id. at § 8.
47. Perhaps the penalty of 10% of the tax due, provided in § 10 of the Act, will be
extended to this violation, although strictly it only applies when the property owner
files a false report with intent to defraud the assessing authority.
48. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 18(d).
49. La. Acts 1976, No. 703, adding LA. R.S. 47:1851-58 (Supp. 1976), and
repealing LA. R.S. 47:1976, 1979-86 (Supp. 1976). The Act defines public service
properties as "property owned or used but not otherwise assessed in this state in the
operation of each airline, electric membership corporation, electric power company,
express company, gas company, pipeline company, railroad company, telegraph
company, telephone company and water company. For each barge line, towing
company or private car company, only the major movable property owned or used
but not otherwise assessed in this state in interstate or interparish operations shall be
considered as public service property."
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service properties of the same nature and kind be appraised in the same
manner. 50 As required by the constitution, land is to be assessed at 10% of
fair market value and other properties at 15% of fair market value.5 Other
provisions of the Act are substantially similar to the previous statutes. 52
Act 704 of 1976 provides for the assessment of bank stock and the
criteria for determining its fair market value.53 In accordance with article
VII, § 18 of the Louisiana Constitution, the Act amends La. R. S. 47:1967 to
provide that all bank stock be assessed at 15% of its market valuation.
54
Previously, the assessment rates were 30% for stock in state and national
banks, and 10% for stock in federal joint stock land banks organized under
the Farm Loan Act of 1916.55
The Act also changes the procedure for determining the value of bank
stock. Previously, stock was appraised according to statements of the bank
to the Comptroller of Currency for banks created under federal laws, and to
the state bank commissioner for banks created under state laws.56 The
assessment was determined by applying the appropriate percentage and then
allowing deductions for (1) value of preferred stock owned by the United
States, and (2) 50% of the assessed value of the real estate owned by the
bank or a subsidiary corporation. 57
The Act provides that the value of bank stock is the stockholder equity
capital, determined by adding paid-in common stock, surplus, undivided
profits, and all reserves (excluding those reserves for loan losses as allowed
by the United States Internal Revenue Service). 58 To determine the fair
market value of the stock, stockholder equity capital serves as a four-time
factor (80%), and annual net earnings of the bank serves as a one-time factor
(20%).1 9 To compute the 20% factor, the earnings are to be capitalized by
50. La. Acts 1976, No. 703, adding LA. R.S. 47:1853(B).
51. LA. R.S. 47:1854 (Supp. 1976), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 703.
52. See LA. R.S. 47:1976,1979-86 (Supp. 1975) (as they appeared prior to Act 703
of 1976).
53. The shareholders are ultimately liable for this tax, but LA. R.S. 47:1971
(1950) provides that the bank must pay the tax to the assessor and the bank then is
entitled to collect the amount thus paid from the shareholders.
54. La. Acts. 1976, No. 704 amending LA. R.S. 47:1967(b) (Supp. 1976).
55. LA. R.S. 47:1967 (Supp. 1966) (as it appeared prior to Act 704 of 1976).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. La. Acts 1976, No. 704 amending LA. R.S. 47:1967(c) (Supp. 1976). Bor-
rowed money and the value of the preferred stock issued by any such bank and
actually owned by the United States of America or any agency thereof are not to be
construed as equity capital. Id.
.59. LA. R.S. 47:1967(D) (Supp. 1976), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 704.
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multiplying the annual net earnings of the bank by the average price
earnings ratio for all banks in the United States as published by a nationally
recognized bond and securities ratings firm.6 The assessment is 15% of the
value determined by use of the above formula, with a subsequent deduction
of 50% of the assessed value of real estate, improvements, buildings,
furniture, and fixtures owned by the bank (or a separate corporation if all the
capital stock is owned by the bank).6'
The taxation system prescribed by these four acts seems to provide a
vehicle by which the constitutional requirements of article VII, § 18 and
Bussie v. Long can be met. It must be remembered, however, that the
present statutory scheme was not held unconstitutional on its face, but only
in its application.6 2 Similarly, the ultimate constitutionality of this taxation
scheme will be determined by the way that the tax commission and the
assessors carry out the duties and authority given them by these acts.
The legislature increased the homestead exemption from $3000 to
$5000 under the authority of article VII, § 20(A)(2) of the constitution. 63
Since article VII, § 18 requires land and improvements for residential
purposes to be assessed at 10% of their fair market value, a homestead worth
$50,000 will be exempt from property taxation. 64 In order to prevent
reduction of local revenues, the Act provides that the increase will become
effective on January 1, 1978 and allows the governing authority of each
local governmental entity to adjust its property tax millages for the calendar
year 1978 so that the revenue collected in 1978 will be the same as that
collected in 1977.65 This statutory millage increase may violate the constitu-
Negative earnings are not considered, and earnings loss may not be carried forward
or backward. Id.
60. LA. R.S. 47:1967(D) (Supp. 1976), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 704.
The tax commission is required to compute the above formula by using the state-
ments of the bank made to the Comptroller of the Currency for United States banks
and to the commissioner of financial institutions for state banks. LA. R.S. 47:1967(E)
(Supp. 1976), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 704.
61. LA. R.S. 47:1967(F) (Supp. 1976), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 704.
The value of preferred stock owned by the United States is no longer allowed as a
deduction (see text at note 57, supra), but it is not considered as a part of equity
capital in applying the formula (see note 58, supra).
62. Bussie v. Long, 286 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 288 So.
2d 354 (La. 1974).
63. La. Acts 1976, No. 387 amending LA. R.S. 47:1703 (Supp. 1976).
64. Homes worth $50,000 which are subject to municipal property taxes may still
have to pay some tax because the homestead exemption does not apply to most of
these taxes. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 20(A)(5).
65. La. Acts 1976, No. 387, § 2.
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tional limits on the millage that local governments may levy, found in article
VI, §§ 26 and 27, 6 unless it can be considered part of the constitutional
roll-up and roll-back of millages provided in article VII, § 23, which is an
exception to these constitutional limits. 67 Since this increase was authorized
by article VII, § 20 and is being implemented in the same year as the other
property tax reforms, a literal reading of § 23 would include this increase
within its provisions. 68 However, it can be forcefully argued that the
authorization to increase the homestead exemption was intended by the
Constitutional Convention to be exercised only if continued inflation
rendered the $3000 exemption insubstantial. 69 From this, the argument
would follow that the convention did not intend that the authorization be
exercised this quickly, and that this millage increase is not authorized by §
23.
SALES TAX
Act 153 amends La. R.S. 47:315 to allow a sales tax refund to dealers
for some credit sales in which the purchaser fails to pay. The amount of the
refund will be the amount of sales tax previously paid on the unpaid balance
of the account due on the sale, and will be allowed if the unpaid balance
"has been found to be bad in accordance with Section 166 of the United
States Internal Revenue Code and has actually been charged off for federal
income tax purposes." 70 This seems to create two separate requirements,
but the Act does not specify who must find the debt to be bad; presumably it
could be the Louisiana Department of Revenue or the Internal Revenue
Service. If the balance is later recovered, it must be reported as a new sale,
and sales tax must be paid on the amount recovered.I The Act provides that
66. Section 26 provides that the millage limitation on parish ad valorem taxes is
four mills on the dollar, except in Orleans and Jackson parishes, where the limits are
seven and five mills respectively. Section 27 provides that the millage limitation on
municipal ad valorem taxes is seven mills on the dollar, but if the municipality is
exempt from the payment of parish taxes or maintains its own public schools, the
limit is ten mills on the dollar. These limits may be increased when approved by a
majority of the voters.
67. Article VII, § 23 reads: "...the total amount of ad valorem taxes collected
by any taxing authority in the year in which Sections 18 and 20 of this Article are
implemented shall not be increased or decreased, because of their provisions, above
or below ad valorem taxes collected by that taxing authority in the year preceding
implementation." (Emphasis added).
68. See emphasized language in note 67, supra.
69. See STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VERBATIM
TRANSCRIPTS October 19, 1973 at 38-9, 109-10; October 20, 1973 at 4.
70. LA. R.S. 47:315(B) (Supp. 1976), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 153.
71. LA. R.S. 47:315(B) (Supp. 1976), as added by La. Acts 1976, No. 153.
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it will apply only to the state sales tax and not to taxes levied by local taxing
authorities, 72 and that the refund applies only to debts incurred on or after
January 1, 1976. 7
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
IN GENERAL
Pursuant to the mandate of article X, § 25 of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion, the legislature has provided for the removal by suit of public officers
for conviction of a felony.' However, Act 628 does not fully satisfy the
mandate of § 25, which requires legislation for the removal by suit of public
officers for conviction or commission of a felony, malfeasance, and gross
misconduct while in office. 2 It is unclear whether § 25 requires legislative
action to create the cause of action of removal by suit, or creates the cause of
action itself and requires legislative action only to establish a procedure for
its enforcement. The latter view is supported by the argument that the
grounds for removal by suit are taken from article X, §'24 on impeachment,
which has separate subsections creating the action and providing the
enforcement procedure. Thus, the § 25 phrase "For the causes enumerated
in Paragraph (A) of Section 24" may be interpreted as creating the cause of
action for each of these grounds. 3 If this view is accepted, a cause of action
for removal by suit exists for the grounds of commission of a felony,
malfeasance, or gross misconduct, despite their omission from Act 628.
Since the legislature has not provided a procedure for these grounds, it may
be argued that the procedure provided in Act 628 or some other procedure
should be judicially adopted. However, it can also be argued that § 25
requires legislation to create the cause of action. If the Constitutional
Convention had intended that the constitution create the cause of action, it
72. La. Acts 1976, No. 153, adding LA. R.S. 47:315(B) (Supp. 1976).
73. La. Acts 1976, No. 153, adding LA. R.S. 47:315(C) (Supp. 1976). Last year
the legislature passed a similar bill, House Bill 22, which the governor vetoed. It
differed from Act 153 in that House Bill 22 tied the eligibility for the refund to whether
the dealer had charged the debt off on his books rather than on his income tax return;
also, House Bill 22 had no provision exempting local sales tax from its provisions.
I. La. Acts 1976, No. 628, adding LA. R.S. 42:1411-12 (Supp. 1976).
2. LA. CONST. art. X, § 25, read in conjunction with LA. CONST. art. X, § 24(A).
3. Cf. STATE OF LOUISIANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1973 VERBATIM
TRANSCRIPTS July 28, 1973 at 79-80.
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could easily have specified this by dividing § 25 into subsections, as it did
§ 24. Although § 25 requires the legislature to enact legislation for removal
by suit for all four grounds, Act 628 does not thereby violate this section
because legislation for removal for the other grounds may be enacted later.
Given this interpretation, the only means of removal for commission of a
felony absent a conviction, malfeasance, or gross misconduct are a recall
election4 or impeachment.5
The Act applies to all public officers, except the governor, lieutenant
governor, and judges of the courts of record, 6 and provides that upon
conviction of a felony they shall be removed by judgment of the district
court of their domicile.7 It seems to require the felony to have been
committed during the term of office although it is questionable whether this
was intended or is even desirable.8 If the district of the officer to be removed
is wholly within the jurisdiction of a district attorney, then that district
attorney must institute the suit. 9 The attorney general must institute the suit
against any other officer and also against any district attorney.' ° Suits
against the attorney general must be brought at the place where he
discharges his official duties by the district attorney of that district." The
Act appears to require the district attorney or attorney general to bring such
suits rather than permitting the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 2 If it is
4. LA. R.S. 42:341-57 (Supp. 1975). Removal by recall election applies to all
public officers except judges of the courts of record.
5. LA. CONST. art. X, § 24. Only state and district public officers are subject to
impeachment.
6. La. Acts 1976, No. 628, adding LA. R.S. 42:1411 (Supp. .1976). These
exceptions are required by LA. CONST. art. X, § 25.
7. La. Acts 1976, No. 628, adding LA. R.S. 42:1412 (Supp. 1976).
8. "Any public officer . . . shall be liable to removal from office for convic-
tion, during his term of office, of a felony while in such office." La. Acts 1976, No.
628, adding LA. R.S. 42:1411 (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added). The policy behind
removal from office for conviction of a felony seems to be that the people do not want
convicted felons in office, rather than simply not wanting them to commit felonies
while in office. The emphasized phrase was taken from art. X, § 24 and seems there
only to modify the cause of gross misconduct rather than all four causes. However,
the legislature may have thought that it modified all four causes and thus included it in
the Act.
9. LA. R.S. 42:1412 (Supp. 1976), as added by La. Acts 1976, No. 628.
10. Id.
I1. In each of the above situations, suit must be brought within 30 days after the
conviction is final and all appellate remedies have been exhausted. Id.
12. If interpreted in this manner, the statute could possibly violate article V,
§ 26(B) of the constitution, which states that the district attorney "shall have charge
of every criminal prosecution by the state in his district." SeeGuidry v. Roberts, 335
So. 2d 438 (La. 1976). However, the bringing of a suit to remove a public officer
probably will not be considered a "criminal prosecution."
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so construed, and the district attorney or attorney general fails to bring suit,
a citizen should be able to bring a mandamus proceeding to force him to
institute suit. '"
The legislature amended the open meetings laws 14 to make it more
difficult for any public body, except the legislature, to call executive
sessions. 5 Act 665 provides that public bodies may hold meetings closed to
the public for the following reasons only:'
6
(1) discussions of the character, professional competence, or physical
or mental health of a single individual (for personnel matters); 17
(2) strategy sessions or negotiations with respect to collective bargain-
ing or litigation;'
8
(3) discussion regarding security personnel, plans, or devices;
(4) investigative proceedings regarding allegations of misconduct;
(5) meetings of the State Mineral Board. at which confidential records
or matters are discussed;
(6) cases of extraordinary emergency, which are limited to natural
disaster, threat of epidemic, civil disturbances, suppression of
insurrections, repelling of invasions, or other matters of similar
magnitude; or
(7) any other matters now provided for or as may be provided for by
the legislature.
The first five exceptions have valid purposes and seem to be sufficiently
limited in scope to prevent abuse. The language in the sixth exception
regarding "other matters of similar magnitude" could be misused by public
bodies, but should not if construed in pari materiae with the enumerated
emergencies, as seemingly required by the Act.' 9
13. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 3861-66.
14. Sometimes called "sunshine laws."
15. La. Acts 1976, No. 665 amending LA. R.S. 42:4.1-10 (Supp. 1976).
16. The following list is a paraphrase of the reasons found in Act 665.
17. However, the individual may require that such discussion be held at an open
meeting. La. Acts 1976, No. 665, adding LA. R.S. 42:6.l(A)(l) (Supp. 1976).
18. This exception is limited to those instances when an open meeting would
have a detrimental effect on the bargaining or litigating position of the public body.
La. Acts 1976, No. 665, adding LA. R.S. 42:6.1(A)(2) (Supp. 1976).
19. The Act provides, "It is essential to the maintenance of a democratic society
that public business be performed in an open and public manner and that the citizens
be advised of and aware of the performance of public officials and the deliberations
and decisions that go into the making of public policy. Toward this end, the provisions
of R.S. 42:4.1 through R.S. 42:10 shall be construed liberally." La. Acts 1976, No.
665, adding LA. R.S. 42:4.1 (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 37
LEGISLATIVE SYMPOSIUM
Under previous legislation a closed meeting could be called for
virtually any reason whenever a majority of the members of the public body
voted to call it.2° Act 665 states that before a closed meeting may be called,
the public body must approve the call by two-thirds of the voting members
present at an open meeting for which proper notice has been given.2 1 Public
bodies must give written public notice of all meetings no later than 24 hours
before the meeting, with the exception of cases of extraordinary
emergency, 22 and keep minutes of all open meetings, which are to be public
records. 23
As under the previous legislation, no final or binding action may be
taken at a closed meeting.24 If a public body violates this provision, the
action taken is not void,25 but the officials of the public body become subject
to the penalties provided in the Act.26 The penalty provisions of the previous
statutes only applied to the presiding officer, 27 but Act 665 extends them to
every official attending any meeting required by law to be open to the
public .28 This should make public bodies more responsive to the open
meetings laws. However, it must be remembered that because these are
criminal penalties, they must be enforced by the district attorney, who may
be hesitant to enforce them strictly.
Act 665 also contains a section specifying how the Act is to be
enforced. The district attorney of competent jurisdiction can bring criminal
actions under the Act only through a grand jury indictment. 29 Citizens are
given the right to sue to require compliance with the Act, but not to require
20. LA. R.S. 42:6 (as it appeared prior to Act 665 of 1976).
21. La. Acts 1976, No. 665 amending LA. R.S. 42:6 (Supp. 1976).
22. LA. R.S. 42:7 (Supp. 1976), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 665. In cases
of extraordinary emergencies, the public body shall give such notice as it deems
appropriate and circumstances permit. Id.
23. LA. R.S. 42:7.1 (Supp. 1976), as added by La. Acts 1976, No. 665.
24. LA. R.S. 42:6 (Supp. 1976), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 665.
25. This is made clear by the fact that the bill as introduced had a provision which
voided any final action taken at a closed meeting (La. S.B. 591, § 8.1 of Title 42 as
provided in the bill), but the provision was deleted by the conference committee.
26. La. Acts 1976, No. 665 amending LA. R.S. 42:9 (Supp. 1976). The penalty for
first conviction is a fine not less than $100 and not more than $1000 or imprisonment
for not more than seven days. For any subsequent conviction, the penalty is a fine of
not less than $250 and not more than $2000 or imprisonment for not more than 30
days, or both.
27. LA. R.S. 42:9 (as it appeared prior to Act 665 of 1976).
28. La. Acts 1976, No. 665 amending LA. R.S. 42:9 (Supp. 1976).
29. La. Acts 1976, No. 665, adding LA. R.S. 42:10(Supp. 1976). This provision
may violate the district attorney's constitutional power to control the initiation of
prosecution, as construed in Guidry v. Roberts, 335 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976).
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the district attorney to bring a criminal action. 30
Act 292 requires each public body, at least seven days prior to its
purchase or sale of land, to enter in its official record the name of any elected
state or local official, or appointed official or employee of the public body
making the purchase or sale, known to have a pecuniary interest in the
purchase or sale.3" The described elected and appointed officials who know
of their pecuniary interest in the purchase or sale must notify the participat-
ing public body of the extent of their interest at least five days prior to the
purchase or sale.
32
There is no penalty for failure to comply with these requirements nor is
merchantibility of title to the land affected thereby.3 3 But the Act also
provides that any elected or appointed official is prohibited from voting on
the purchase or sale of land if he has a pecuniary interest therein, and that
voting on such a transaction will constitute malfeasance in office.
34
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Act 689 establishes a new method of funding the sheriff's department
of each parish, except Orleans, beginning with fiscal year 1977-78. 31
Presently, sheriffs' departments are funded by commissions taken by the
sheriffs on taxes which they collect, with most of the revenue coming from
the commission on property taxes. 36 Act 689 creates special districts known
as law enforcement districts, with boundaries coterminous with parish
boundaries, which have the power to levy property taxes to fund the
sheriff's office. 37 The commission on property taxes is abolished and
30. LA. R.S. 42:10 (Supp. 1976), as added by La. Acts 1976, No. 665. The court
must order payment of court costs to a successful plaintiff in such a citizen's suit. Id.
31. La. Acts 1976, No. 292, adding LA. R.S. 38:2211.1 (Supp. 1976). This section
does not apply to the purchase of land through expropriation proceedings. For the
purposes of this section, the purchase or sale of land includes, but is not limited to,
the purchase or sale of mineral rights, timber rights, and the letting or acquiring of a
leasehold interest or any other interest in land. "Pecuniary interest" means any
interest in the consideration given for the land. Id.
32. LA. R.S. 38:2211.1(C) (Supp. 1976), as added by La. Acts 1976, No. 292.
33. LA. R.S. 38:2211.1(G) (Supp. 1976), as added by La. Acts 1976, No. 292.
34. La. Acts 1976, No. 292, adding LA. R.S. 38:2211.1(0) (Supp. 1976).
35. La. Acts 1976, No. 689, adding LA. R.S. 33:9001-08 (Supp. 1976).
36. LA. R.S. 33:1423(E) (as it appeared prior to Act 689 of 1976).
37. La. Acts 1976, No. 689, adding LA. R.S. 33:9001-02 (Supp. 1976). Although
art. VI, § 19 of the constitution also allows the legislature to authorize special districts
to incur debt and issue bonds, they did not confer these powers on the law
enforcement districts. (The original bill, House Bill 1285, did have a provision
granting these powers to the district but was amended to delete that grant.). The
sheriff will be the ex officio chief executive officer of the district. LA. R.S. 33:9001
(Supp. 1976). as added by La. Acts 1976, No. 689.
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instead the sheriff is allowed compensation for the actual cost of collecting
property taxes for other tax-recipient bodies.3 8 In addition, each law
enforcement district shall levy, without a vote of the people, a tax on the
assessed valuation of all property appearing on the tax rolls in an amount
that, when added to the compensation for actual costs of tax collection, will
produce for the district in the initial year the same revenue as produced by
the commission in the previous fiscal year.39 Therefore, the district may
impose additional millages only when approved by a majority of those
voting in an election held for that purpose.' Thus the funding of the
sheriffs' departments will be controlled by their constituency rather than by
the legislature. Authorizing a special district to levy a tax without a vote of
the people seems to be valid under article VI, § 19, especially in this case
where the taxpayers' ultimate tax burden will not be increased. There will be
no increase because the Act provides for a mandatory reduction of ad
valorem tax millages of the other tax-recipient bodies of the parish so that
the total amount of ad valorem taxes received by them is not increased by the
reduction of the sheriff's commission provided for in the Act.
4 1
The question of how the expenditures of the sheriff's department were
to be made public was a very controversial issue. The compromise reached
requires the sheriff to publish a budget estimate in the official newspaper of
the parish. 42 Another important provision of the Act makes sheriffs'
38. La. Acts 1976, No. 689, § 3; LA. R.S. 33:9004 (Supp. 1976), as added by La.
Acts 1976, No. 689. The sheriff is to determine what the actual cost of collection is,
but this determination may be reviewed by the legislative auditor upon the written
request of the parish governing authority or school board within the parish.
39. LA. R.S. 33:9003-04 (Supp. 1976), as added by La. Acts 1976, No. 689.
40. LA. R.S. 33:9003 (Supp. 1976), as added by La. Acts 1976, No. 689.
41. La. Acts 1976, No. 689, adding LA. R.S. 33:905 (Supp. 1976). However, this
section adds, "... nothing herein shall prohibit a taxing authority from collecting,
in the year in which the special district is created or in any subsequent year a larger
dollar amount of ad valorem taxes by:
(a) levying additional or increased millages as provided by law;
(b) putting additional property on the tax rolls; or
(c) increases in the fair market or use value of the property."
It also provides that the rollback shall not apply to millages required to be levied for
the payment of general obligation bonds.
This Act may indirectly increase the taxpayers' tax burden without their vote
because a local governing authority whose millage before was equal to the constitu-
tional limit will have to decrease this millage because of the Act, and it may thereafter
increase the millage to the constitutional limit without a vote of the people.
42. LA. R.S. 33:9006 (Supp. 1976), as added by La. Acts 1976, No. 689. The
original bill required the sheriff to furnish the clerk of court with a budget, the form
and contents of which were to be prescribed by the legislative auditor. Thereafter, the
sheriff was required to schedule a public hearing on the budget, and was allowed to
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departments subject to the public bid laws of the state for the first time.4 3
In order to make the "pill" easier for the sheriffs to swallow, each
received an increase in salary of $6000 per year and an increase in expense
allowance from 5% to 10% of his salary."
Act 639 eliminates the limit on the amount and duration of the special
taxes that political subdivisions of the state can levy for the construction and
maintenance of public improvements.4 5 This tax was previously limited to
five mills on the dollar per year for any one purpose, and twenty-five mills
on the dollar in any year for all purposes, with a ten-year duration limitation
on any such tax.46 Act 639 provides that a political subdivision may levy this
tax without limitations, provided that the rate, purpose, and duration be
approved by the voters.
Several parishes and municipalities have long had ordinances which
allowed businesses dispensing alcoholic beverages to stay open into the
early morning hours on Sunday, even though state statutes prohibited
engaging in business on Sunday.47 Act 149 grants the governing authority of
each parish and municipality the authority to pass ordinances allowing
Sunday openings, and also operates retroactively, thus validating the
ordinances previously adopted.48
Act 372 allows the governing authority of a parish or municipality to
compromise or settle any claim against it before suit is filed.49 Previously,
the statute authorizing such settlements only mentioned the settling of
"suits." ,50 The former requirement that the district or city attorney concur in
the decision to settle suits is extended to pre-suit settlements. A further
limitation on the pre-suit settlement is that ten days must have elapsed after
the publication of the proposed settlement in the official journal of the
appropriate political subdivision.
revise the budget with the clerk of court after this hearing. La. H.B. 1285, 39th Reg.
Session, 1976.
43. La. Acts 1976, No. 689, adding LA. R.S. 33:9907 (Supp. 1976).
44. LA. R.S. 33:1421 (Supp. 1976), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 689.
45. La. Acts 1976, No. 639, adding LA. R.S. 39:801 (Supp. 1976).
46. LA. R.S. 39:801 (as it appeared prior to Act 639 of 1976). Before this
amendment, the language of § 801 tracked the language of art. X, § 10 of the 1921
Constitution. The current constitutional authorization for these special taxes, art. V1,
§ 32, authorizes such taxes without mention of any limitations. Thus, perhaps the
limitations of § 801 were invalidated by this constitutional provision and this Act is
merely to update the statute.
47. LA. R.S. 51:191-92 (1950).
48. La. Acts 1976, No. 149, adding LA. R.S. 51:195 (Supp. 1976).
49. La. Acts 1976, No. 372, adding LA. R.S. 13:5109(c) (Supp. 1976).




The legislature, pursuant to the mandate of article XI, § 1 of the
constitution, enacted an election code which provides for permanent regis-
tration of voters and for the conduct of all elections." Act 697 amends the
entirety of Title 18 of the Revised Statutes, except for Chapter 8, dealing
with politicial contributions, and Chapter 9, dealing with the Registrars of
Voters Employees' Retirement System.52 The election code must be
approved by the United States Attorney General,53 and if so approved, will
become effective on January 1, 1978." 4
The Election Campaign Finance Disclosure Act was amended by the
legislature in an attempt to validate its enforcement provisions and to correct
some of the administrative problems encountered in its first year of
operation." The Louisiana Supreme Court, in Guidry v. Roberts,56 held
that the section of the 1975 Act providing that the district attorney could
enforce the Act only on the basis of information forwarded by a supervisory
committee contravened article V, § 26(B) of the constitution, which states
that the district attorney "shall have charge of every criminal prosecution by
the state in his district. " The court interpreted this phrase to mean that the
district attorney has exclusive power over the initiation of prosecutions for
state criminal offenses in his district, and since the enforcement provision of
the 1975 Act limited this power, it was unconstitutional.5 7 Act 386 amends
the enforcement provision to provide that the initiation of actions by the
51. La. Acts 1976, No. 697 amending LA. R.S. 18:1-1466 (Supp. 1976).
52. These chapters were designated Chapters 11 and 12, respectively.
53. Voting Rights Act, § 5; 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (Supp. 1975).
54. La. Acts 1976, No. 697, § 4. There are several changes made by the Act, but
space limitations prevent their full discussion. Some of the more important changes
are: (1) the extension of the open election system to the elections of U.S. senators
and representatives, La. Acts 1976, No. 697 amendingLA. R.S. 18:1271 (Supp. 1976);
(2) the transfer of the power to qualify candidates from political party committees to
the secretary of state, for statewide candidates, and to either the clerk of court or the
president or secretary of the parish board of election supervisors, for local and
municipal candidates. La. Acts 1976, No. 697 amending LA. R.S. 18:462 (Supp.
1976); (3) the removal of the requirement that the name of a candidate who is
unopposed be placed on the ballot. La. Acts 1976, No. 697 amending LA. R.S.
18:511(B), 512(B) (Supp. 1976).
55. La. Acts 1976, No. 386 amending LA. R.S. 18:1481-93 (Supp. 1976). There
were also some substantive changes made, including: (1) deletion of the provision
prohibiting candidates from paying to appear or speak at a fair or festival; (2) allowing
corporate contributions to be made by an executive officer designated by the
corporation rather than solely from the board of directors; and (3) closing a loophole
on contributions in the form of purchases of tickets to testimonials.
56. 335 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976).
57. Id. at 446.
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district attorney shall be only on the basis of information forwarded by the
supervisory committee," . . . and on the basis of such information as may
be gathered by the district attorney otherwise if information concerning the
complaint has been forwarded to such official by the supervisory commit-
tee." 58 Unless the supreme court reverses Guidry, this enforcement provi-
sion should also be held unconstitutional because the supervisory committee
can still prevent the district attorney from enforcing the Act by not
forwarding any information to him, thus infringing upon his exclusive
power to institute state criminal proceedings.5 9
However, in the Guidry case, the supreme court also held that the
enforcement provision is severable from the rest of the Act.' Thus, all other
provisions of the Act are valid, 6 and the criminal provisions will be
enforceable by the district attorney even though no information is forwarded
to him by the supervisory committee.
EDUCATION
Act 688 is a specific grant of authority to teachers and school principals
to use corporal punishment in a reasonable manner against any pupil to
maintain discipline and order. 62 Although a 1975 Act contains broad
language which could be interpreted as authorizing the use of reasonable
corporal punishment, 63 Act 688 dispels any doubt. The local school board is
58. La. Acts 1976, No. 386 amending LA. R.S. 18:1492(B)(1) (Supp. 1976).
59. A forceful argument can be made that article V, § 26(B) only gives the district
attorney complete control over the prosecution once it is initiated, and not complete
control over the initiation of prosecution. For example, the constitution gives the
grand jury complete control over initiation of prosecution for capital crimes and
crimes punishable by life imprisonment (art. I, § 15). Also, the debates of the
Constitutional Convention on article V, § 26(B) indicate that the delegates meant not
to change existing law, which in some instances allowed the legislature to provide for
the initiation of prosecution by other means. However, this argument was presented
to the supreme court on application for rehearing of the Guidry case, and the court
denied the application for rehearing.
60. 335 So. 2d 438, 439 (La. 1976).
61. The plaintiff in Guidry challenged several other provisions of the 1975 Act,
and the supreme court held all of these constitutional.
62. La. Acts 1976, No. 688 amending LA. R.S. 17:223 (Supp. 1976). Whether the
procedural due process guidelines for the use of corporal punishment enunciated in
Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D. N.C.), aff'd mem., 423 U.S. 907 (1975), (e.g.,
that it be used only in the presence of another school official; that it not be used as a
first line of punishment for misbehavior) still apply was put in doubt by the recent
case of Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976). See Comment, Corporal
Punishment of Students, 36 LA. L. REV. 984 (1976).
63. LA. R.S. 17:416.1 (Supp. 1975) provides that: "teachers, principals, and
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required to defend any teacher or principal sued for using corporal punish-
ment and to indemnify him for any recovery against him in such suit, except
when his acts are malicious, and willfully and deliberately intended to cause
bodily harm.
64
Act 455 transfers to the Department of Education many of the powers
given last year to the State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education.
65
A recent opinion of the attorney general concludes that this legislation is
violative of article VIII, §§ 2 and 3 of the constitution. 66 The opinion states
that article VIII, § 2 "clearly provides specifically that the Superintendent
shall be the administrative head of the Department of Education and shall
implement the policies of BESE [Board of Elementary and Secondary
Education] and the laws affecting schools under its jurisdiction." 67 While
this is true, the opinion fails to mention another sentence of § 2 which states,
" . . .other powers, functions, duties, and responsibilities of the superin-
tendent shall be provided by law." Thus, the legislature is authorized to
give the superintendent other powers beyond those stated in § 2, as long as
they do not conflict with powers given by the constitution to the board.
Article VIII, § 3 provides that the board
. . .shall supervise and control the public elementary and secondary
schools, vocational-technical training, and special schools under its
jurisdiction and shall have budgetary responsibility for all funds
appropriated or allocated by the state for those schools, all asprovided
by law (emphasis added).
The key to the interpretation of § 3 is determining the meaning of the phrase
administrators . . . may . . . employ other reasonable disciplinary and corrective
measures to maintain order in the schools."
64. Act 688 allows the use of reasonable corporal punishment "subject to the
provisions of LA. R.S. 17:416. 1," which requires the school boards to so indemnify
and defend the teachers, principals and administrators.
65. The powers transferred include: (i) the power to approve public elementary
and secondary schools for state funding; (2) the authority to prepare a minimum
foundation program and a formula for equitable allocation of minimum foundation
funds to city and parish school systems, and to submit them to the legislature for
approval; (3) the authority to receive, administer, and distribute federal funds; and (4)
the authority to provide staff services for the board. The Act also requires the board
to obtain the approval of the superintendent of education, the administrative head of
the department, before entering into almost any contract or agreement. La. Acts
1976, No. 455 amending LA. R.S. 17:6, 7, 10, 22 (Supp. 1976).
66. LA. Op. ATry GEN., No. 76-950 (July 29, 1976). The attorney general also
issued two opinions on the pertinent constitutional provisions before the Act was
passed. 1974-75 LA. Op. ATr'Y GEN. 239 (June 13, 1975); 1974-75 LA. Op. ATr'Y GEN.
240 (Feb. 3, 1975).
67. LA. Op. ATr'y GEN., No. 76-950 (July 29, 1976).
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"all as provided by law." 68 The attorney general's opinion is based on the
premise that the phrase means that the legislature has the authority to specify
in detail the general powers enumerated in § 3, but not the authority to limit
or delete them. However, a careful examination of the form of the entire
constitution supports the opposite conclusion. Throughout the constitution,
whenever a power is granted which was not meant to be controlled by the
legislature, the grant is absolute.69 Such a grant does not prohibit the
legislature from specifying the details of the power so granted. Since
expressly conditioning the grant would serve no purpose if it were intended
to mean only that the legislature could specify the powers granted, it is
logical to conclude that such a phrase would only be included if the intention
were to allow the legislature to limit or delete the enumerated powers as
well. Also, the phrase "as provided by law" is consistently used in the
constitution behind grants of power which were obviously meant to be
completely controlled by the legislature.7 °
When the constitution is interpreted in this manner, there seems to be
no question of the validity of Act 455, since the constitution authorizes the
legislature to give the superintendent additional power and does not prohibit
the legislature from limiting the powers of the board.
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
RIGHT TO WORK
The most hotly debated and emotionally charged issue of the 1976
legislative session was the right to work provision prohibiting requirement
of union membership as a condition of employment.' Various methods of
68. In interpreting a state constitution, one must remember that it is not a grant of
power to the legislature, but a limitation on such power. Thus legislative action
cannot be invalidated as contrary to the state's constitution unless there is a particular
constitutional provision that limits the power of the legislature to act in all the
respects assailed. Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So. 2d 577 (La. 1976).
69. LA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 7, 8,9, 12, 21(B); art. V, §§ 26(B), 27; art. VIII, § 5(A).
70. Id. The most frequent example of this is the grant". . he shall have other
powers and duties as provided by law."
I. For full discussions of the desirability of such provisions see Borron, The
Case for the Right to Work Act, 15 LA. L. REV. 66 (1954); Brooks, Stability Versus
Employee Free Choice, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 344 (1976); Dodd, The Case Against the
So-Called Right to Work Act, 15 LA. L. REV. 74 (1954); Kuhn, Right to Work
Laws-Symbols or Substance?, 14 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 587(1961); Pulsipher, The
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enactment, ranging from declarations of public policy2 to proposed con-
stitutional amendments, 3 were introduced. The proposal finally adopted
prohibits agreements, understandings, or practices which require an em-
ployee to become or remain a member of a labor organization or to pay dues
or fees to such an organization as a condition of his employment.4 Viola-
tions of the Act are punishable by a possible criminal penalty of 90 days
imprisonment or a maximum $1,000 fine. 5 Civil remedies in the nature of
injunctions and damages are also available.6
The constitutional validity of the new right to work law appears
unquestionable. In general, states may legislate against what they find to be
injurious practices in their internal and business affairs if the enactments do
not conflict with federal provisions.7 The right to enact right to work laws is
specifically reserved to the states in the National Labor Relations Act ,8 and,
additionally, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld similar
laws passed in other states.
9
Louisiana's first right to work legislation, enacted in 1954, was
basasicically similar to the present provision. 10 However, the former law
Union Shop: A Legitimate Form of Coercion in a Free-Market Economy, 19 IND. &
LAB. REL. REV. 529 (1966).
2. La. H.B. 641, 39th Reg. Sess., 1976; La. H.B. 1190, 39th Reg. Sess., 1976.
3. La. H.B. 103-05, 39th Reg. Sess., 1976; La. S.B. 68, 69, 75, 39th Reg. Sess.,
1976. There was considerable support for providing the right to work law in the form
of a constitutional amendment. This would have allowed the voters to make the
ultimate decision as to whether the provision should become law and would also have
prevented right to work battles from becoming a regular item on the session agenda.
Senate Bill 69 did pass the Senate with the requisite two-thirds majority but on the last
night of the session the House tabled this proposal.
4. La. Acts 1976, No. 97, adding LA. R.S. 23:981-87 (Supp. 1976).
5. La. Acts 1976, No. 97, adding LA. R.S. 23:985 (Supp. 1976).
6. La. Acts 1976, No. 97, adding LA. R.S. 23:986 (Supp. 1976).
7. See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525 (1949).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1947) provides: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or
Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial
law."
9. E.g., Plumbers Union v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953) (upholding Virginia's
statute); AFL v. American Sash & Door, 335 U.S. 538 (1949) (upholding Arizona's
constitutional amendment); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) (upholding a North Carolina statute and a Nebraska
constitutional amendment).




contained a clause prohibiting lockouts, strikes or picketings designed to
induce violations of the act. This picketing clause led to an unsound decision
by the Louisiana Supreme Court which enjoined peaceful picketing
designed to have a union recognized as the sole bargaining representative of
all the company's employees." The court reasoned that the non-union
employees' rights would be abridged if the union acted as their bargaining
agent, giving too broad a scope to the right to work law. Picketing to
persuade an employer to provide a union shop in violation of a state's right
to work law has also since been held to lie exclusively within the domain of
federal law. 12 Had the former law not been repealed in 1956 it might have
fallen under federal preemption, at least insofar as its picketing provision.
The other major difference between the former provision and the present
enactment is that the former provided no criminal penalties, only civil
remedies.
NON-COMPETITION AGREEMENTS
Clauses in employment contracts restraining an employee from engag-
ing in a competing business following termination of his relationship with
his employer have not been favored in this state because of the Louisiana
courts' emphasis on an individual's freedom to improve his employment
situation. 3 Some courts have distinguished promises made by the employee
not to solicit business from his former employer's customers from broader
promises not to compete. ' 4 These courts validated the former promises by
reasoning that contractual provisions Which merely restrict the employee's
activity as to certain particulars of the employer's business should be
respected. An attempt to codify this jurisprudence by statutorily allowing
restrictions on the enticement of a former employer's clients and custom-
ers 5 failed during the recent legislative session.
11. Piegts v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 228 La. 131,81 So. 2d 835 (1955). See
also Note, 16 LA. L. REV. 187 (1955).
12. Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
13. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 So. 2d 593 (La. 1972); National Motor
Club of La. v. Conque, 173 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 247 La. 875,
175 So. 2d 110 (1965); Comment, Agreements Not to Compete, 33 LA. L. REV. 94,
103-06 (1973).
14. See Martin-Parry Corp. v. New Orleans Fire Detection Serv., 221 La. 677,60
So. 2d 83 (1952). See also Bookkeepers Business Serv. v. Davis, 208 So. 2d I (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1968); Delta Finance Co. v. Graves, 180 So. 2d 85 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1965); contra National Motor Club of La. v. Conque, 173 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 247 La. 875, 175 So. 2d 110 (1965).
15. House Bill 809 was designed to add a new paragraph to LA. R.S. 23:921




Following the lead of the federal government's attempt to prevent
future employment discrimination and redress past discriminatory prac-
tices, legislators introduced two bills designed to achieve these goals on the
state level. House Bill 188 would have created a state procedure adminis-
tered by the Health and Human Resources Administration to enforce
anti-discrimination provisions similar to those contained in Title 7 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.16 Under Title 7 procedures, the federal Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission will defer to a state fair employment
practices commission such as the one House Bill 188 would have created, 1 7
thus allowing the first attempts at conciliation and settlement of employee
grievances to be made at the state level. Resort to the EEOC and its
procedures would not have been removed by the proposal, only delayed. 18
Employees could still have received federal consideration of their claims
had they desired it, after utilizing the state's mechanism. The proposal
would have been more comprehensive than the federal scheme because in
addition to the federal categories of race, sex, religion, and ancestral origin,
the Louisiana provision included the criteria of age' 9 and physical
handicaps.
The Senate also considered a bill relating to employment discrimina-
tion that was much narrower than the House proposal. Senate Bill 87 would
have prohibited age discrimination by employers, employment agencies,
and labor organizations, tracking the federal age discrimination provisions
defining unfair employer practices.20 The only method of enforcement
provided, however, would have been a civil action for legal or equitable
relief; no enforcing agency would have been designated.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Third Party Tort Suits
Under workmen's compensation systems, employees theoretically
relinquish their remedies in tort against their employers 2' in order to secure a
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1964).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 (Supp. 1972); 2000e-7 (1964).
18. The complainant must allow the state agency 60 days for processing of his
claim before resorting to the EEOC for relief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1972).
19. The federal government provides for age discrimination grievances under a
separate statute, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1967).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1967).
21. LA. R.S. 23:1032 (1950). This exclusivity also protects principal employers
under LA. R.S. 23:1061 (1950) who carry out their businesses through contractors.
Employers who subcontract their work are made liable for compensation benefits to
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guaranteed compensation without having to prove that the employer was at
fault.2" In Louisiana, as in most systems, the employee retains his right to
bring a tort suit against anyone other than his employer who was responsible
for the accident .23 Louisiana courts have experienced difficulty in determin-
ing the limits of the category of third parties amenable to suit in tort. It has
been held that executive officers,24 employees who are also stockholders,2
and partners 26 may be sued in tort if their negligence contributes to the
industrial accident. This jurisprudence has been criticized because, as a
practical consequence, employers have been required to carry liability
insurance to cover the negligence of their official personnel in addition to
their company's compensation insurance.27 This has caused an undermining
of the policy of the compensation act 28 because the employer must satisfy
tort judgments rendered against those for whom he is responsible.
prevent evasion of the system; once liable for compensation they become immune
from tort liability. W. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 121 (1951) [hereinafter cited as MALONE]. See also Duhon v. Texaco,
Inc., 490 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1974); Etienne v. Home Indem. Co., 307 So. 2d 654 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1975); Wynn v. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 85 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1956).
22. A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as LARSON].
23. LARSON at § 72.10; MALONE at § 366.
24. Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So. 2d 716 (La. 1973); Chaney v. Brupbacher,
242 So. 2d 627 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); Adams v. Fidelity &Cas. Co., 107 So. 2d496
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1958).
25. Rogers v. Highlands Ins. Co., 270 So. 2d 277 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972) (dicta);
Boudreaux v. Falco, 215 So. 2d 538 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1968).
26. Partners have presented an especially complex problem because of the
reluctance of courts to recognize the partnership as a separate entity for which the
partners may work as employees. A number of cases have held that partners are
immune from third party suits because they are considered employers unless they are
shown specifically to be earning separate wages as employees. Obiol v. Industrial
Outdoor Displays, 288 So. 2d 425 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 So. 2d 166
(1974). Bersuder v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 273 So. 2d 46 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1973); Cockerham v. Consolidated Underwriters, 262 So. 2d 119 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 262 La. 315,263 So. 2d 49 (1972); Leger v. Townsend, 257 So. 2d 761 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 261 La. 464, 259 So. 2d 914 (1972). The recent case of
Cooley v. Slocum, 326 So. 2d 49 (La. 1976), removed the previous uncertainty by
holding that a partnership is an independent "person" at civil law, separate from the
partners who compose it so that the partner's liability for his own fault is an obligation
owed by him individually, independent of the partnership's liability.
27. MALONE at § 366; Comment, Workmen's Compensation-Executive Officer
Liability, 33 LA. L. REV. 325, 333 (1973).
28. A third party tortfeasor cannot circumvent an employer's immunity from
tort actions and obtain contribution or indemnity from the employer when the
accident is the result of concurrent negligence. Gros v. Steen Prod. Serv., Inc., 197
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To prevent this circumvention of the basic compensation design, the
1976 legislature made compensation the exclusive remedy of the employee
against "his employer, or any principal or any officer, director, stockhold-
er, partner, or employee.' '29 The tort immunity does not cover these parties,
however, when they are not engaged in the normal course and scope of their
employment at the time of the injury.30 Neither the employer nor any of the
other parties is relieved of any civil or criminal liability resulting from an
intentional act.
Although the new provision decreases the avenues of relief open to
injured employees, the increased benefits made possible by the 1975
workmen's compensation amendments3' might be sufficient to provide for
employees so that the additional tort remedies formerly allowed by the
courts are no longer necessary.
Double Compensation Benefits
Perhaps as a response to the legislation limiting the availability of tort
suits by an injured employee,32 the House and Senate considered, but did
not pass, bills which would have increased available compensation benefits.
The proposals 33 would have required that the employer pay double the
weekly benefits due to an employee if an injury resulted from the em-
ployer's violation of a safety rule, his failure to provide a safety device, or
some gross negligence on the part of a supervisory employee. Such a
provision would undoubtedly have encouraged stricter compliance with
safety rules and supplying of safety devices to employees. However, a
So. 2d 356 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967); Hebert v. Blankenship, 187 So. 2d 798 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1966). These holdings provide strong support for limiting the class of third
parties amenable to suit since executives who are insured by their employers are in
effect receiving an indemnity from them contrary to the basic Louisiana scheme.
29. LA. R.S. 23:1032, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 147, § 1.
30. LA. R.S. 23:1032, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 147, § 1. The named
parties remain liable for fines and penalties imposed by other statutes. A partner may
not take advantage of this immunity, however, if the partnership of which he is a
member was formed for the purpose of evading any of the workmen's compensation
laws.
31. LA. R.S. 23:1202, as amended by La. Acts 1975, No. 583, § 5 increased the
maximum and minimum benefits to $85 and $25 per week respectively after Sep-
tember 1, 1975, $95 and $30 per week after September I, 1976, and to sixty-six and
two-thirds percent and twenty percent of a computed average weekly wage after
September I, 1977. Comment, 1975 Amendments to the Louisiana Workmen's
Compensation Act, 36 LA. L. REV. 1018 (1976).
32. See text at notes 29-31, supra.
33. La. H.B. 650, 39th Reg. Sess., 1976; La. S.B. 647, 39th Reg. Sess., 1976.
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modicum of fault would have been injected into the basically "no-fault' 34
workmen's compensation system, since the amount of compensation due
would have depended on whether or not the employer was negligent.35
Some degree of the predictability now provided by the maximum benefit
provisions 36 would also have been lost, perhaps affecting the computation
of insurance premiums. Nonetheless, if such a provision is passed in the
future, the onus of providing benefits would remain with the employer who
is best able to pass the costs to the ultimate consumer of his product37 and the
injured worker would receive more adequate compensation for his injuries.
Waiver of Compensation Coverage
Corporate officers and members of partnerships create special prob-
lems under a workmen's compensation system because their managerial
functions cause them to appear to be employers rather than employees.
Nevertheless, most compensation schemes cover corporate officers when
they are acting in the course and scope of their employment unless they own
a controlling share of the corporate stock. 38 The Louisiana statute presently
provides that executive officers of other than non-profit or municipal
corporations shall be considered employees within the scheme. 39 Louisiana
courts have held that a partner may be an employee of his partnership for
purposes of collecting workmen's compensation benefits if he is clearly
acting as an employee when injured.'
With the passage of Act 177 of 1976, 4' the legislature provided that
34. LA. R.S. 23:1031 (1950), which establishes the employee's right of action,
requires only an injury from an accident arising out of and in the course of
employment with no mention of a fault requirement. This accords with the basic
principles of compensation systems. LARSON at § 1. 10. Some inquiry is now made
into the fault of the employee with regard to the defenses available to the employer
without any damage to the system. See LA. R.S. 23:1081 (1950). The proposed statute
might have had a similar de minimis effect.
35. Gross negligence by a supervisory employee would also have imposed this
double liability on the employer.
36. LA. R.S. 23:1202, as amended by La. Acts 1975, No. 583, § 5.
37. MALONE at § 32 states this as the basic compensation principle: to impose
accident costs on those who use the products of the work causing the accident. Id.
38. LARSON at § 54.10.
39. LA. R.S. 23:1044, as amended by La. Acts 1958, No. 306, § 1.
40. Trappey v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 229 La. 632, 86 So. 2d 515 (1956);
DeSoto v. Tusa Bros. Inc., 273 So. 2d 739 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 277 So. 2d
442 (1973); Carpenter v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 159 So. 2d 757 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 245 La. 797, 161 So. 2d 276 (1964). See also note 26, supra, for recent
clarifications of the status of partners.
41. La. Acts 1976, No. 177 amending LA. R.S. 23:1035 (Supp. 1975).
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partners and the top officers of a corporation42 owning at least 10% of the
corporate stock may elect not to be covered by the compensation scheme by
executing a written agreement to that effect. This allows officials who, in
theory at least, are more nearly employers to relinquish the employee status
granted them. Act 295 specifically exempts officials of non-profit or
charitable corporations from employee status if they receive no remunera-
tion for their work. 43 These two provisions, by keeping these officials from
collecting benefits under certain conditions, will make it necessary for
employers to carry additional insurance to meet the potential threat of tort
suits by these parties.
Recovery of Travel Expenses
Act 400 of 1976" codifies the existing jurisprudence relative to the
recovery of travel expenses incurred by an injured employee in his attempts
to obtain medical care. The courts have repeatedly held that these travel
costs, if proven, are a legitimate part of the medical expenses45 for which the
employer is liable. However, the jurisprudence has not used any uniform
method for computing these expenses .4 6 The new provision requires that the
mileage allowance be determined in accordance with the United States
Internal Revenue Service standard rates for computing mileage
deductions. 4
Second Injury Fund
Minor changes were made in the administration of the newly created
second injury fund .48 The time limit for filing claims for reimbursement was
42. The president, vice-president, secretary, and treasurer may make such an
agreement with their employing corporation.
43. La. Acts 1976, No. 295, § 1, adding LA. R.S. 23:1046 (Supp. 1976).
44. La. Acts 1976, No. 400 amending LA. R.S. 23:1203 (Supp. 1975).
45. Pennywell v. Crawford, 262 So. 2d 830 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972); Southall v.
Kingsville Timber Co., 168 So. 2d 424 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964); Murry v. Southern
Pulpwood Co., 136 So. 2d 165 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
46. For examples of awards made and settlements reached, see Jack v. Fidelity
& Cas. Co. of New York, 326 So. 2d 584 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976) (15c per mile);
Bananno v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 299 So. 2d 923 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974) (7c
per mile); Burgess v. Southern Cas. Ins. Co., 203 So. 2d 434 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967)
(10c per mile); Dugas v. Houston Contracting Co., 191 So. 2d 178 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1966) ($35 awarded); Walters v. General Accident & Fire Assurance Co., 119 So. 2d
550 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1960) (5c per mile for some trips; 40c per trip for others).
47. The present deduction allowed under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 213 is 7c per
mile. PRENTICE-HALL FEDERAL TAX HANDBOOK 266 (1976).
48. LA. R.S. 23:1378 (Supp. 1974).
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extended by Act 29841 from 10 days to 180 days following the first payment
of benefits after the second injury. Act 29950 provides that an employer may
receive reimbursement when the second injury has caused the worker's
death and the employer is thereby liable for death benefits. The employer's
liability in such a situation51 is now limited to 175 weeks, and he will be
reimbursed from the second injury fund for any amounts paid in excess of
that time period. Additionally, spinal fusions or surgical disc removals have
been included as new permanent, partial disabilities.52 This allows an
employee to register these with the second injury fund thereby benefitting
his future employers in the event he receives a second compenshble injury.
Employee's Right to Medical Report
An injured employee must submit to a physical examination following
an accident53 or face the penalty of suspension of his right to compensa-
tion.54 Should the employer have that examination made, he must provide
the employee with a copy of the medical report. 55 The 1976 legislature
further expanded the employee's rights to medical reports by requiring that
the employee may demand a written report of any examination, even a
pre-employment physical, which he undergoes at his employer's request.5 6
An employer failing to comply with such a demand within thirty days
without just cause will be liable to the employee for a $250 civil penalty.
49. La. Acts 1976, No. 298 amending LA. R.S. 23:1378 (Supp. 1975).
50. La. Acts 1976, No. 299 amending LA. R.S. 23:1378 (Supp. 1975).
51. The death must have been the result of the combination of the two compen-
sable injuries or one which would not have occurred but for the pre-existing
permanent partial disability of the employee.
52. La. Acts 1976, No. 299, § 2 amending LA. R.S. 23:1378 (Supp. 1975).
53. LA. R.S. 23:1121 (1950).
54. LA. R.S. 23:1124 (1950).
55. LA. R.S. 23:1122 (1950). See also Dow v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 9 So. 2d
828 (La. App. I st Cir. 1942) (as a correlative of his right to require an exam, employer
owes employee a duty to inform him of results).






La. Acts 1976, No. 574, amendingLA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 1421-1474,
makes several major changes in the law of discovery. I Act 574 broadens the
scope of civil discovery in Louisiana, though it is not as liberal as similar
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 The changes made in
civil discovery involve three main subjects: information known to persons
participating in civil proceedings, information contained in insurance
policies, and the mechanics of discovery.
One may discover the writings of a party, his attorney, or an expert
witness made in preparation for trial upon a showing of unfair prejudice or
"undue hardship" if its discovery is denied.3 Even without such a showing,
both a party and a non-party may obtain a copy of a statement which he
I. The changes made by Act 574 are too numerous to be discussed in detail in
this article. Therefore, this discussion will be limited to changes which are of major
importance.
2. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (allowing discovery of expert opinion) with
LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1425, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 574 (limitingdiscovery
of expert knowledge to facts only). The original version of Act 574, La. H.B. 904,
Reg. Sess. (1976), allowed discovery of expert opinion. See also C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTs 365 (1970) (distinguishing between fact and work product)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
3. The following chart may prove helpful in comparing the (A) FED. R. Civ. P.,
(B) LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. (as they appeared prior to Act 574 of 1976), and (C) LA.
CODE CIV. P. arts., as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 574:
A B C A B C
26(a) 1421 1431 1435
26(b)(1) - 1422 29 1421-22 1436
26(b)(2) 1423 30(a) 1436 1437
26(b)(3) - 1424 30(b)(1) 1451 1438
26(b)(4) 1425 30(b)(2) - 1439
26(c) 1452 1426 30(b)(4) 1440
26(d) - 1427 30(b)(5) 1492 1441
26(e) 1428 30(b)(6) 1491 1442
27(a)(1) 1432 1429 30(c) 1453 1443
27(a)(2) 1433 1430 30(d) 1454 1444
27(a)(3) 1434 1431 30(e) 1455 1445
27(a)(4) 1435 1432 30(f) 1456 1446
27(b) 1433 30(g) 1457 1447
28 1423 1434 31(a) 1471 1448
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previously made.4 The "opinions" of attorneys and experts are not
discoverable.
5
Facts known by experts are discoverable by either interrogatories or
depositions.6 If the expert is to be called as a witness, no special circum-
stances need be shown. However, if the expert has "been retained or
specially employed," 7 but is not expected to be a witness, facts known to
him are discoverable only if the information was obtained through examina-
tion by a physician or if the party seeking discovery shows that it is
"impracticable" to gain the information by other means. 8 The court may
order the party seeking discovery to pay a portion of the expenses of the
other party in securing the services of the witness to be called as an expert;
the court must do so if the expert is not expected to be called.9 Two types of
experts not mentioned in Act 574 could exist: those who are informally
consulted and those who are generally employed.' 0 The discovery of facts
known to either of these types of experts is questionable."
The second area of change in regard to discovery relates to insurance
policies. Act 574 provides that the existence and contents of liability
A B C A B C
31(b)(c) 1472 1449 34(b) 1462
32(a) 1428 1450 34(c) - 1463
32(b) 1429 1451 35(a) 1493 1464
32(c)* 1430 1452 35(b) 1494 1465
32(d)(1) 1424 1453 36(a) 41 1496 I1 1466
32(d)(2) 1425 1454 36(a) 2&3 1496 41 1467
32(d)(3) 1426 1455 36(b) - 1468
32(d)(4) 1427 1456 37(a) - 1469
33(a) I 1491 41 1457 37(b)(I) 1512 1470
33(a) 12 1491 T1 1458 37(b)(2) 1513 1471
33(b) 1 1491 2 1459 37(c) 1514 1472
33(c) - 1460 37(d) 1515 1473
34(a) 1492 1461 1474
*Abrogated by amendment, Nov. 20, 1972, eff. July I, 1973.
4. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 1424-25, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 574.
5. Id.
6. See generally Maraist, Scope of Discovery, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1975
THIRTIETH ANNUAL MIssIssPPI LAW INSTITUTE ON STATE COURT DISCOVERY 31,35-6
(1975) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
7. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1425, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 574.
8. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1425, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 574.
9. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1425, as amended byLa. Acts 1976, No. 574. See also
WRIGHT at 357-59 (discussing the development and application of comparable federal
law, now FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)).
10. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1425, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 574.
11. PROCEEDINGS at 43-44.
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insurance policies are discoverable.' 2 The corresponding federal provi-
sion'3 expressly prohibits the discovery of the insured's application for the
policy, a provision not present in the Louisiana law. It is doubtful, however,
that such applications will be discoverable in Louisiana. 4
Act 574 makes numerous changes in the mechanics of discovery. After
an unsuccessful motion requesting discovery, the court may issue a protec-
tive order without the filing of a separate motion; likewise, no separate
motion is necessary for the court to issue an order allowing discovery
following an unsuccessful objection to discovery.' 5 Furthermore, Act 574
provides for the automatic supplementation of responses in some situations.
A party must supplement:
any question directly addressed to the identity and location of persons
having knowledge of discoverable matters, and the identity of each
person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject
matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his
testimony.' 
6
A party must also supplement:
a prior response if he obtains information upon which he knows that the
response was incorrect when made, or he knows that the response
though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are
such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing
concealment. 7
Leave of court must be obtained if a party seeks a deposition within
fifteen days of service of citation, rather than from filing of suit, unless
special notice of the unavailability of the witness is given to every other
party. 8 Act 574 further requires that a designation of materials requested in
a subpoena duces tecum be "attached or included in the notice."' 9
12. LA..CODE CIV. P. art. 1425, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 574.
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2). La. Acts 1976, No. 574, amending LA. CODE CIV. P.
art. 1423. Since liability insurance policies are normally discoverable in direct action
suits, La. Act 574 does not signify a major change in this regard.
14. See PROCEEDINGS at 36.
15. La. Acts 1976, No. 574, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. P. arts. 1426 and 1469(2).
16. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1423, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 574.
17. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1428, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 574.
18. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1437, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 574. See also
LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1436 (as it appeared prior to La. Acts 1976, No. 574) (requiring
leave of court if the deposition was sought within fifteen days of commencement of
the action), LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 1438-39, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 574.
19. La. Acts 1976, No. 574, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1438.
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Upon order of court, a report of testimony at a deposition may now be
made by "other than stenographic means .... .. 20 Act 574 also provides
that it is the duty of a deponent organization to designate the representative
who will testify on its behalf. 2 Furthermore, a precise and fair procedure for
the copying of and substitution for original documents is now established. 22
Prior to Act 574, one could serve an interrogatory only on an adverse
party;23 now any party may serve an interrogatory upon any other party.24
Act 574 also provides an option to produce business records in response to
interrogatories,25 thereby eliminating the possible use of interrogatories to
harass an opponent by submitting interrogatories which require answers
regarding intricate and detailed information about the party's business. The
inspection of documents and the testing and sampling of property are now
possible without the necessity of a court order.26
An incomplete answer is deemed a failure to answer under Act 574.27
An objection that the issue is one for trial or that the party lacks the
knowledge is not an acceptable excuse for failure to respond to a request for
admissions.28 If a party refuses to comply with a court order allowing
discovery, he may now be ordered to pay the expenses resulting therefrom
as an additional sanction.
29
The original version of Act 57430 recommended by the Louisiana State
Law Institute proposed a more expansive concept of discovery of expert
witnesses' information. It allowed the discovery of expert opinion, but this
provision was deleted from the bill. Fortunately, this deletion marks the
only substantive deviation from the original draft.
CITY COURT JURISDICTION
La. Acts 1976, No. 84, amending LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 4832-4833
and repealing LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 4834, changes the jurisdiction of city
20. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1440, as amended byLa. Acts 1976, No. 574. Examples
of other means are not given in Act 574. Presumably, such means would include tape
recordings and similar methods.
21. La. Acts 1976, No. 574, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1442.
22. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1446, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 574.
23. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1491 (as it appeared prior to Act 574 of 1976).
24. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1457, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 574.
25. La. Acts 1976, No. 574, amending LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 1460.
26. LA. CODE CiV. P. arts. 1461-62, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 574.
27. La. Acts 1976, No. 574, amending LA. CODE. CIv. P. art. 1469.
28. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1467, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 574.
29. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1471, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 574. See also
WRIGHT at 395-96 (discussing federal sanctions for refusal to allow discovery).
30. La. H.B. 904, Reg. Sess. (1976).
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and justice of the peace courts. The 1976 legislature raised the jurisdictional
ceiling to fifteen hundred dollars for city courts and three hundred dollars for
justice of the peace courts, exclusive of interest and attorney fees. 3
LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 4833-4834 (as they appeared prior to Act 84 of
1976) made a further distinction as to the jurisdiction of city courts, other
than New Orleans city courts.32 Act 84 removes the population demarcation
and raises the amount limit. Specifically, the civil jurisdiction of city courts
whose jurisdictional populations exceed ten thousand, New Orleans city
courts excluded, now is concurrent with the district court in matters
involving a claim not exceeding two thousand dollars. 33
Prior to Act 84, appeal from a city court was to the district court if the
amount in dispute was one hundred dollars or less and to the court of appeal
if the amount exceeded one hundred dollars.3 4 Act 84 changes this amount
distinction to one thousand dollars.35 It may be argued that articles 4899 and
5002, applying the one hundred dollar line, are tacitly amended thereby.
SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS TO DETERMINE THE RANK OF LIENS AND PRIVILEGES
Due to an inadvertent error of the Legislative Bureau in 1974, the
words "and privileges" was deleted from line (7) of Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 2592, thereby preventing the use of summary
proceedings to decide the rank of privileges. The Louisiana Law Institute,
under the authority of LA. R.S. 24:253(8) (1950), corrected the error. 36 La.
Acts 1976, No. 321, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2593, insures the
availability of summary proceedings to determine the rank of "liens and
privileges" and thus legislatively corrects the mistake made by the Legisla-
tive Bureau.
DELAY FOR TAKING A DEVOLUTIVE APPEAL
La. Acts 1976, No. 201, amending LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2087,
reduces the allowable delay for taking a devolutive appeal from ninety to
31. La. Acts 1976, No. 84, amending LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4832.
32. If the population exceeded ten thousand but was less than twenty thousand,
the city court had concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in civil cases
involving a claim not exceeding five hundred dollars. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4833 (as it
appeared prior to Act 84 of 1976). If the population was twenty thousand or more, the
concurrent jurisdiction existed in cases involving a dispute not exceeding one
thousand dollars. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4834 (as it appeared prior to Act 84 of 1976).
33. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 4833, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 84. See also
LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 4835 (establishing the jurisdiction of New Orleans city courts).
34. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 4899 and 5002.
35. La. Acts 1976, No. 84, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 4833.
36. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2591, n.l (as it appeared prior to Act 321 of 1976).
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sixty days. 37 Louisiana appeal courts consistently dismiss appeals not
timely filed, 38 and the Louisiana Supreme Court seems to approve.3 9
Therefore, this change should be noted with particular care.
EXTENSION OF RETURN DAY
Prior to La. Acts 1976, No. 426, amending LA. R.S. 13:4438 (1950)
and LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2125, few restrictions limited the court's power to
extend the return day. 4 Act 426 greatly limits this authority by allowing the
trial court to grant only one extension of no more than thirty days. 4' The
clerk of the trial court must mail notice of any extension to counsel for all
parties and to those parties unrepresented by counsel .42 The court of appeal,
for sufficient cause shown, may grant further extensions.
4 3
COST OF PREPARING THE RECORD
La. Acts 1976, No. 708, amending LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2126 and LA.
R.S. 13:4445 (1950), changes the time limitation for payment of the costs of
the record for appeal. Under prior law, these costs had to be paid "not later
than three days prior to the return day,"44 which could be set at any time
within sixty days of the granting of appeal and could be extended even
further. 45 Act 708 allows an estimation of the costs to be paid within
"twenty days of the granting of the order of appeal ...... The trial court
37. The original version, La. H.B. 271, Reg. Sess. (1976), proposed a thirty day
time limitation, as in suspensive appeals (LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2123).
38. In Re Tutorship of Jones, 310 So. 2d 698 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975);Thomas v.
Berman, 308 So. 2d 797 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
39. Wall v. American Employers Ins. Co., 215 So. 2d 913 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 253 La. 325, 217 So. 2d 415 (1969); Britt v. Brocado, 170 So. 2d 516
(La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 247 La. 618, 172 So. 2d 701 (1965).
40. Two of the restrictions were that good cause had to be shown (LA. CODE CIV.
P. art. 2125 as it appeared prior to Act 426 of 1976) and that the return date previously
set must not have passed. See Thibodeaux v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 310 So. 2d
860 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1975); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Lasseigne, 255 La. 579,
232 So. 2d 278 (1970). In Thibodeaux, supra, the court had already granted three
extensions; the fourth, however, was attempted after the date set by the third
extension had passed.
41. La. Acts 1976, No. 426, amending LA. R.S. 13:4438 (1950) and LA. CODE
Civ. P. art. 2125.
42. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2125.1, added by La. Acts 1976, No. 708.
43. LA. R.S. 13:4438 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 426; LA. CODE
Civ. P. art. 2125, as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 426.
44. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2126 and LA. R.S. 13:4445 (1950) (as they appeared
prior to Act 708 of 1976).
45. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 2125 (as it appeared prior to Act 426 of 1976).
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may grant only one twenty-day extension; and, if there is any discrepancy
between estimated and actual costs, the difference is to be paid "not later
than three days prior to the return day or extended return day." 46
PRE-TRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
SHOPLIFTER DETECTION
La. Acts 1976, No. 339, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 215,
provides that, if notice of the device is given to customers, the signal from a
shoplifter detection device "constitutes a sufficient . . . basis for reason-
able cause to detain the person." In a recent case,' the Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed the appellate court and found civil liability for detaining a
customer whom the detection device had signalled as a suspect. The
decision, however, was based upon the imputation of knowledge of an
employee (who did not remove the tag from the goods) to her employer and
upon knowledge of numerous malfunctions of the device.2 The court found
that since the defendant had such knowledge he "did not have reasonable
grounds to believe that the sounding of the alarm was caused by a theft of
goods ....... The court did not discuss the possible outcome had the
defendant been ignorant of the circumstances.
The effect Act 339 would have on such a situation is not clear. A
merchant must meet the requirements of the statute to avoid liability,4 and
the Act provides that a signal from the device is "sufficient basis for
reasonable cause .... ." However, the circumstances surrounding the
signal will surely be examined; and, if a merchant knows that his detection
device is prone to malfunction and knows (by imputation at least) that the
tag was not removed from the goods, surely his detention of the customer is
unreasonable if based solely upon the signal.
INDIGENT DEFENSE
Appointed counsel for indigent defendants is a sensitive problem
46. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2126 and LA. R.S. 13:4445 (1950), as amended by La.
Acts 1976, No. 708.
I. Clark v. 1. H. Rubenstein, Inc., 314 So.'2d489(La. App. Ist Cir. 1975), rev'd,
326 So. 2d 497 (La. 1976).
2. 326 So. 2d at 488-89.
3. Id.
4. See Lasseigne v. Walgreen, 274 So. 2d 480,482 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1973). See
also Comment, Louisiana Merchant Detention Statute, 25 LA. L. REV. 956 (1965).
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involving the rights of both defendants and attorneys. 5 La. Acts 1976, No.
653, establishes the new indigent defense program and recognizes the needs
of both groups. 6
Act 653 creates the Louisiana Indigent Defender Board, 7 composed of
eleven members. 8 The duties of the state board are to regulate the judicial
district indigent defender boards and to report to the legislature, at least
thirty days before the regular annual session, on the "status and cost of legal
representation for indigent defendants." 9
Each judicial district is to have a separate district board, composed of
three to seven members selected by the district court from nominees of the
district bar association. 0 The district boards may select one of two alterna-
tive means of providing counsel for indigents: appointment from a list of
volunteer attorneys, and, if inadequate, appointment from a nonvolunteer
5. The right of the indigent defendant to appointed counsel has been expanded
in recent years, and this expansion has been fully discussed by doctrinal writers. See
Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,35 LA. L.
REV. 1, 45 (1974) (comparing LA. CONST. art. 1, § 13 with Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972)); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975
Term-Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 36 LA. L. REV. 575, 600 (1976) (discussing the
retroactivity of Argersinger v. Hamlin); Comment, Balance Sheet of Appointed
Counsel in Louisiana Criminal Cases, 34 LA. L. REV. 88 (1973) (discussing the
problem of defining indigency); Note, 33 LA. L. REV. 731 '(1973) (casenote on
Argersinger v. Hamlin, establishing the right to counsel for defendants prosecuted for
offenses punished by imprisonment); Note, 33 LA. L. REV. 740 (1973) (discussing the
possibility of malpractice suit against a court-appointed attorney). See also LA.
CONST. art. I, § 13 (extending right to counsel to those prosecuted for offenses
punishable by imprisonment).
Attorneys themselves have brought their own rights to the attention of the
courts. See State v. Carruth, 324 So. 2d 400 (La. 1975); State v. Wells, 324 So. 2d 399
(La. 1975); State v. Campbell, 324 So. 2d 395 (La. 1975); State v. Bryant, 324 So. 2d
389 (La. 1975) (all dealing with the right of the appointed attorney to reasonable
compensation). For a superficial comparison of the rights of doctors, investigators,
and attorneys see also State v. Cummings, 324 So.2d 401, 402 (La. 1975); State v.
Jackson, 324 So. 2d 398 (La. 1975). Attorneys in both cases filed motions requesting
the appointment of an investigator and a medical doctor. In Jackson, both were
denied. In Cummings, the Court stated: "Nor has any showing been made to warrant
either the motion to withdraw or the motion to appoint an investigator." However,
the Court made no mention of the motion to appoint a medical doctor.
6. La. Acts 1976, No. 653, amending LA. R.S. 15:141 (Supp. 1976), 142 (Supp.
1972), 143-44 (Supp. 1974), 145 (Supp. 1975), and LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 512-13, and
adding LA. R.S. 15:146-49 (Supp. 1976).
7. Hereinafter referred to as the state board.
8. La. Acts 1976, No. 653, amending LA. R.S. 15:141 (Supp. 1976).
9. LA. R.S. 15:143 (Supp. 1974), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 653.
10. LA. R.S. 15:144 (Supp. 1974), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 653.
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list; or appointment of a salaried "chief indigent defender" and assistants. "
Act 653 provides two means for bearing the cost of the system. First,
an indigent defender fund supplied by special costs taxed by every court of
original jurisdiction is established for each judicial district.' 2 Second, the
state allocates ten thousand dollars to each district board.' 3
The court must make the decision on indigency "at any stage of the
proceedings."' 4 The law sets forth factors to be considered in making the
determination, including "property owned, outstanding obligations,
number and ages of dependents .... ,,15 A person may still receive
appointed counsel even though he is released on bail. 16 If the defendant is
able to pay part of the cost of counsel, the court will so order and may even
"order payment in installments.... ... 7 Such payments, however, enter
the district fund and are not paid to the attorney. 18
Act 653 further provides that the Department of Corrections is respons-
ible for providing counsel for an indigent parolee at a prerevocation or
revocation hearing. '9 Therefore, it is not the duty of the district boards to
provide counsel in such situations.
Act 653 changes the law on assignment of counsel in capital2" and other
cases. 2' Now, the court must follow the new indigent defense plan in
appointing counsel, as described above. Furthermore, the new law removes
the provision that the defendant is not required to pay for counsel.22
CRIMINAL TRIAL PROCEDURE
JURY SERVICE EXCUSALS
Louisiana HOUSE BILL 272, Regular Session (1976), proposed adding
a new section to LA. R.S. (1950) relative to the excusal of prospective jurors
from jury service in any trial "whether criminal or civil." Fortunately, the
11. LA. R.S. 15:145 (Supp. 1975), as amended by La. Acts 1976, No. 653.
12. La. Acts 1976, No. 653, adding LA. R.S. 15:146 (Supp. 1976).
13. La. Acts 1976, No. 653, adding LA. R.S. 15:146 (Supp. 1976).
14. LA. R.S. 15:147 (Supp. 1976), added by La. Acts 1976, No. 653.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. LA. R.S. 15:148 (Supp. 1976), added by La. Acts 1976, No. 653.
18. Id.
19. La. Acts 1976, No. 653, adding LA. R.S. 15:149 (Supp. 1976).
20. La. Acts 1976, No. 653, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 512.
21. La. Acts 1976, No. 653, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 513.
22. La. Acts 1976, No. 653, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 512-13.
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legislature chose a more direct and thus preferable method of reaching the
same result in La. Acts 1976, No. 212, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art.
1767 and LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 873.' Act 212 provides that the district
court may excuse prospective jurors if "undue hardship" or "extreme
inconvenience" would result from jury service2 and prohibits the automatic
excusal of any group from jury service. 3
However, the constitutionality of Act 212 is questionable since Article
V, § 33(B) of the Louisiana Constitution gives the Louisiana Supreme Court
the authority to provide for exemptions from jury service.4 The court has
done so in Louisiana Supreme Court Rule XXV.'
RESPONSIVE VERDICTS TO THEFT AND ATTEMPTED THEFT
In State v. White, 6 the Louisiana Supreme Court invalidated a respon-
sive verdict which was specifically provided for by LA. CODE CRIM. P. art.
I. The original version, La. H.B. 272, Reg. Sess. (1976), included the phrase
'whether criminal or civil" because one law was intended to apply to both types of
cases. Since the legislature chose instead to amend the pertinent articles in both the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure and the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure,
the phrase should have been deleted. However, though omitted in the amendment of
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1767, the phrase was retained in the
amendment of Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 783. The retention of the
phrase is an obvious oversight, but it should present no practical legal problems.
2. La. Acts 1976, No. 212, amending LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1767(B) and LA.
CODE CRIM. P. art. 783(B). However, even prior to Act 212, Louisiana courts
exercised broad discretion in excusing prospective jurors. See State v. Elam, 312 So.
2d 318 (La. 1975) (no reversible error in excusing twenty prospective jurors before
voir dire); State v. Sears, 298 So. 2d 814 (La. 1974) (no abuse of trial judge's discretion
in excusing a prospective juror on the basis of financial hardship); State v. Ceaser,
249 La. 435, 187 So. 2d 432 (1966) (trial judge's discretion in excusing prospective
jurors will not be disturbed absent a showing of prejudic6 to accused); Lindsey v.
Tioga Lumber Co., 108 La. 468, 32 So. 464 (1902) (in civil case when juryman became
ill during trial, judge had authority to excuse him and substitute another juryman).
3. La. Acts 1976, No. 212, amending LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 1767(C) and LA.
CODE CRIM. P. art. 783(C).
Delegate Dennis speaking of Article V, § 33(B): "The reason we adopted this is
that exemptions from jury service have really become much too much of a political
matter as handled in the legislature. . . . We have placed this decision in the hands of
the Supreme Court." Xl TRANSCRIPTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
1974, 36th Convention Day, p. 99. Furthermore, it is evident that the term "exemp-
tion" also encompasses the situations referred to as excusals in Act 212. Id. p. 102.
4. See generally Taylor v. La., 419 U.S.522, 534 (approving "exemptions. ..
to those engaged in particular occupations the uninterrupted performance of which is
critical to the community's welfare"); State v. Procell, 332 So. 2d 814 (La. 1976) and
State v. Gaines, 315 So. 2d 298 (La. 1975) (both interpreting Louisiana Supreme
Court Rule XXV).
5. 315 So. 2d 301 (La. 1975).
6. LA. R.S. 14:27(D)(2) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1970, No. 471.
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814 (as it appeared prior to Act 85 of 1976). The verdict, guilty of attempted
theft, failed to specify the value of the property involved. Since a deter-
mination of the value is necessary to set the possible sentence, the court
found that the verdict did not form the basis of a valid judgment because it
did not reveal the jury's decision as to the grade of theft attempted. 7 La. Acts
1976, No. 85, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 814(23) and (24), prevents
another such situation by requiring that the value of the property involved be
set forth in the verdict.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
In Roberts v. Louisiana,8 the United States Supreme Court held
Louisiana's death penalty scheme unconstitutional, finding "no standards
to guide the jury in the exercise of its power . . . and no meaningful
appellate review of the jury's decision." 9 Following this decision, the
Louisiana legislature in 1976 redefined first and second degree murder,'°
provided specific procedures to be followed in determining the sentence to
be imposed for a capital offense," and provided for mandatory review of
death sentences by the Louisiana Supreme Court.'"
La. Acts 1976, No. 657, amending LA. R.S. 14:30 (1950) and 30.1
(Supp. 1973), defines first degree murder as the "killing of a human being
when the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm."
The penalty is death or life imprisonment, "in accordance with the
recommendation of the jury." Act 657 defines second degree murder as
"the killing of a human being when the offender is engaged in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration" of certain enumerated felonies,
even without intent to kill, punishable by life imprisonment at hard labor.
La. Acts 1976, No. 694, adding LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 905-905.9,
provides a new sentencing procedure in capital cases. Article 905 requires a
sentencing hearing before the death penalty may be imposed. The hearing is
held before the jury which decided the issue of guilt, and the order of
sequestration remains in effect.' 3 The "hearing shall focus on the circum-
7. 315 So. 2d at 306.
8. 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976).
9. Id. at 3007.
10. La. Acts 1976, No. 657, amending LA. R.S. 14:30 (1950) and 30.1 (Supp.
1973).
II. La. Acts 1976, No. 694, adding LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 905-905.9.
12. Id.
13. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.1, added by La. Acts 1976, No. 694. Since the
new law requires the sentencing hearing to be held before the same jury which
determines the guilt issue and requires a unanimous agreement to impose the death
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stances of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender." ' 4
Article 905.3 requires a finding of "at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance" and the jury's consideration of mitigating factors before the
death penalty can be imposed.' 5 Article 905.4 lists seven aggravating
circumstances; and Article 905.6 lists seven mitigating circumstances and
an eighth catch-all provision: "Any other relevant mitigating circum-
stance." In order to impose the death penalty, the jury must unanimously
agree; otherwise, the sentence is "life imprisonment without benefit of
probation, parole or suspension of sentence.' 6 Review of each death
sentence by the Louisiana Supreme Court is mandatory.' 7
The legislature did not pass Louisiana HOUSE BILL 1506, Regular
Session (1976), which would have provided new responsive verdicts for
first degree murder. Whether Acts 657 and 694 alone provide sufficient
guidelines for the jury to meet constitutional requirements is questionable.
Referring to Louisiana's responsive verdict provision,' 8 the United States
Supreme Court in Roberts v. Louisiana noted that it
not only lacks standards to guide the jury in selecting among first-
degree murderers, but it plainly invites the jurors to disregard their
oaths and choose a verdict for a lesser offense whenever they feel the
penalty, a problem may arise if one of the jurors becomes incapacitated and cannot
attend the sentencing hearing.
14. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.2, aaded by La. Acts 1976, No. 694. This same
language was used by the United States Supreme Court in Roberts v. Louisiana to
explain what a proper sentencing hearing should consider. 96 S. Ct. at 3006.
15. The jury is given a list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
16. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.6, added by La. Acts 1976, No. 694.
17. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 905.9, added by La. Acts 1976, No. 694. Even prior to
Act 694, defendant had the right to review, but review was not mandatory. Note also
that the Louisiana Constitution, Article V, § 5, limits the review of the Louisiana
Supreme Court in criminal cases to questions of law. It is questionable whether a
death penalty is a question of fact or one of law, though in some instances the
Louisiana Supreme Court has given a broad interpretation to "questions of law." See
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Pre-Trial
Criminal Procedure, 36 LA. L. REV. 575, 590-93 (1976); The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Postconviction Procedure, 35 LA. L. REV.
512, 512-15 (1975) and cases discussed therein.
18. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 814(A)(1). See generally The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Criminal Trial Procedure, 35 LA. L. REV.
493, 505 (1975); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973
Term-Criminal Law, 34 LA. L. REV. 332, 334 (1974) (discussions of Furman v.




death penalty is inappropriate. . . .The Louisiana procedure neither
provides standards to channel jury judgments nor permits review to
check the arbitrary exercise of the capital jury's de facto sentencing
discretion. 19
However, in Gregg v. Georgia,2 ° the Court rejected petitioner's argument
against the jury's ability to convict of a lesser included offense 2' and upheld
Georgia's capital punishment scheme, finding sufficient guidelines for the
jury and adequate review of the decision. 22 The Louisiana statute hopefully
provides sufficient guidelines as does the Georgia statute in this area. 23
POSTCONVICTION PROCEDURE
CONCURRENT SENTENCING
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 883 provides that if the
defendant is convicted of two or more offenses arising from a common act or
plan, the sentences are to run concurrently, unless the court expressly
directs otherwise. However, if the offenses do not arise from the same act or
plan, the sentences run consecutively, unless the court specifies that they
run concurrently. La. Acts 1976, No. 439, adding LA. CODE CRIM. P. art.
883.1, expands the court's power by providing in pertinent part: "The
sentencing court may specify that the sentence imposed be served concur-
rently with a sentence imposed by a federal court or a court of any other state
. ... " Unlike the scheme of article 883, the court must specify if the
multi-sovereign sentences are to run concurrently whether or not the
offenses for which they are imposed arise from a common act or plan.
Prior to Act 439, the possibility of concurrent service of multi-
sovereign sentences was questionable in Louisiana. In State v. Jones, I the
Louisiana Supreme Court indicated the possibility of such concurrent
19. 96 S. Ct. at 3007.
20. 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
21. Id. at 2937-38.
22. Id. at 2936-37.
23. Compare LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 905.3-.4, added by La. Acts 1976, No. 694
with GA. CODE § 27-2534. I (Supp. 1975) (both dealing with aggravating circumstances
for jury consideration). Both statutes list ten very similar aggravating circumstances,
and both require a jury finding of at least one such circumstance before the death
penalty may be imposed. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2936 (1976)
(discussing the attributes of the Georgia statute).
I. 285 So. 2d 231 (La. 1973).
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service when it referred to one reason for a prompt probationary hearing as
the "otherwise possible loss of having multiple sentences run concurrently
rather than consecutively." 2 However, in State v. McClanahan3 and State
ex rel. George v. Hunt,4 the court refused to allow concurrent service of a
Louisiana sentence with a federal sentence.
HABEAS CORPUS APPLICATIONS
La. Acts 1976, No. 382, amending LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 353,
addresses itself to the "persistent troublesome problem" 5 of repetitive writs
for habeas corpus relief. 6 Act 382 requires that an application for habeas
corpus relief state the factual basis of the grounds asserted, all previous
applications by the same person with regard to his present custody, and "all
errors known or discoverable by the exercise of due diligence." The final
provision of the Act states, inter alia:
In cases in which the person in custody is imprisoned after
sentence for the commission of an offense, a subsequent petition may
be dismissed if it does not allege new or different grounds for relief or,
if . . . the court finds that a failure to assert these grounds in a prior
petition is not excusable.
This final provision deals with two separate concepts: "res judicata" 7
and by-pass. If the issues raised have been alleged in a previous petition, the
application will be dismissed; if the new ground could have been raised in a
previous application and the failure to do so is inexcusable, the application
will be dismissed.8 This new law should help to relieve the problem of
identifying and disposing of repetitive writs.
2. Id. at 234.
3. 262 La. 138, 262 So. 2d 499 (1972).
4. 327 So. 2d 375 (La. 1976).
5. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 353, comment (d).
6. See also 28 U.S.C. 2244 (1948) (dealing with multiple applications for habeas
corpus relief in the federal system); 28 U. S.C. 2255 (providing in pertinent part: "The
sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for
similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.").
7. The term is not used in its technical sense, but only to indicate the situation in
which the issues have been previously determined. Res judicata is not technically
applicable in habeas corpus proceedings. See Tyler v. Henderson, 322 F. Supp. 142,
144 (D.C. La.), aff'd., 453 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1971); Townsend v. Twomey, 322 F.
Supp. 158, 173 (N.D. Ill.) rev'd on other grounds, 452 F.2d 350 (7th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 854 (1972).
8. See also Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972); Lawrence v. Henderson, 478
F.2d 705 (1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1002 (1975); Proposed Rule 9 as reported in
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 19 CRIM. L.





La. Acts 1976, No. 439, adding LA. R.S. 15:499, 500, 501 (Supp.
1976), deals with the concept generally known as "chain of evidence." The
Act provides that proof of findings by criminal laboratories may be made by
the certificate of the person in charge of the laboratory.' The certificate is
admissible in evidence in criminal cases and cases of a criminal nature in
juvenile or family court, "as prima facie proof of its contents and as prima
facie proof of proper custody of said evidence from the time of delivery to
the laboratory until the time of its removal for transport to court .... 2
However, this presumption will not apply if the opposing party summons
the maker of the certificate for cross-examination, as he has the right to do.3
Written notice of the intent to introduce such a certificate must be given at
least ten days before trial.4
Act 439 applies only to the chain of evidence during the custody of the
laboratory, and its effect is thereby limited. Furthermore, since the con-
tinuity of possession influences the weight of the evidence, as opposed to its
admissibility, 5 Louisiana courts usually find that the evidence sufficiently
establishes the chain, 6 though the presence of any chain is sometimes
difficult to imagine.7 Since the identification of evidence may already be
States Supreme Court sustained the findings of the District Court at a hearing of the
facts surrounding the by-pass, "at which transcripts of the trials and of the state
post-conviction proceedings, as well as the testimony of witnesses called by Mot-
tram, were introduced into evidence." 409 U.S. at 44. Therefore, the importance of
such a hearing to establish fact findings which will later be given a presumption of
correctness by a reviewing court is obvious.
I. La. Acts, No. 439, adding LA. R.S. 15:499 (Supp. 1976).
2. LA. R.S. 15:500 (Supp. 1976), added by La. Acts 1976, No. 439.
3. LA. R.S. 15:499 (Supp. 1976), added by La. Acts 1976, No. 439.
4. LA. R.S. 15:501 (Supp. 1976), added by La. Acts 1976, No. 439.
5. See State v. Mims, 330 So. 2d 905, 911 (La. 1976); State v. Batiste, 318 So. 2d
27, 33 (La. 1975) and cases cited therein.
6. See State v. Jones, 332 So. 2d 466 (La. 1976); State v. Mims, 330 So. 2d 905
(La. 1976); State v. Collins, 328 So. 2d 674 (La. 1976); State v. Lemoine, 319 So. 2d
911 (La. 1975); State v. Nance, 315 So. 2d 695 (La. 1975); State v. Mitchell, 311 So. 2d
888 (La. 1975); State v. Adams, 302 So. 2d 599 (La. 1974); State v. Flood, 301 So. 2d
637 (La. 1974); State v. Sarrazin, 291 So. 2d 393 (La. 1974); State v. Dotson, 260 La.
471, 256 So. 2d 594 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 913 (1972).
7. E.g., State v. Flood, 301 So. 2d 637,646-47 (La. 1974) (allowed admission of
blood which the examining physician "assumed" was taken from the victim and of
202 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37
accomplished either by testimony identifying the particular evidence or
proof of the chain of custody, 8 the actual effect of Act 439 on the
identification of evidence will probably not be extensive.
toenail and hair clippings obtained by an "unnamed person" whom the state did not
produce).
8. See State v. Collins, 328 So. 2d 674, 677 (La. 1976); State v. Dotson, 260 La.
471, 512, 256 So. 2d 5d 594, 608 (1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 913 (1972).
